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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Management scholars and practitioners have long acknowledged that 
organizational controls are an integral part of organizational functioning 
(Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long, 2010). Many of the controls emphasized by 
present-day managers and researchers have been in use for a number of 
centuries in diverse contexts ranging from ancient Chinese workplaces 
through eighteenth-century European industries to American businesses 
(Dunbar and Statler, 2010; Rindova and Starbuck, 1997). Managers exercise 
organizational controls to resolve the divergence of interests that exists 
between the managers and the organizational employees or the external 
partners (e.g., suppliers, retailers). In other words, controls help managers to 
align the interests of organizational employees and external partners with 
their interests (Das and Teng, 1998; Ouchi, 1980). The use of organizational 
controls is therefore an important aspect of the organizational life of the 
managers. 
Organizational controls refer to the process through which managers 
direct and motivate organizational employees and external partners to behave 
in ways that are in alignment with the organizational objectives (Cardinal, 
2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Controls are exercised by a controller (i.e., 
one who exercises the control), such as project manager, departmental head, 
business unit head or a client firm, over a controllee (i.e., one over whom the 
control is exercised), such as project team members, departmental 
employees, business unit employees or a vendor firm (Brenner and Ambos, 
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2013; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). While a 
large number of studies have examined organizational controls in a wide 
variety of contexts, ranging from functional tasks, such as sales (e.g., Guenzi, 
Baldauf, and Panagopoulos, 2014; Kim and Tiwana, 2017) and human 
resource management (e.g., Snell and Youndt, 1995; Voss and Brettel, 2014), 
to the management of subsidiaries (e.g., Brenner and Ambos, 2013; Grewal, 
Kumar, Mallapragada, and Saini, 2013) and outsourcing partners (e.g., Gopal 
and Gosain, 2010; Tiwana, 2008), there are still several issues that need to 
be addressed.  
First, the extant research on the relationship between the 
organizational controls and performance remains equivocal. Prior studies on 
organizational controls have provided empirical evidence that performance 
can be enhanced by employing different types of controls (Kreutzer, 
Cardinal, Walter, and Lechner, 2016; Liu, 2015). However, some studies 
have also reported that the effect of controls on performance is either 
negative or not significant (e.g., Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011; 
Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, and Roodhooft, 2012). As such, there are mixed 
findings related to the organizational controls-performance relationships. 
These contradictory findings present a dilemma for researchers and 
practitioners related to the controls that can be exercised to enhance 
performance and therefore additional empirical research is essential for 
further clarification.  
Second, managers often exercise organizational controls to 
effectively manage new product development (NPD) projects (Carbonell and 
Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011), but these 
projects can pose a special challenge for managers to effectively exercise 
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controls due to their evolving nature. Due to the evolving aspect of NPD 
projects, flexibility is essentially required in these projects to accommodate 
the evolving requirements and that can be at odds with the primary intent of 
controls, that is, behaving in a desired manner (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 
2000; Turner and Makhija, 2006). While the extant literature has posited that 
there is simultaneous need for control and flexibility in NPD projects, the 
relationship between them remains unclear (Carbonell and Rodriguez-
Escudero, 2013; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). Although the extant 
literature recognizes that controls affect flexibility, this discussion has been 
mainly implicit in prior research (Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; 
Carson, 2007; Tiwana, 2010). There is therefore very little empirical research 
on the organizational controls-flexibility relationships especially in NPD 
projects. As such, the relationship between organizational controls and 
flexibility in NPD projects remains theoretically underdeveloped.  
Third, research on controls in NPD projects has typically focused on 
the in-house NPD projects (e.g., Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; 
Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). While this research provides important 
empirical insights, it is limited in that it does not examine the influence of 
organizational controls in an inter-organizational setting where the 
organizations lack a formal managerial authority over their external partners 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). The lack of 
managerial authority can further add to the difficulty of effectively governing 
tasks that involve external partners, particularly in an outsourcing context 
(Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Moreover, the studies that have investigated 
controls in the outsourcing context have mainly focused on information 
systems (IS) development projects where the managers in both the 
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organizations that outsource the development activities and the external 
partners to whom the activities are outsourced are usually IS professionals 
(e.g., Tiwana, 2008; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). However, in NPD outsourcing, 
organizations usually outsource their NPD tasks to access the complementary 
and distinct domain knowledge of external partners (Carson, 2007). As such, 
the difference in the knowledge expertise between the managers in the two 
organizations in NPD outsourcing can be relatively higher than in IS 
development projects. Outsourcing organizations therefore can face 
difficulty in effectively specifying desired outcomes or processes associated 
with transformation of inputs into outputs to their external partners 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Therefore, the 
efficacy of organizational controls in NPD outsourcing can remarkably vary.  
Overall, investigating controls in NPD outsourcing is critical because 
our understanding related to the influence of organizational controls in NPD 
outsourcing remains limited. This research insufficiency is also remarkable 
in light of the facts that organizations exercise controls to govern their NPD 
tasks and that they also generally outsource their NPD tasks (Carson, 2007; 
Quinn, 2000; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). 
Fourth, prior controls research also suggests that various 
organizational controls can have diverse behavioral consequences, but this 
research is mostly limited to intra-organizational settings (e.g., Boss et al., 
2009; Ramaswami, 1996). As such, the empirical evidence related to the 
behavioral responses to controls in inter-organizational settings remains 
scant. This research gap is especially important considering the fact that 
inter-organizational control literature implicitly recognizes that controls can 
evoke varied behavioral responses in external partners, especially the ones 
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that are not desired. For example, Grewal et al. (2013) stated that the use of 
controls by an organization can inhibit its foreign distributor’s motivation to 
perform. Similarly, some other control studies have implicitly discussed the 
influence of organizational controls on intrinsic motivation, which refers to 
the motivation to perform an activity within a particular context (Carson, 
2007; Kreutzer et al., 2016). Since intrinsic motivation is also critical for the 
completion of NPD tasks (Amabile, 1997; Burroughs et al., 2011), 
inattention to the relationship between organizational controls and intrinsic 
motivation in NPD outsourcing also represents a critical theoretical gap. In 
sum, there are critical research gaps in the organizational controls literature, 
most notably in the context of NPD outsourcing that need to be addressed. 
This dissertation therefore aims to delve into several of these critical research 
gaps. 
 
1.1.1 Theoretical Background 
Most of the work on controls is based on the seminal work by Ouchi (1979) 
that discriminates between three prototypical organizational controls: 
outcome, behavior, and clan (Eisenhardt, 1985a; Ouchi, 1979). When 
exercising outcome control, controllers specify performance outputs, and 
evaluate controllees based on the extent to which they have achieved the 
specified outputs (Cardinal, 2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006). When 
employing behavior control, controllers specify appropriate behaviors, 
explicit procedures, or rules for controllees, and monitor and evaluate them 
based on their adherence to the specified behaviors , procedures or rules 
(Cardinal, 2001; Kirsch, 1996). Clan control is exercised by controllers using 
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socialization mechanisms that facilitate interpersonal interactions, meetings, 
and trainings with controllees (Kirsch, 1996; Turner and Makhija, 2006). 
When using clan control, controllers seek to facilitate development of shared 
values, goals, and understanding with controllees (Kirsch et al., 2010).  
As depicted in Figure 1.1, Ouchi’s (1979) framework postulates that 
the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control depends on the 
following two conditions: knowledge of the transformation process and 
outcome measurability. Knowledge of the transformation process refers to 
the controller’s understanding related to the process required to transform 
inputs into outputs (Ouchi, 1979; Snell, 1992b). If knowledge of the 
transformation process is perfect, it means that the process needed for 
transforming inputs into outputs is well understood by the controller. The 
other concept of outcome measurability refers to the extent to which the 
outputs can be clearly measured (Eisenhardt, 1985a; Ouchi, 1979). A high 
level of outcome measurability means that the controller can specify and 
measure the desired outputs.  
 
Figure 1.1. Organizational Control Framework  
     (adapted from Ouchi (1979)) 
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Traditional controls research based on Ouchi’s (1979) framework has 
emphasized singular control approach, that is, they have theoretically and 
empirically focused on a single type of control  and, as such, has advocated 
one control over the other. For example, Ouchi’s framework suggests that 
outcome control can be effectively exercised when outcome measurability is 
high. Similarly, behavior control can be effectively exercised when a 
controller’s knowledge of the transformation process is high. Clan control is 
only viable when a controller’s understanding related to the transformation 
process is lacking, and the controller cannot measure outputs effectively. 
There is considerable empirical research that provides support for the 
singular control approach (e.g., Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990; Henderson 
and Lee, 1992; Snell, 1992).  
At the time of Ouchi’s (1979) framework conceptualization, 
organizations used to be more bureaucratic in nature with clear hierarchical 
reporting relationships. Much of the work in these organizations used to 
involve identifiable goals and processes. However, the organizational 
structure and work in contemporary organizations vary greatly in design as 
they span across departments, business units, and organizations (Sitkin et al., 
2010). As such, the traditional control research that advocates a single type 
of control in a particular context is less likely to “provide a complete 
understanding of control in complex, dynamic, and uncertain organizational 
environments” (Kirsch and Choudhury, 2010, Pg. 320). Therefore, the recent 
contemporary controls research has emphasized that managers in 
contemporary organizations are more likely to use a variety of controls 
within various contexts because of evolving organizational conditions (e.g., 
Cardinal, Sitkin and Long, 2010; Kreutzer and Lechner, 2010; Kreutzer, 
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Walter and Cardinal, 2015). Hence, this dissertation follows the 
contemporary view on organizational controls that suggests employing 
multiple controls in a particular context to provide a better understanding 
related to the organizational controls (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2004; Kreutzer and 
Lechner, 2010). 
 
1.2 DISSERTATION OBJECTIVE AND OUTLINE 
The overall research goal of this dissertation was to study the effectiveness 
of the three organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) to further our 
understanding about what are the behavioral and performance 
consequences of outcome, behavior, and clan control? This research 
question is addressed by focusing on two related research objectives.  
 The first research objective of this dissertation is to provide a better 
understanding related to the effectiveness of controls, in general, by 
assessing the relationship between the three organizational controls 
(outcome, behavior, clan) and performance along with their performance 
effects in combination. To this end, Chapter 2 (Study 1) meta-analyzes the 
empirical evidence related to organizational controls-performance 
relationships and provides insights related to these relationships. Using some 
of these insights and critical gaps in the controls literature, the rest of the 
dissertation focuses on the effectiveness of controls in NPD outsourcing.  
 The second research objective of this dissertation is therefore to 
investigate the behavioral and performance consequences of the three 
organizational controls in NPD outsourcing. Accordingly, Chapter 3 (Study 
2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) examines the performance and behavioral 
implications of three controls in NPD outsourcing. Chapter 3 (Study 2) 
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investigates the influence of organizational controls and knowledge 
integration mechanisms (KIMs) on NPD project performance via supplier 
flexibility. Chapter 4 (Study 3) examines the behavioral consequences of 
controls in outsourced NPD tasks. 
 The Chapter 5 (Discussion) of this dissertation summarizes the 
overall findings and contributions of the three empirical studies. In doing so, 
this chapter also discusses the managerial implications of this dissertation 
and directions for future research. Figure 1.2 depicts the outline of the three 
empirical studies conducted in this dissertation. The relationships among the 
three empirical studies are encapsulated in the next section. The next section 
also describes in detail the research motivation and objectives of each of three 
empirical studies.  
Figure 1.2. Outline of the Studies in the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 (Study 1) 
                   
                                                         
 
       
Chapter 3 (Study 2)               Chapter 4 (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
• The Relationship of Outcome, 
Behavior, and Clan Control with 
Performance 
• Substitute vs Complementarity 
among Organizational Controls 
Organizational Controls—
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1.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OVERVIEW 
1.3.1 Research Motivation and Objectives Chapter 2 (Study 1) 
Chapter 2 (Study 1) of this dissertation meta-analyzes the relationship 
between the three organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) and 
performance (see Figure 1.2). While the research on the relationship between 
organizational controls and various performance outcomes have gained 
momentum in recent years, the empirical evidence related to the 
effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control remains inconclusive. 
Prior studies have investigated the effectiveness of three controls in a wide 
variety of organizational tasks, such as sales (e.g., Guenzi et al., 2014; Joshi 
and Randall, 2001), information systems development (e.g., Gopal and 
Gosain, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2007), human resource management (e.g., 
Snell, 1992; Snell and Youndt, 1995), and new product development (e.g. 
Bonner et al., 2002; Rijsdijk & van den Ende, 2011) across different 
organizational settings and levels (Cardinal, 2001; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). 
However, these studies have reported mixed results on the effects of 
outcome, behavior, and clan control on performance. For instance, some of 
the studies have reported positive effects of outcome control on performance 
(e.g, Tiwana, 2010), whereas other studies have reported negative or no 
effects (e.g., Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Bonner et al., 2002).  
Similarly, studies have reported mixed results for both behavior 
control-performance and clan control-performance relationships (e.g., 
Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Bello and Gilliland, 1997; Bonner et al., 2002; 
Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Moreover, the controls research also remains 
divided whether the effectiveness of one control depends on its interplay with 
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other controls. While some scholars have posited that one control decreases 
(substitutes) the effectiveness of other controls, other scholars have asserted 
that exercising one control increases (complements) the effectiveness of 
other controls (Cardinal et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1985a; Long, Burton, and 
Cardinal, 2002; Ouchi, 1979). To address these research gaps, Chapter 2 
(Study 1) therefore examines the following research questions: (a) how do 
organizational controls affect performance, and (b) do controls substitute 
or complement one another’s effects. 
The Chapter 2 (Study 1) of this dissertation also sheds light on the 
effect of several additional variables on the strength of organizational 
controls—performance relationships. First, it analyzes whether the three 
organizational controls have differential relationships with different types of 
performance outcomes (rational-goal, adaptability, process, human relations) 
and the relationship between each control and performance is moderated by 
the type of performance outcome. Second, the moderating effect of 
performance data is also analyzed because self-reported data can cause 
upward bias relative to archival data (Williams et al., 2010). Third, the 
moderating effects of organizational setting (intra- and inter-organizational), 
task type (NPD, IS development, Sales, HRM) and level of analysis (firm, 
business unit, project team, individual) are also analyzed as task 
specification, observation, and evaluation in one context can be easier than 
the others (Kirsch, 1996). Overall, Chapter 2 (Study 1) provides insights on 
the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control and that also act as 
inputs for Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3). As such, the first few 
paragraphs of the next two sections (section 1. 3.2 and section 1.3.3) discuss 
how Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) build on empirical insights 
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provided by Chapter 2 (Study 1) and existing research gaps in the controls 
literature. 
 
1.3.2 Research Motivation and Objectives Chapter 3 (Study 2) 
The meta-analytic study in Chapter 2 (Study 1) indicates that our 
understanding related to the use of organizational controls in NPD 
outsourcing is limited. In particular, the paradoxical meta-analytic results 
that outcome, behavior, and clan control generally enhance performance, but 
behavior control is not effective in NPD tasks indicate that more research 
investigating the use of controls in NPD tasks is needed. Moreover, the meta-
analytic sample indicates that present controls research has mainly focused 
on the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control in in-house NPD 
projects. This is surprising in light of the fact that organizations exercise 
controls to govern their outsourced NPD tasks (Carson, 2007). Given the 
scant empirical evidence on the effectiveness of controls in NPD 
outsourcing, the inconsistent finding that all the three controls are effective 
in inter-organizational settings further suggests that, in general, additional 
research is needed on the effectiveness of controls in inter-organizational 
settings. Overall, the aforementioned arguments suggest that additional 
research is needed to better understand the effectiveness of organizational 
controls in NPD outsourcing.  
The task requirements in NPD projects change over the course of the 
project due to the evolving nature of these projects (Iansiti, 1995; Tatikonda 
and Rosenthal, 2000). Organizations want their suppliers to flexibly respond 
to the changing requirements and therefore depend on supplier flexibility, 
which is the willingness of suppliers to respond flexibly to the changing 
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requirements of organizations (Ivens, 2005; Noordewier et al., 1990). To 
facilitate flexible behavior from suppliers, organizations need to ensure that 
its suppliers are willing to align their efforts. Alignment of efforts requires 
both cooperation (alignment of interests) and coordination (alignment of 
actions) from suppliers as suppliers may not coordinate their actions even 
when their interests are aligned with outsourcing organizations (Gulati et al., 
2005). Existing research on flexibility has focused on those determinants 
(e.g., supply management, opportunism, market uncertainty, relationship-
specific investments) of supplier flexibility that do not focus on the 
cooperation and coordination aspect independently (e.g., Chu et al., 2012; 
Ivens, 2005; Liao et al., 2010). While organizational controls have been 
recognized as mechanisms that facilitate cooperation (e.g., Turner and 
Makhija, 2006), knowledge integration mechanisms (KIMs) have been 
highlighted as mechanisms that facilitate coordination (De Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima, 2007). KIMs refer to the processes and structures that 
facilitate knowledge sharing as they enable one party to capture, articulate, 
combine, and exploit the varied knowledge and skills of other parties (Olson, 
Walker, and Ruekert, 1995; Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt, 2000). As such, Chapter 
3 (Study 2) investigates the research question, do organizational controls 
and KIMs enhance supplier flexibility in NPD outsourcing? 
Increased flexibility from suppliers can help organizations to achieve 
the desired NPD project objectives as organizations can efficiently use the 
supplier resources to respond to the changes in project requirements (Cannon 
and Homburg, 2001). In contrast, a lack of supplier flexibility can lead to 
problems such as developing a product that does not meet the outsourcing 
organization’s requirements and that can lead to lower project performance. 
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As such, supplier flexibility is critical for the success of NPD projects. 
Previous studies on the performance consequences of flexibility has either 
focused on relational outcomes such as buyer satisfaction, relationship 
quality and commitment or supply chain performance such as cost, reliability 
etc. (Ivens, 2005; Liao et al., 2010). The empirical evidence related to the 
effect of supplier flexibility on NPD project performance is therefore lacking. 
Thus, another question addressed in Chapter 3 (Study 2) is, does supplier 
flexibility influence NPD project performance? In sum, Chapter 3 (Study 
2) provides insights related to the relationship of organizational controls and 
KIM with supplier flexibility, and its effect on NPD project performance (see 
Figure) using survey data on 109 outsourced NPD projects gathered from 
clients’ managers. 
 
1.3.3 Research Motivation and Objectives Chapter 4 (Study 3) 
The findings from both the meta-analytic study in Chapter 2 (Study 1) and 
empirical studies on controls highlight that exercising various controls can 
result in distinct behavioral influences (e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1993; 
Boss et al., 2009). Korsgaard et al. (2010) have also asserted that controls 
can lead to varied behavioral consequences because different motivational 
mechanisms underlie different types of control. Although there is some 
research about behavioral responses to controls in intra-organizational 
settings (e.g., Boss et al., 2009; Ramaswami, 1996), they do not capture the 
characteristics of an inter-organizational setting that involves weaker 
managerial authority.  
 Further, scholars have implicitly asserted that the use of controls can 
evoke diverse behavioral responses in external partners, especially the ones 
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that are not desirable. For example, Tiwana and Keil (2007) suggest that a 
client’s emphasis on explicit procedures that suppliers need to follow can 
result in its suppliers faithfully following the specified procedures such that 
the suppliers sometimes do not use their own idiosyncratic expertise due to 
fear of non-compliance. Therefore, notwithstanding that organizational 
controls are used extensively in outsourcing (e.g., Tiwana, 2010; Tiwana and 
Keil, 2007), existing empirical research on the behavioral responses to 
organizational controls in outsourcing remains scarce.  
To address this void in the controls research, Chapter 4 (Study 3) 
explores the behavioral consequences of organizational controls in the 
outsourcing context, particularly, NPD outsourcing. Organizations that 
outsource their NPD tasks want their suppliers to comply with prescribed 
outcomes and procedures, but they also want them to leverage their 
complementary expertise to a greater extent for successful completion of 
outsourced NPD tasks. Further, intrinsic motivation plays a critical role in 
completion of NPD tasks as it enhances creative behavior and problem-
solving capabilities (Amabile, 1997; Burroughs et al., 2011). As such, 
suppliers lack of use of idiosyncratic expertise and their lower intrinsic 
motivation can greatly impact outsourced tasks completion (Carson, 2007; 
Tiwana and Keil, 2007).  
Chapter 4 (Study 3) therefore examines the influence of organizational 
controls on two behavioral consequences (supplier mechanical compliance 
and intrinsic motivation). Specifically, Chapter 4 (Study 3) examines the 
research question, what are the effects of various organizational controls 
on supplier mechanical compliance and intrinsic motivation? Supplier 
mechanical compliance refers to the extent to which a supplier adheres to the 
Chapter 1 
 
16 
 
specified prescriptions without sometimes using its own idiosyncratic 
expertise, whereas intrinsic motivation refers to the intent of a supplier to 
perform the outsourced tasks to experience satisfaction and enjoyment 
inherent in the tasks (Chae et al., 2017; Tiwana and Keil, 2007).  
Research on controls has stressed that outcome and behavior controls 
function through extrinsic motivation by emphasizing compliance with 
explicit outcomes and procedures (Stouthuysen et al., 2012; Tiwana, 2008). 
In contrast, clan control promotes intrinsic motivation through internalization 
of values, norms, and beliefs (Cardinal et al., 2004; Korsgaard et al., 2010). 
Self-determination theory (SDT) theory posits that different regulatory 
processes underlie extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 
Ryan and Deci, 2000b). These regulatory processes range from passive 
compliance based on the avoidance of non-compliance to external 
prescriptions (extrinsic motivation) to active commitment based on the 
inherent enjoyment and interest (intrinsic motivation) (Ryan and Deci, 
2000b). Using SDT, Chapter 4 (Study 3) therefore asserts that outcome and 
behavior control that draw on extrinsic motivation can induce supplier 
mechanical compliance, but diminish intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, 
clan control that draws on intrinsic motivation not only reduces mechanical 
compliance, but also enhances intrinsic motivation. The hypothesized 
relationships are examined using survey data on 114 outsourced projects 
gathered from suppliers’ managers as the hypotheses focus on understanding 
how the controls are perceived by those (in this case suppliers) that are 
subjected to them and, as such, stimulate their behavioral responses, such as 
compliance and intrinsic motivation (Korsgaard et al., 2010; Long, 2010; 
Weibel, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 2 
Organizational Controls and Performance Outcomes: A Meta-Analytic 
Assessment and Extension1 
 
ABSTRACT  
Managing employees and external partners effectively has been a primary 
concern for organizations and their managers. Many studies have 
investigated the effectiveness of organizational controls in a wide variety of 
contexts. Using organizational controls literature that discriminates among 
outcome, behavior, and clan control, this study synthesizes the research on 
the effectiveness of these controls. In particular, the study examines 23,839 
organizational controls–performance relationships from 120 independent 
samples, and tests several new hypotheses using advanced meta-analytic 
methods. The results indicate that outcome, behavior, and clan controls 
generally enhance performance, with each control having a distinct 
performance effect. Our analysis also demonstrates that controls function as 
complements to one another. This finding indicates that one form of control 
increases the effectiveness of other forms of control. We also examine the 
organizational controls–performance relationships across various contexts, 
and our results show that they vary according to the type of task. The paper 
concludes with a discussion on the theoretical and managerial implications 
of these findings. 
                                                 
1 This chapter has been published as Sihag, V. and Rijsdijk, S. A. (2019) ‘Organizational 
controls and performance outcomes: A meta‐analytic assessment and extension’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 56(1), pp. 91–133. doi: 10.1111/joms.12342. 
Earlier version of this chapter were presented at the below mentioned conferences: 
• Sihag, V., Rijsdijk, S.A. (May, 2016): “The Effectiveness of Organizational Controls: 
A Meta-Analysis”. In Journal of Management Studies Conference on Special Issue on 
Meta-analysis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA. 
• Sihag, V., Rijsdijk, S.A. (August, 2016): “The Effectiveness of Organizational 
Controls: A Meta-Analysis”. In Operaions Management Division, Annual Meeting of 
the Academy of Management, Anaheim, USA. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizational controls are “integral to the way in which organizations 
function” (Cardinal et al., 2010, p. 51). They are exercised by controllers 
(e.g., project managers, client firms, business unit heads) over controllees 
(e.g., project team members, suppliers, business unit members). Controls are 
defined as any process through which controllers motivate and direct 
controllees to behave in ways that are aligned with the controllers’ objectives 
(Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 2004). In the absence of organizational 
controls, or when controls are used inappropriately, controllees are assumed 
to act in ways that favor their own interests and objectives that are not 
necessarily in line with the controllers’ objectives (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The organizational controls literature specifies three prototypical 
types of control: outcome, behavior, and clan (Ouchi, 1979; Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). Outcome and behavior controls focus on the specification 
and evaluation of desired task outcomes and behaviors. Clan controls involve 
socialization and input (e.g., selection and training) mechanisms for 
influencing controllees’ behavior (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 1996). A 
growing body of research on organizational controls has investigated how 
organizational controls shape performance in various empirical settings. 
These studies generally assert that controls increase performance, as they 
limit the extent to which controllees act in their own self-interest and behave 
opportunistically (Ouchi, 1979). However, two issues still remain that need 
to be addressed to advance our understanding of the organizational controls-
performance landscape. 
First, the empirical evidence for the assertion that organizational 
controls increase performance remains equivocal (Cardinal, Kreutzer, and 
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Miller, 2017). Some studies report that controls have a positive effect on 
performance (e.g., Liu, 2015), while other studies report that they are 
ineffective (Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Specifically, there have been 
contradictory findings in previous studies as to how outcome, behavior, and 
clan controls affect performance. For instance, several studies have reported 
that outcome control has a positive effect on performance (e.g., Liu, 2015; 
Tiwana, 2008), whereas other studies have found that the effect of outcome 
control on performance is insignificant or negative (e.g., Aulakh et al., 1996; 
Bonner et al., 2002). Similarly, mixed findings exist with regard to the effects 
of behavior and clan controls (e.g., Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Bello and 
Gilliland, 1997; Bonner et al., 2002; Tiwana, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). 
Therefore, additional empirical evidence is necessary to understand whether 
and to what extent organizational controls are related to performance. 
Second, the performance effect of one control may depend on its 
interplay with another control. Some researchers have taken a singular view 
of control and suggest the use of single form of control over another to 
achieve the desired performance (Cardinal et al., 2017) – for example, 
behavior control rather than outcome control or clan control rather than 
behavior control. In other words, researchers have historically advocated that 
different controls function as substitutes, and that using one type of control 
decreases the effectiveness of the others (Eisenhardt, 1985a; Ouchi, 1979). 
Contemporary researchers have taken a holistic view of control and advocate 
that different controls jointly influence performance. Specifically, what these 
researchers have suggested is that the different controls function as 
complements, and that exercising one type of control makes the other controls 
more effective (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2015; Long et al., 2002). In a recent 
Chapter 2 
 
22 
 
review, Cardinal et al. (2017) also suggested that we still have only a limited 
understanding of control configurations that commonly exist in organizations 
and how different controls combine with each other. From a managerial 
perspective, achieving the desired performance is strongly dependent on the 
types of control exercised by managers (Cardinal et al., 2017; Kirsch, 1996). 
The current ambivalent findings on the interplay of outcome, behavior, and 
clan controls are likely to confuse managers. Clarification of whether and 
how different controls interact with each other to improve performance is 
therefore needed. 
In sum, the present study addresses two primary research questions: 
(a) How do organizational controls affect performance, and (b) Do controls 
substitute or complement one another’s effects? To investigate these 
questions, we need to meta-analyze the organizational controls–performance 
relationships found in prior research. Meta-analysis allows conflicting 
empirical findings to be reconciled by calculating effect sizes from existing 
empirical observations using weighted average techniques (Hedges and 
Olkin, 1985; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). This method not only provides a 
rigorous assessment of a relationship as it corrects for the distorting effects 
of statistical artifacts, but it also facilitates theory extension by throwing light 
on how different controls combine with each other with the help of meta-
analytic path analysis (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
This study therefore contributes to current controls research as 
follows. It provides rigorously derived discrete estimates for the three 
controls–performance relationships. This also allows us to assess how much 
controls matter. Consolidating the relationship between the three 
organizational controls and performance across different organizational 
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settings provides a broader and more complete picture of the relationships. 
Further, since meta-analysis helps in addressing open research questions with 
data that are more proximate to the general population than those supplied in 
an individual primary study (Eden, 2002), this study makes a substantial 
contribution to the ongoing debate in the organizational controls literature on 
the interplay among individual controls. By focusing on the interplay among 
the three controls, we are able to move controls research forward by 
providing greater clarity on whether the different types of control are more 
or less effective when combined. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Organizational controls are defined as any process through which controllers 
motivate and direct controllees to behave in ways that are aligned with the 
controllers’ objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; Turner and Makhija, 2006). The 
organizational controls literature discriminates among three prototypical 
controls: outcome, behavior, and clan.[1] Controllers (who exercise control) 
can use outcome, behavior, and clan controls to motivate the controllees 
(those over whom the control is exercised) to achieve the desired 
performance (Kirsch, 1996; Tiwana, 2008).  
 
2.2.1 Organizational Controls and Performance 
Controllers exercising outcome controls specify quantitative performance 
objectives and reward controllees based on the extent to which they achieve 
those objectives (Cardinal, 2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006). To exercise 
outcome control effectively, the controller does not need to understand the 
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process by which inputs are transformed into outputs (Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 
1979). Also, outcome control does not require controllers to monitor 
controllees’ behavior closely, and controllers can thus save time and 
resources (Kreutzer et al., 2015). The hands-off approach of outcome control 
therefore makes it an efficient form of control. Some scholars have argued 
that this hands-off approach may also result in a disconnect between 
controllers and controllees (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Kreutzer et al., 
2015). However, others have argued that the hands-off approach allows 
controllees discretion in terms of how they behave and this can give them a 
greater sense of commitment and engagement (e.g., Snell, 1992). Outcome 
control therefore leads to higher performance as it incentivizes controllees 
and holds them accountable for achieving the specified goals. Outcome 
control also gives controllees flexibility and motivation as it allows them 
discretion to select their own ways of achieving the specified goals (Kreutzer 
et al., 2015). 
In outcome control, controllers can review the activities completed 
by controllees and provide feedback so that they can take corrective actions 
or make further improvements (Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; 
Liu, 2015). Outcome control therefore enables controllees to deliver 
efficiently on the requirements specified by the controller. In addition, it 
helps in specifying clear and unambiguous goals and requirements. Control 
researchers have asserted that controllees who are given clear performance 
goals adopt appropriate behavior to achieve the specified goals (Bonner et 
al., 2002; Kirsch, 1997). This perspective on controls is also supported by 
path–goal and agency theory that discuss the positive influence of setting 
straightforward goals (Eisenhardt, 1989; House, 1971). Thus, specifying 
Chapter 2 
 
25 
 
appropriate goals helps to align controllees’ interests with controllers’ 
objectives and thus enables the desired performance to be achieved. We 
therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: Outcome control is positively related to performance. 
 
In behavior control, controllers emphasize procedures and rules that 
controllees are expected to follow while doing their assigned tasks and they 
evaluate controllees’ performance on how they adhere to the prescribed 
procedures (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 1996). Different tasks involve a 
certain level of ambiguity and complexity that could hamper controllees’ 
ability to finish them on time or within budget. Controllers aim to mitigate 
these inefficiencies by exercising behavior control as they encase 
controllees’ tasks with standardized development practices. Standardized 
development methods help to reduce errors and ensure consistency in the 
procedures followed to complete tasks (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). Prescribing specific methodologies and procedures also 
helps in providing guidance and direction to controllees throughout the entire 
process (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). Thus, behavior control improves the 
consistency of controllees’ work. 
Some scholars have suggested that some controllers do not have 
sufficient foresight and knowledge and thus do not understand fully the 
process by which inputs are transformed into outputs. These controllers may 
therefore find it difficult to specify effective procedures that controllees need 
to follow (Hendry, 2002; Kirsch et al., 2002). Also, even with the right 
knowledge of the transformation process, monitoring controllees’ behavior 
involves substantial time and cost (Eisenhardt, 1985b). Despite these 
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disadvantages, researchers assert that behavior control involves dynamic 
involvement from controllers as they need to actively provide input on the 
behaviors that controllees need to follow in order to complete various tasks 
(Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000). Such active involvement signals that the 
controller is committed to the activity. This not only helps to create an active 
dialogue between controllers and controllees, but also fosters commitment 
from controllees (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002; Kreutzer et al., 2015). Thus, 
behavior control motivates controllees to follow the specified procedures and 
achieve the desired performance. In line with these arguments, we propose 
that: 
Hypothesis 1b: Behavior control is positively related to performance. 
 
Clan control refers to the mechanisms used by controllers to ensure 
that controllees embrace common values and goals and commit to shared 
objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch et al., 2010).[2] Examples of such 
mechanisms include socialization approaches such as social events, off-site 
meetings, and casual lunches or dinners (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; 
Kirsch et al., 2010) or input mechanisms such as selection, training, and 
development procedures (Snell and Youndt, 1995). These mechanisms 
allows beliefs, values, and norms to be transmitted by the controller to the 
controllees. Thus, socialization mechanisms help in cultivating a common 
understanding and language between them (Kirsch, 1996; Liu, 2015). Shared 
understanding and values provide a rich, broad implicit guide to controllees 
as to what is considered by the controller to be acceptable or deviant behavior 
without the controller formally monitoring whether controllees are adhering 
to acceptable behaviors (Kirsch et al., 2010). Unlike outcome and behavior 
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control, clan control relies on common values and norms to put pressure on 
controllees to conform to acceptable behaviors (Barker, 1993; Kirsch et al., 
2010). As such, clan control helps to guide controllees toward actions and 
behaviors that ensure the desired performance is achieved. 
Clan control also promotes mutual trust and interests through social 
interactions (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Huang et al., 2005). The 
increase in positive mutual expectations and interests further motivates 
controllees to commit to their relationship with controllers and encourages 
cooperative behavior from them (Das and Teng, 2001; Sengun and Wasti, 
2009). Clan control therefore plays an important role in fostering mutual 
working relationships between controllers and controllees. Past research has 
also shown that shared interests and understanding between controllers and 
controllees lead to improved decision making and on-time completion of 
tasks (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 1996). Furthermore, clan 
control through input approaches ensures rigorous selection and training of 
controllees (Snell and Youndt, 1995). Through training controllees acquire 
the right knowledge and skills to understand diverse perspectives and 
internalize the controller’s values and goals (Cardinal, 2001; Liao, 2006). In 
sum, clan control facilitates the transmission of common beliefs, values, and 
understanding, and these help in achieving the desired performance. We 
therefore propose that:  
Hypothesis 1c: Clan control is positively related to performance. 
 
2.2.2 Organizational Controls: Substitutes or Complements? 
The interplay among the three organizational controls has been a topic of 
considerable debate in the controls literature (Cardinal et al., 2017; Tiwana, 
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2010). Specifically, existing research on outcome, behavior, and clan 
controls is divided about whether the three controls substitute or complement 
each other in explaining performance. Controls function as substitutes when 
one control reduces the effectiveness of other controls. Conversely, they 
function as complements when one control reinforces the effectiveness of 
other controls (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Siggelkow, 2002; Tiwana, 
2010). 
 Scholars advancing a substitutes perspective take a “singular” 
approach and have implicitly advocated the use of one form of control rather 
than multiple forms (Cardinal et al., 2017, pg. 22). They contend that 
exercising multiple organizational controls simultaneously creates 
redundancies and inefficiencies, thus weakening the impact of individual 
controls on performance. For example, Rijsdijk and van den Ende (2011) 
postulate that using clan control and behavior control as complements is 
“inefficient”, because clan control weakens the positive influence of 
behavior control on performance “as both types of controls are relatively 
communication-intensive” (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011, p. 876). Clan 
control can replace behavior control as both perform the same function of 
reducing the ambiguity surrounding the behaviors that controllees need to 
follow (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990). There is therefore no need for one 
control if another can be exercised. The simultaneous use of behavior and 
clan control that rely on active communication between a controller and a 
controllee can therefore be inefficient. Similarly, Tiwana (2010) posits that 
exercising clan control with outcome control is not beneficial, since the 
information needed to exercise outcome control effectively can be measured 
reliably without requiring clan control. 
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Empirical studies have used contingency-based theoretical arguments 
to emphasize the substitute perspective, that is, that only one type of control 
is effective in a given context (Cardinal et al., 2017). The contingency view 
builds on Ouchi’s (1979) framework where it is argued that outcome control 
should be exercised when outputs can be clearly specified and measured by 
a controller, and behavior control should be exercised when a controller 
understands the process required to transform inputs into outputs. When the 
outcomes are not measurable and controllers also do not have sufficient 
understanding of how inputs can be transformed into outputs, clan control is 
suggested to be an effective form of control.  
Scholars have also used other theories and empirical arguments to 
suggest that different forms of control act as substitutes (e.g., Nidumolu and 
Subramani, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Using transaction cost theory as 
a theoretical foundation, some scholars have posited that exercising multiple 
forms of control is costly and they advocate the use of one control over the 
other, based on the costs of specification, measurement, and evaluation. 
Some other scholars have used agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) to argue 
that, as tasks become more complex and ambiguous, a controller must then 
exercise behavior control instead of outcome control as controllees are 
typically risk-averse, and exercising outcome control would shift the risk 
unnecessarily on to the controllees. Scholars have also posited that exercising 
multiple controls simultaneously can prove counterproductive as it signals a 
lack of trust to controllees, who are thereby encouraged to engage in 
opportunistic and other undesirable behaviors (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; 
Tiwana, 2010).  
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 In contrast, contemporary scholars who suggest a complements 
perspective argue for a “holistic” approach and have focused on 
understanding how different forms of control jointly influence performance 
(Cardinal et al., 2017, pg. 24). Specifically, they have focused on blending 
different types of control to achieve the desired performance (e.g., Cardinal 
et al., 2004; Long et al., 2002), and have described the singular view of 
control as problematic because it does not reflect actual controller–controllee 
settings that are often dynamic and complex and involve various forms of 
control (Cardinal et al., 2017; Kreutzer et al., 2016, 2015). They suggest 
instead that a holistic approach allows for a greater variety of control and 
provides a better reflection of actual controller–controllee settings. 
Therefore, a complements perspective allows us to understand better how the 
combination of different forms of control is greater than the sum of the single 
control mechanisms.  
Empirical studies investigating the complements perspective posit 
that each control addresses the limitations of the other controls and thereby 
improves performance. For example, Kreutzer et al. (2015) argue that 
outcome and behavior controls jointly improve the performance of strategic 
organizational initiatives by mitigating one another’s disadvantages. 
Similarly, Tiwana (2010) argues that clan controls create an environment in 
which controllees freely share information about specified behaviors and the 
effectiveness of behavior control is thereby increased. Further, the 
communication between controller and controllee while behavior control is 
being exercised can also facilitate interpersonal relationships between them, 
and this can establish conditions that are favorable for effective clan control 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 2004).  
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Scholars also argue that exercising outcome and behavior controls 
provide extrinsic motivation for controllees and that clan controls provide 
intrinsic motivation by internalizing group traditions, values, and norms 
(Kirsch, 1996; Merchant, 1985). Using all three types of control motivates 
controllees to achieve prescribed outputs and behaviors and at the same time 
reduces their tendency to show ineffective behaviors. Therefore, 
investigating different forms of control together provides a better 
understanding of how controllers can manage dynamic, fluid, and complex 
managerial challenges effectively.   
Some scholars argue for a substitutes view in which controls weaken 
the performance effects of other controls, while other scholars support the 
complements view in which controls strengthen the performance effects of 
those other controls. To reflect this lack of consensus, we propose two 
competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Outcome, behavior, and clan controls weaken one 
another’s effects on performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Outcome, behavior, and clan controls strengthen one 
another’s effects on performance. 
 
2.3 METHODS 
2.3.1 Literature Search and Inclusion Criteria 
The objective of our data collection was to identify all studies that 
investigated organizational control–performance relationships. To retrieve 
the relevant studies for the meta-analysis, we used the following search 
strategies. First, we used Boolean combinations of relevant keywords to 
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explore five electronic databases: (1) ABI/INFORM, (2) ISI Web of 
Knowledge, (3) EBSCO, (4) Google Scholar, and (5) JSTOR. The keywords 
used were “outcome control”, “output control”, “market control”, “results 
control”, “behavior control”, “process control”, “action control”, 
“bureaucratic control”, “clan control”, “cultural control”, “social control”, 
“personnel control”, “input control”, “formal control”, and “informal 
control”. We specified no start date and the search included studies published 
up till May 2017. We excluded those studies that included keywords such as 
conceptual, case study (or studies), review, or synthesis in their abstract. 
Second, we explored and traced the reference lists of all the studies identified 
using Google Scholar, especially the seminal article by Ouchi (1979) and the 
review article by Cardinal et al. (2017). Third, we searched the proceedings 
of conferences (e.g., Academy of Management Proceedings), Research Gate, 
and the Open Access Theses and Dissertation Database as well as the 
Research Gate discussion forum and a variety of electronic listservs (e.g., 
AOM’s Organization and Management Theory Division) to identify 
unpublished manuscripts. 
Four criteria were used to select the studies for our meta-analysis. 
First, a study had to include at least one measure of any of the three 
organizational controls and one measure of performance. A common 
problem faced by meta-analytic researchers is how to deal with constructs 
that are labeled differently but have identical measures and constructs that 
are labeled identically across studies. To address this problem, Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001) suggest defining appropriately the focal constructs and 
measurements used in various studies that make use of these definitions. 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the focal construct definitions that are consistent with 
prior literature and some of the representative measures.  
Second, studies had to report the sample size and correlations or other 
statistics (e.g., t or F statistics) needed to calculate correlations among the 
organizational controls and performance outcome(s) (Hunter and Schmidt, 
2004). Third, the unit of analysis for the meta-analytic research needed to be 
the individual sample and not the individual effect size (Hedges and Olkin, 
1985). Therefore, if multiple measures of one or more controls (e.g., 
monitoring, directing, evaluating, and rewarding) or one or more 
performance outcomes (e.g., quality and project efficiency) were used in a 
single study, and separate correlations were reported for those measures, the 
correlations were averaged to calculate a single estimate for the study 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). However, if effect sizes for multiple countries 
were reported, they were considered as different samples and were included 
as individual effect sizes. Fourth, to avoid the problem of conceptual 
replication (Geyskens et al., 2006) we ascertained that all studies were 
independent and had no overlapping samples. Our sample contained nine sets 
of studies that had overlapping samples.[3] Thus, we examined these sets of 
studies for duplication following the detection heuristic provided by Wood 
(2008). While five sets of studies with duplicate datasets were coded 
separately as they examined either different constructs or measures, two 
published studies and one PhD dissertation were marked as duplicate as four 
sets of studies appeared to use similar data, construct, and measures.[4] 
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Table 2.1. Definition of Study Constructs and Representative Measures 
Construct Definition and Representative Measures 
Outcome 
Control 
 
Construct Definition: Control where the controller specifies 
performance outputs, standards, or goals, and monitors and evaluates 
controllees’ performance relative to those outputs or goals (Cardinal, 
2001; Kirsch, 2004). 
Representative Measures: Our company establishes specific and 
clear performance objectives for the service provider (Stouthuysen et 
al., 2012); The client placed significant weight on accomplishing 
project goals (Tiwana, 2008). 
Behavior 
Control 
Construct Definition: Control where the controller specifies 
appropriate behaviors, explicit procedures, or rules for the controllee, 
and monitors and evaluates controllees based on their performance 
relative to specified behaviors or procedures (Cardinal, 2001; Turner 
and Makhija, 2006). 
Representative Measures: The project followed documented 
processes for software development (Gopal and Gosain, 2010); 
Upper management specified procedures used by the team (Bonner 
et al., 2002). 
Clan Control Construct Definition: Control where the controller relies upon 
informal interactions to achieve shared values and norms among the 
controllees, and within the group to which they are affiliated. The 
controller also relies on input mechanisms such as selection and value 
training to guide and influence controllee behaviors (Cardinal et al., 
2010; Kirsch et al., 2010). 
Representative Measures: There was a strong community feeling 
between myself and the team members (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 
2011); we often have social meetings where our firm managers and 
foreign agents interact with each other (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000); 
Managers received substantial formal training (task-related 
knowledge, e.g., market knowledge) before they assumed 
responsibility in growth initiatives (Kreutzer et al., 2015). 
Performance Construct Definition: Multi-dimensional measures that include self-
reported evaluations and archival records of goal accomplishments. 
Representative Measures: Adherence to schedules, overall 
effectiveness, overall efficiency (Tiwana and Keil, 2007); Customer 
satisfaction, market share, profitability (Baldauf et al., 2001b). 
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Altogether, these procedures yielded 23,893 observations from 120 datasets 
across 108 studies. These studies were based on various levels of analysis, 
including individual, business unit, and firm, with firm being the most 
prevalent level of analysis. The 108 studies are reported in Appendix 2.1. 
The literature search and selection process are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.3.2 Coding  
To code for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c we obtained three statistics from each 
study: sample size, correlation coefficients of the three organizational 
controls with performance, and reliability levels for the three organizational 
controls and performance. We used the composite reliability or Cronbach’s 
alpha to represent reliability. If a study did not report one of these two 
indicators, we used the average reliability to replace the missing values 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). If studies reported multiple measures for a 
construct, we averaged the correlations and reliability measures to yield a 
single estimate and each sample is only represented once (Hunter and 
Schmidt, 2004).  
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we also needed correlations among the 
three organizational controls. We therefore also obtained the correlations 
among outcome, behavior, and clan control measures. Also, controls 
researchers generally suggest that a large organization has more means with 
which to achieve the desired performance (Gencturk and Aulakh, 1995; 
Kreutzer et al., 2015), and firm size is therefore an important control variable. 
To this end, we also obtained correlations of firm size with the three 
organizational controls and performance. 
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Final sample. (108 studies) 
 
Is sample independent? 
(Nine sets of studies with 
overlapping samples) 
Exclude 
3 studies 
 
Step 3: Manual search of journals identified in first two steps. (52 
studies) 
 
Step 4 and 5: Conference proceedings, research gate, and open access 
theses and dissertation database along with research gate discussion 
form. (5 studies) 
 
Do construct definitions conform to 
Table 2.1 and does study report 
required empirical statistics? 
Exclude 
1742 
studies 
 
Total: 1853 studies 
Total: 1848 studies 
Total: 1796 studies 
Electronic databases: ABI/INFORM, ISI Web of Knowledge, 
EBSCO, Google Scholar, and JSTOR 
Step 1- Keywords involving control and performance  
 
Total: 4726 studies 
Step 2-Keywords for exclusion, such as, conceptual, case study 
(/studies), review, and synthesis 
Exclude 2876 
studies 
 
Figure 2.1. Literature search and selection process 
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Using the definitions of three control constructs provided in Table 2.1 
and focusing also on how the control constructs were measured, we 
categorized the organizational controls of the various studies into outcome, 
behavior, and clan controls. For example, Menguc and Barker (2003) use 
‘incentive pay’ as an outcome control. The construct measures the amount of 
incentives paid to salespeople when they meet performance targets and is in 
line with the definition of outcome control as described in Table 2.1. 
Outcome controls included construct labels such as output control, results 
control, outcome-based control, financial control, incentive pay, outcome-
based incentives, and use of outcome controls. Behavior controls consisted 
of construct labels such as process control, behavior-based control, action 
control, supervisor monitoring, activity control, and capability control. Clan 
controls covered construct labels such as social control, informal control, 
clan culture, professional control, relational governance, and formal and 
informal socialization mechanisms. Appendix 2.1 provides an overview of 
the studies used in this meta-analysis and the labels they employed. 
 We also coded several additional variables that might play a role in 
determining the strength of the organizational controls–performance 
relationships. First, the three organizational controls may play different roles 
in enhancing different types of performance outcome (Cardinal et al., 2017). 
We therefore coded all the performance measures into the four categories of 
performance outcome proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) and 
adopted by Cardinal et al. (2017): rational goal, process, adaptability, and 
human relations outcomes. Rational goal outcomes concern efficiency and 
productivity measured in terms of, for example, speed, quality, financial 
performance, and other outcomes that are of interest to customers, 
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shareholders, and partners. Process outcomes concern order, and 
corresponding measures therefore consider the quality of coordination, 
cooperation, and information flows. Adaptability focuses on the capabilities 
required for long-term survival, and representative measures include, for 
example, innovation, flexibility, and learning orientation. Human relations 
outcomes concern employee wellbeing and growth, and are captured by 
measures such as employee satisfaction, relationship quality, and 
commitment. For studies that reported several performance outcomes, we 
obtained all the performance outcomes and coded them separately. 
Second, we coded the nature of the performance data used in the 
individual samples as either self-reported or archival. Compared to archival 
data, self-reported data may cause a potential upward bias (Williams et al., 
2010). Archival measures often have a lower reliability and act as unrefined 
proxies that are subject to many factors, while self-reported perceptual 
measures tend to be more fine-grained (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986). We therefore coded the performance data variable as self-reported 
(coded as 0) or archival (coded as 1).  
Third, researchers have argued that task and outcome information 
may be more difficult to transmit in inter-organizational settings than in 
intra-organizational settings, because in inter-organizational settings the 
controller and controllees are part of different organizations and information 
has to be transmitted across organizational boundaries (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). We therefore coded whether the 
organizational setting of a specific study was intra-organizational (coded as 
‘0’) or inter-organizational (coded as ‘1’) or both (coded as ‘2’). For example, 
the study by Kreutzer et al. (2015) is coded as ‘0’ as it investigates the 
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management of strategic initiatives within organizations and the controller 
and controllee are part of the same organization. The study by Wallenburg 
and Schäffler (2014) is coded as ‘1’ as it focuses on the management of 
horizontal alliances and the controller and controllee are part of separate 
organizations. The study by Tiwana and Keil (2009) examines the 
effectiveness of controls in both internal (intra-organizational) and 
outsourced (inter-organizational) systems development projects. The study 
does not provide correlation coefficients separately for these two subsamples 
and is therefore coded as ‘2’. 
Fourth, we coded the nature of the task being carried out by the 
controllee as some tasks can be more easily specified, observed, and 
evaluated than others (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996). We 
classified each study according to the particular type of task involved (e.g., 
new product development (NPD), information systems (IS) development, 
sales, human resource management (HRM), etc.) and labeled this variable as 
task type. For instance, a study was coded as NPD when it focused on 
activities associated with identifying and transforming customer needs into 
new products or as Sales when it focused on tasks associated with selling and 
distribution activities.  
Fifth, controls researchers have argued that the level of analysis is 
important when investigating organizational controls as outcomes, 
behaviors, and culture vary across organizational levels (Cardinal, 2001; 
Ouchi, 1977). As such, we coded the variable level of analysis into four main 
categories: firm (coded as ‘0’), business unit (coded as ‘1’), project team 
(coded as ‘2’), and individual (coded as ‘3’).  
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Measurement quality is important for meta-analytic research as it 
involves coding of measures based on judgements. (Orwin and Vevea, 2009; 
Perreault, Leigh, and Leigh, 1989). Each study was therefore coded 
independently by two coders. After data collection, we used Perreault and 
Leigh’s (1989) method for calculating the interrater reliability index.[5] This 
method provides more accurate estimates of chance agreement and corrects 
for problems associated with Cohen’s kappa as it does not rely on marginal 
frequencies. The reliability index estimates of the coders ranged from 0.93 
to 0.98 for different constructs. Therefore, the reliability of the coding 
process is more than sufficient. The coding differences were resolved 
through discussion. The resulting data were used for meta-analytic 
calculations. 
 
2.3.3 Meta-Analytic Procedures 
To test Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c, we applied a random-effects model to 
compute the sample-size-weighted mean estimates (r) and the reliability-
corrected mean estimates (𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) of the correlations (r) between organizational 
controls and performance. We used reliability-corrected mean estimates for 
interpretation as effect sizes reported in an individual study are subject to 
measurement error (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). We 
used the ‘metafor’ package in R to perform random-effects model analysis 
using three steps (Viechtbauer, 2010). First, Fisher’s Zr transformation was 
used to transform the correlation estimates to minimize skewness in the effect 
size distribution due to standard error formulation (Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001). Secondly, each transformed effect size was weighted by its inverse 
variance weight to account for sample-size-related differences in precision 
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(sampling error) across effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 2009; Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001). The rationale is that an effect size obtained from a study with 
a large sample size offers greater precision than an effect size obtained from 
a study with a small sample size (Ellis, 2006; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
The inverse variance weight was also used to calculate confidence and 
credibility intervals for assessing the significance and distribution of effect 
sizes respectively (Whitener, 1990). Thirdly, the meta-analytic mean was 
transformed back into the standard correlation form for ease of interpretation 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). 
We used Q and I2 statistics to examine the heterogeneity in effect size 
distribution (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Sagie and Koslowsky, 1993). The Q 
statistic tests for the existence of heterogeneity and is calculated by 
computing the sum of squared deviation of each study’s effect size from the 
mean effect size and weighting the contribution of each study by its 
invariance (Borenstein et al., 2009). The I2 estimates indicate the meta-
analytic sample and are computed by comparing the Q statistic value with its 
degrees of freedom (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). In the case of 
heterogeneity, mean effect sizes are best interpreted as an average rather than 
as a common true correlation value, which implies that further moderator 
analyses are required (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
While estimating the weighted mean effect sizes, we also checked for 
outliers and publication bias as both may affect the effect sizes obtained 
(Borenstein et al., 2009; Viechtbauer and Cheung, 2010). We used 
studentized deleted residuals along with Cook’s distances and COVRATIO 
values to identify potential outliers (Viechtbauer and Cheung, 2010). These 
diagnostics measure how excluding the observed effect size of a particular 
Chapter 2 
 
42 
 
study affects the mean effect size. It is important to note that an outlier model 
might not have a significant impact on the results, and exclusion should only 
be considered when it brings about significant changes in the fitted model. 
While no outlier was found for clan control, one outlier was identified for 
outcome control and one for behavior control. However, we checked the 
robustness of mean effect size estimations by including and excluding the 
outlier correlation coefficients and there was no substantial change in the 
estimates. 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we used the meta-analytic structural 
equation modeling (MASEM) procedure for path analysis. In this two-stage 
method (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Cheung and Chan, 2005), we first 
calculated the ten sample sizes and reliability-corrected mean correlations 
among organizational controls, performance, and firm size using the random-
effects procedure to create a correlation matrix. Since sample size varied 
across the intercorrelations, we used the harmonic mean to calculate the 
sample size required for the second stage (Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995). In 
the second stage, we carried out the path analysis using the correlation matrix 
as input for the structural equation modeling program AMOS.  
Testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b required us to assess the 
complementary vs substitution effects on performance of the three 
organizational controls: outcome, behavior, and clan.[6] As very few studies 
had reported the interaction terms of the three organizational controls and 
their relationship to performance, we employed the following method to 
investigate the joint effects of the three controls on performance. We 
simultaneously captured the influence of the three organizational controls on 
performance to see whether they strengthen one another and whether at the 
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same time they have a positive and statistically significant relationship to 
performance. The three organizational controls will have a complementary 
effect on performance when the total effect of an individual organizational 
control on performance is greater than the direct effect of that organizational 
control (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). In contrast, 
for the substitution effect, the total effect of an individual control on 
performance should be smaller than the direct effect of that control on 
performance. To compute the total effect of an organizational control X on 
performance, the path coefficient values between X and the other two 
controls should be multiplied by their respective values of direct effect on 
performance. The resulting value is then added to the direct effect of X on 
performance (Alwin and Hauser, 1975; Cao and Lumineau, 2015).  
We also performed supplementary analyses to examine the 
differential performance effects of the three organizational controls and 
moderation effects of the nature of the performance data, organizational 
setting, task type, and level of analysis. To estimate the effects of outcome, 
behavior, and clan controls on the four performance outcomes of rational 
goal, adaptability, human relations, and process, we conducted path analyses 
in AMOS using the reliability-corrected effect-size estimates among them. 
The estimates were computed using the random-effects model analysis 
described earlier. We used Z-tests and the epsilon statistic to assess the 
differences in effectiveness of the three controls (cf. Jiang et al., 2012). While 
Z-tests were used to test the significant difference between the path estimates 
(Clogg et al., 1995), the epsilon statistic was used to compute the relative 
weight of each type of control in order to calculate the proportion of total 
variance explained by each control (Johnson, 2000). 
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2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Organizational Controls and Performance 
We first tested the main effects of organizational controls on performance. 
Table 2.2 shows the results for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, and indicates that 
the three organizational controls and performance are positively related. 
Specifically, the estimates for outcome (rc = 0.24; CI95% = 0.19-0.29), 
behavior (rc = 0.26; CI95% = 0.23-0.30), and clan control (rc = 0.32; CI95% 
= 0.26-0.38) are all positively significant. 
 We also performed statistical tests for publication bias (see Table 
2.2). The fail-safe estimates suggest that it would take 32,457, 40,076, and 
23,169 additional studies with insignificant results to potentially reduce the 
effect sizes obtained to null values (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). The results 
of the trim and fill procedure indicate that there is no evidence of publication 
bias as no studies are missing for various controls–performance relationships 
(Duval and Tweedie, 2000b, 2000a). The Egger rank correlation test also did 
not show any indication of bias in the data (Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, 
and Minder, 1997). Overall, the results of publication bias tests indicate that 
the effect sizes obtained for the three controls–performance relationships are 
robust to these tests. 
The heterogeneity tests for the relationships between three controls 
and performance suggest true heterogeneity between samples. The values of 
the Q statistic are all significantly different from zero (p < 0.001), and high 
values of the I2 statistic indicate that the effects have substantial 
heterogeneity. Taken together, these findings imply that additional 
contextual factors are at play that influence the size of the correlations and  
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explain the heterogeneity (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Our supplementary 
analyses discussed below explore this heterogeneity in more detail. 
 
2.4.2 Organizational Controls: Substitutes or Complements? 
Table 2.3 presents the meta-analytic correlations matrix employed in our path 
analysis. Figure 2.2 shows the results. The overall measurement model has a 
good fit to the data. The fit indices of the model are χ2 (4) = 135.03, p < .001; 
CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.95; AGFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.06; and SRMR = 0.03. 
The results in Figure 2.2 show that outcome and behavior control (rc = 0.53, 
95%C.I. = 0.51-0.55), behavior and clan control (rc = 0.42, 95%C.I. = 0.40-
0.44), and outcome and clan control (rc = 0.37, 95%C.I. = 0.34-0.39) are all 
positively correlated. The results also indicate that the control variable firm 
size is not significantly related to performance (rc = -0.01, 95%C.I. = -0.02-
0.01).  
 Furthermore, the path estimates for the direct paths from outcome, 
behavior, and clan control to performance are all positive (0.10, 0.10, and 
0.23 respectively). As such, the three types of control impact performance 
directly but also indirectly, through their strengthening effect on one another. 
For instance, the indirect effect of outcome control on performance through 
behavior and clan control is 0.134 (= 0.53*0.10+0.37*0.22), and therefore 
the total effect of outcome control is 0.234 (=0.10+0.134), which is greater 
than its direct path estimate (0.10). Controls will function as complements 
when the total effect of one type of control on performance is greater than 
the direct effect of that control on performance (cf. Cao and Lumineau, 
2015). As such, we can infer that performance is improved because behavior 
and clan control complement outcome control. 
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Table 2.3. Meta-analytic correlation matrix a 
 
Outcome 
Control 
Behavior 
Control 
Clan 
Control Performance 
Firm 
Size 
Outcome 
Control 1.00 
76 (15924) 50 (8943) 91 (19038) 25 
(3938) 
Behavior 
Control 0.53*** 1.00 
44 (7739) 97 (19703) 27 
(4507) 
Clan Control 0.37*** 0.42*** 1.00 58(10060) 
22 
(3483) 
Performance 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.32*** 1.00 
32 
(5127) 
Firm Size 0.05 0.07** 0.05 0.02 1.00 
a.Cells below the diagonal contain sample size and reliability-corrected correlation mean 
correlations. Cells above the diagonal contain the number of samples (k) and the total 
number of observations in parentheses (N). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Harmonic 
mean = 9253 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Results of the meta-analytic path analysis b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b Number outside parentheses represent path coefficients, numbers in parentheses represent 
the lower and upper bounds for the 95% confidence interval for path coefficients. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Clan Control 
Outcome 
Control 
Behavior 
Control 
Performance 
0.10** (0.08, 0.12) 
0.10** (0.08, 0.11) 
0.22** (0.21, 0.24) 
0.53** (0.51, 0.55) 
0.42** (0.40, 0.44) 
0.37** (0.34, 0.39) 
Firm Size 
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Similarly, the total effect for behavior control is 0.245 
(=0.10+0.53*0.10+0.42*0.22) and clan control is 0.299 
(=0.22+0.37*0.10+0.42*0.10), and that is greater than their individual direct 
path estimates (0.10 and 0.23 respectively). Hence, Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported, but Hypothesis 2b is supported. Outcome, behavior, and clan 
control function as complements. 
 
2.4.3 Supplementary Analyses 
We assessed the differential effects of organizational controls on distinct 
types of performance outcome to determine whether other potential 
moderators explain the heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. To 
estimate the differential effects of outcome, behavior, and clan controls, we 
performed four path analyses for the rational goal, adaptability, human 
relations, and process outcomes. As shown in Table 2.4, most organizational 
controls have positive significant effects on the four types of performance 
outcome. Only for the process outcomes is the effect of outcome control 
significantly negative (β = -0.15, p < 0.001). The Z-tests show that the path 
estimates of clan control are systematically and significantly larger than the 
path estimates of outcome and behavior control for each type of performance 
outcome. The results also indicate that the path estimates of outcome and 
behavior control for rational goal outcomes and human-relations outcomes 
are not significantly different. However, the path estimates of behavior 
control are  
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significantly stronger than those of outcome control for adaptability (Z-value 
= 5.15, p < 0.01) and process outcomes (Z-value = 15.90, p < 0.01). In 
addition, we analyzed the complementarity and substitution among the three 
controls for the four types of performance outcome using the path analysis 
procedure outlined for testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The analysis indicates 
that the three controls are positively correlated to each other and the 
correlation values among them remain the same as shown in Figure 2.2. The 
path estimates for the direct effect of each control on rational goal, 
adaptability, human relations, and process outcomes are same as the 
standardized coefficients shown in Table 2.4. When we calculate the total 
effects of each type of control on each of the four types of performance 
outcome, the results reveal that the total effects of each control is greater than 
its direct effect. Even though the direct effect of outcome control on process 
outcomes is negative (-0.15), the total effect of outcome control on process 
outcomes is positive (0.103), as the indirect effect is 0.253 
(=0.53*0.25+0.37*0.32) and that is greater than -0.15. Therefore, outcome, 
behavior, and clan control complement each other to improve each type of 
performance outcome. 
We also assessed the influence of the nature of the performance data 
(self-reported versus archival), the organizational setting (intra-
organizational versus inter-organizational), task type (NPD, IS development, 
sales, and HRM), level of analysis (firm, business unit, project team and 
individual), and type of performance outcome (rational goal, adaptability, 
human relations, and process outcomes). Table 2.5 reports the results of these 
analyses. We found no significant effect for the nature of the performance 
data, which implies that the correlations reported in studies that use self-
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reported performance data are not positively or negatively biased compared 
to studies that use archival performance data. Also, the strength of the 
association among the organizational controls and performance does not 
differ significantly between intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
settings. The results also show that the outcome control–performance 
relationship and the clan control–performance relationship do not differ 
significantly for different task types. However, for behavior control the 
analysis does support the notion that there are significant differences among 
the various subgroups of task type (QM = 9.21, p < 0.05). To assess whether 
the estimates of the behavior control–performance relationship for various 
task types are different from each other, we applied a Wald-type test 
(Viechtbauer, 2010). The analyses reveal that the behavior control–
performance relationship is significantly stronger for IS development tasks 
(rc = 0.30, 95%CI = 0.20-0.40) and sales tasks (rc = 0.29 , 95%CI = 0.24-
0.35) than for NPD tasks (rc = 0.11, 95%CI = -0.08-0.29) and HRM tasks (rc 
= 0.12, 95%CI = 0.04-0.20). Further, the results indicate that neither the level 
of analysis, nor the type of performance outcome, play a significant role in 
explaining the heterogeneity in effect sizes.  
Finally, although we do not have a theoretical reason to expect 
performance to influence organizational controls, we calculated the estimates 
for three control–performance relationships from studies that employ 
longitudinal data in order to ascertain causality. The results suggest that 
reverse causality is not likely to be in play as the estimates for outcome (rc = 
0.20, 95%CI = 0.06-0.34), behavior (rc = 0.29, 95%CI = 0.11-0.46), and clan 
control (rc = 0.30, 95%CI = 0.16-0.43) are all positively significant. 
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Table 2.5. Supplementary Analyses: Organizational Setting, Task 
Type, Level of Analysis and Types of Performance Outcome 
Variable  k N r rc SE CI95% QM QE 
Performance Data 
Outcome Control          
Self-reported 82 15663 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.03 0.20 0.30 0.25 977.72*** 
Archival 7 681 0.11 0.14 0.11 -0.07 0.33   
          
Behavior Control          
Self-reported 88 16329 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.02 0.23 0.31 1.52 628.14*** 
Archival 8 756 0.21*** 0.25** 0.08 0.10 0.39   
          
Clan Control          
Self-reported 53 9452 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.04 0.26 0.39 0.24 679.70*** 
Archival 5 608 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.08 0.11 0.40   
          
Organizational Setting          
Outcome Control          
Intra-organizational 59 13151 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.03 0.18 0.28 1.63 905.85*** 
Inter-organizational 25 3916 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.07 0.18 0.42   
          
Behavior Control      
  
  
Intra-organizational 67 13631 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.21 0.30 2.44 826.70*** 
Inter-organizational 24 3617 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.05 
0.24 0.42 
  
      
  
  
Clan Control          
Intra-organizational 33 5539 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.04 0.23 0.37 1.52 459.54*** 
Inter-organizational 18 2816 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.06 0.27 0.48   
          
Task Type 
Outcome Control          
NPD 13 2835 0.19** 0.24* 0.10 0.05 0.41 2.59 797.29*** 
IS Development 19 2114 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.19 0.40   
Sales 36 8845 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.04 0.14 0.28   
HRM  5 1111 0.10* 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.25   
          
Behavior Control          
NPD 8 1454 0.10 0.11 0.10 -0.08 0.29 9.21* 650.92*** 
IS Development 16 1675 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.05 0.20 0.40   
Sales 47 10289 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.03 0.24 0.35   
HRM  5 1111 0.11*** 0.12** 0.04 0.05 0.20   
          
Clan Control          
NPD 8 1605 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.09 0.18 0.48 1.82 365.41*** 
IS Development 14 1548 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.06 0.15 0.38   
Sales 16 2781 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.06 0.22 0.44   
HRM 5 1111 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.05 0.13 0.31   
Chapter 2 
 
53 
 
Variable  k N r rc SE CI95% QM QE 
Level of Analysis 
Outcome Control          
Firm 44 11881 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.04 0.18 0.31 4.14 947.29 
Business Unit 11 1696 0.10* 0.13* 0.06 0.02 0.24   
Project Team 25 2794 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.08 0.41   
Individual 14 2498 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.12 0.29   
          
Behavior Control          
Firm 42 10594 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.04 0.20 0.33 2.42 885.09*** 
Business Unit 24 3654 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.04 0.22 0.35   
Project Team 20 2030 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.10 0.33   
Individual 24 3971 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.04 0.25 0.38   
          
Clan Control           
Firm 30 5726 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.05 0.29 0.46 5.97 594.24*** 
Business Unit 3 495 0.13 0.15 0.08 -0.00 0.29   
Project Team 18 2092 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.20 0.40   
Individual 7 1225 0.14 0.17 0.11 -0.04 0.37   
          
Types of Performance Outcome 
Outcome Control          
Rational Goal 77 15611 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.19 0.30 1.87 1187.54*** 
Adaptability 20 4898 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.13 0.33   
Process 6 942 0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.29   
Human Relations 9 1733 0.22** 0.27* 0.05 0.06 0.45   
          
Behavior Control           
Rational Goal 84 16980 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.21 0.29 1.72 960.31*** 
Adaptability 18 4120 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.02 0.20 0.40   
Process 5 766 0.21 0.27  0.08 -0.02 0.51   
Human Relations 11 2028 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.03 0.16 0.43   
          
Clan Control           
Rational Goal 51 8528 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.01 0.24 0.37 7.04 977.38*** 
Adaptability 12 2684 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.04 0.19 0.48   
Process 4 646 0.40* 0.48* 0.21 0.04 0.77   
Human Relations 6 955 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.09 0.29 0.72   
k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = sample-size-weighted correlation; rc = 
sample-size-weighted correlation corrected for unreliability; SE = standard error of rc; 
CI95% = confidence interval; QM, Q statistic for overall moderator model; QE, Q statistic 
for residual heterogeneity. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
This meta-analytic study had two primary objectives: (a) to investigate the 
bivariate relationship between the three organizational controls (outcome, 
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behavior, and clan) and performance, and (b) to assess whether the three 
controls increase (complement) or decrease (substitute) one another’s 
performance effects. By analyzing data obtained from 120 independent 
samples comprising 23,839 organizational control–performance 
relationships, we demonstrate that organizational controls generally have a 
positive association with performance and they act as complements. Our 
analysis indicate that the three organizational controls have differential 
relationships with various performance outcomes. In addition, moderator 
analyses reveal that the effectiveness of controls does not differ between 
studies that employ self-reported performance data and those that use 
archival performance data, and also does not differ for various organizational 
settings (intra- and inter-organizational), level of analysis (firm, business 
unit, project team, individual), and type of performance outcome (rational 
goal, adaptability, human relations, and process outcomes). We also found 
that the behavior control–performance relationship is moderated by the type 
of task that is being controlled. Below we discuss the theoretical and 
managerial implications of these findings. 
 
2.5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This study enriches the organizational controls literature in four important 
ways. First, a major contribution of this study to the controls literature is that 
the results show that all three organizational controls positively impact 
performance and that all are therefore important mechanisms that help 
organizations to achieve their objectives. The results indicate that controls 
are at least as important as other determinants of performance such as 
strategic resources (rc = 0.22) (Crook et al., 2008), organizational knowledge 
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transfer (rc = 0.19) (van Wijk et al., 2008), and exploration (rc = 0.22) and 
exploitation (rc = 0.22) (Junni et al., 2013). These positive performance 
effects were found not only for controlling the firm as a whole, but also for 
controlling business units, project teams, and individual employees. As such, 
our results do not provide support for arguments made in prior research that 
the effectiveness of controls differs for different levels of analysis (Ouchi, 
1977). We also find that the three organizational controls are equally 
effective in intra- and inter-organizational settings. These results therefore 
do not support the premise that controls are less effective in inter-
organizational settings due to controllers having difficulty in measuring and 
observing controllees’ outputs and behaviors, or because controllers and 
controllees are less likely to have shared values, goals, and understanding 
(Tiwana, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Therefore, future research should 
focus on gaining a more detailed understanding of how controllers acquire 
the informational and social requirements needed to exercise controls 
effectively in inter-organizational settings and at different levels of analysis. 
Second, this study complements and extends recent research on the 
interplay among organizational controls (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2016, 2015). 
Our results support the argument that controls act as complements and that 
each control enhances the performance effects of the other controls. This 
suggests that each control helps in addressing the limitations of the other 
controls. For example, the “hands-off” approach of outcome control may 
result in a disconnect between controllers and controllees, and controllees 
might therefore receive fewer inputs on the behaviors that need to be 
followed to improve performance (Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Cardinal, 
2001). Complementing outcome control with clan control, for instance, may 
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help to mitigate these unintended consequences. Clan control may help not 
only to develop consensus on which behaviors are considered effective for 
achieving the desired performance, but also to facilitate interactions between 
controller and controllees and reduce or prevent a possible disconnect 
between them (Kirsch, 1996; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Our results also 
show that the three controls function as complements for all the types of 
performance outcomes that we considered in our study (i.e., rational goal, 
adaptability, process, and human relations). Therefore, our study provides a 
means for controls research to move beyond the traditional “singular view” 
of control as prescriptive (i.e., that in any given context, there is one approach 
to control that will be effective) towards a “holistic view” that incorporates a 
variety of controls (Cardinal et al., 2017, 2004; Long et al., 2002). Going 
forward, we encourage researchers to include all three organizational 
controls when examining the effectiveness of organizational controls and 
their interactions. Failure to do so may lead to inaccurate estimates and 
erroneous inferences about the effectiveness of those controls that are 
included. In this regard, researchers can employ complementarity theory to 
investigate why a combination of different controls is more effective than 
any one individual control used on its own (Cardinal et al., 2017; Kreutzer et 
al., 2016). 
The third contribution of this study lies in the fact that it shows that 
while all controls generally have positive performance effects, the 
relationship between each control and performance is not moderated by the 
type of performance outcome but that the direct effects of three controls on 
each type of performance outcome differ in strength, depending partly on the 
type of performance outcome. This suggests that each control has its own 
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characteristics and provides support for the notion put forward by Korsgaard 
et al. (2010, pg. 224) that various controls “operate on the behavior of 
individuals in fundamentally different ways”. More specifically, we find that 
clan control has a stronger effect on each type of performance outcome than 
outcome and behavior controls. This finding diverges from classic controls 
research that emphasizes clan control as an “alternative control” that is only 
effective when outcomes or behaviors cannot be accurately measured or 
observed (Ouchi, 1979). According to Korsgaard et al. (2010), clan control 
operates through internalization of values, norms, and beliefs that generally 
encourage intrinsic motivation, whereas outcome and behavior controls rely 
on behavioral contingency mechanisms that are mainly associated with 
extrinsic motivation. Previous research suggests that intrinsic motivation has 
greater performance consequences than extrinsic rewards (Ryan and Deci, 
2000a). A possible reason why clan control is more likely to lead to intrinsic 
motivation is that it comprises of proportionately greater informal 
mechanisms than formal mechanisms. However, this notion needs further 
investigation. As self-determination theory (SDT) focuses on the 
mechanisms that regulate the intrinsic motivation of individuals (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000a, 2000b), we encourage future research to examine the 
motivational mechanisms that underlie different types of control and to use 
SDT to explicate the behavioral and performance consequences of these 
mechanisms. 
The finding that behavior and outcome controls influence 
adaptability and process outcomes to different degrees also suggests that 
each control operates through alternative mechanisms. For example, 
adaptability outcomes (i.e., flexibility, innovation, and learning) involve 
Chapter 2 
 
58 
 
unique situations that emerge continuously over time and require rich 
controller–controllee interactions (Cardinal et al., 2017). In this regard, 
behavior control is more effective as it facilitates more active involvement 
by controllers than outcome control, which involves a hands-off approach 
(Kreutzer et al., 2015). Process outcomes (i.e., smooth coordination, 
cooperation, and information flows) rely on consistency and effectiveness in 
existing routines and practices (Cardinal et al., 2017). Behavior control is 
more effective in settings where process outcomes are required as it involves 
the specification of standardized procedures, whereas in outcome control no 
inputs whatsoever are provided to controllees in terms of the procedures that 
should be followed (Kirsch, 1996). To understand more about these different 
paths, we encourage future research to explore other mechanisms that may 
act as mediators of the control–performance relationships. For example, role 
theory could be used to explore whether providing greater clarity over the 
processes and goals for a particular task may help to increase controllees' job 
satisfaction, and thus lead to higher performance (Carbonell and Rodriguez-
Escudero, 2013; Sawyer, 1992). 
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence 
that the effectiveness of controls depends partly on the task that is being 
controlled. Our results show that behavior control is more effective for tasks 
such as IS development (Gopal and Gosain, 2010) or sales (Baldauf et al., 
2005) that rely on an identifiable series of procedures and routine activities, 
than for tasks such as NPD and HRM that involve higher levels of complexity 
and a more varied body of expertise. In our view, these results are 
underpinned by the notion that behaviors are dependent on the complexity 
involved in a particular system and that these behaviors can interact with 
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controls to influence their functioning (Cardinal et al., 2017; McCarthy et al., 
2006). This notion is also empirically supported by Liu (2015), who found 
that the behavior control is generally effective, but that its effectiveness 
decreases due to high system complexity. Therefore, although we find that 
behavior control is generally effective for distinct outcomes that span various 
tasks, the explanation for our finding that behavior control is less effective 
for HRM and NPD tasks may lie in the fact that NPD and HRM can be 
viewed as complex systems (Colbert, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2006). NPD and 
HRM tasks involve more complexity due to the fact that there is high task 
interdependence and coordination is needed because the activities are cross-
functional (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Thompson, 1967). As such, our study 
suggests that the complexity involved in various tasks may interact with the 
functioning of the control. We thus encourage future research to explore how 
systems complexity affects the effectiveness of controls and also how 
controls function across different tasks.  
 
2.5.2 Managerial Implications 
Our meta-analysis suggests that managers can achieve the desired 
performance outcomes by exercising outcome, behavior, and clan controls. 
The results also indicate that managers are likely to reap the greatest benefits 
in terms of performance by emphasizing clan controls that can intrinsically 
motivate controllees. However, this does not mean that managers should 
ignore outcome and behavior controls as a means of enhancing performance 
as these may motivate employees through extrinsic rewards. 
 Considering the various situations in which managers exercise 
organizational controls, our results also suggest that they should give equal 
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emphasis to outcome, behavior, and clan controls when exercising control in 
intra-organizational or inter-organizational settings. Also, their choice of 
control should not be dependent on whether the control is being exercised at 
the firm level, or at the business or functional unit, project team, or individual 
level. However, we also find that managers cannot take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach across different types of task. More specifically, if they emphasize 
outcome and clan control managers can expect similar performance effects 
for various types of tasks. Further, behavior control is less effective for tasks 
such as NPD and HRM that do not involve an identifiable series of 
procedures and routine activities than it is for IS development and sales tasks. 
Finally, our study indicates that managerial controls are complements, and 
that exercising different types of control simultaneously provides synergies 
that help in overcoming the limitations of the individual controls. Instead of 
relying on a single type of control, managers should appreciate the strengths 
and added value of using all three types of control.  
 
2.6 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Although this study has several important implications, the results of this 
study should be considered in light of several limitations, and additional 
research is needed to address these. The first limitation is that our findings 
are silent on the time-dependent performance effects of the interplay among 
controls. This interplay may well change as controller–controllee 
relationships evolve over time (Kirsch, 2004). Thus, the way in which 
controls interact over time remains a black box, and additional longitudinal 
studies or experimental studies are needed to develop our understanding of 
Chapter 2 
 
61 
 
this aspect of organizational control. The second limitation is that we were 
only able to focus on three moderators as we were limited by the data 
available for our analysis. As evident in the significant Q statistics through 
our statistical analyses, there is still a substantial amount of variability in 
terms of the moderators to be accounted for. The organizational controls 
literature argues that the effectiveness of controls is also affected by the 
ability of controllers to measure outcomes, observe behaviors, and 
understand the process associated with transforming inputs into outputs 
(Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Investigation of outcome measurability, 
behavior observability, and knowledge of the transformation process as 
additional moderators in future empirical studies will help in a better 
understanding of the organizational controls–performance relationships.[7] 
There are at least three other areas for further research. First, building on 
our findings regarding the different types of task, researchers may want to 
investigate whether it is better for managers to specialize in controlling one 
specific type of task (e.g., to limit themselves to controlling only people 
engaged in sales activities) or whether they might become more effective by 
diversifying and gaining experience in controlling different tasks (e.g., 
controlling salespeople and new product development teams, etc.). Second, 
our research largely suggests that more control is better. However, 
researchers have acknowledged that the gains obtained from exercising 
various controls may be canceled out by using more controls due to the high 
resource requirements and adverse behaviors associated with an increased 
use of controls (e.g., Grewal et al. , 2013). Thus, we encourage future 
researchers to determine what the optimal level of controls may be in a 
context, how that can be achieved, and at what point controls become 
Chapter 2 
 
62 
 
excessive. Third, in line with the suggestion by Cardinal et al. (2017), we 
encourage future studies to explore whether our results will hold in new types 
of organizational forms and work styles such as relational networks, virtual 
teams, open innovation, and flexible working practices. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The overall objective of this study was to examine the relationship between 
organizational controls and performance. We found that outcome, behavior, 
and clan controls all contribute to performance but that clan control is more 
effective than the other two controls for each type of performance outcome. 
Our analyses also highlight that the effectiveness of outcome and clan 
controls is stable across various organizational settings, levels, and tasks as 
well as across various performance outcomes, and that it is only for behavior 
control that the effectiveness of varies according to the type of task. This 
study also provides strong additional support for the view that one type of 
control increases the effectiveness of the others. By combining and analyzing 
the empirical results of many independent studies, we are the first to examine 
these factors in a systematic manner. In sum, this research opens up several 
new avenues for future research on the effectiveness of controls that should 
be explored in order to extend our understanding of organizational controls. 
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NOTES 
[1] The traditional controls research has discussed the three types of control 
as    either formal or informal. Lately, however, scholars have argued that all 
three types involve both formal and informal mechanisms (Cardinal et al., 
2010; Kreutzer et al., 2016). 
[2] Historically, clan control has been labeled as an informal control. 
However, clan control has both formal and informal attributes as it involves 
selection, training, and diversity of the workforce in addition to socialization 
and interpersonal approaches to influence norms, values, and beliefs (Kirsch 
et al., 2010; Ouchi, 1979). We therefore focus on a notion of clan control that 
includes not only the role of the clan in stimulating specific controllee 
behaviors through unwritten and unofficial values, norms, and beliefs, but 
also the search for and selection of controllees who undergo value training to 
internalize the desired behaviors. 
[3] The different sets of studies with duplicate datasets are: (1) Challagalla 
and Shervani (1996, 1997); (2) Austrian dataset in Baldauf et al. (2002) and 
Baldauf et al. (2001b); (3) Miller et al. (2013), Saldanha et al. (2013), and 
Saldanha et al. (2014); (4) Flaherty et al. (2007) and Flaherty and Pappas 
(2012); (5) Piercy et al. (2009) and Piercy et al. (2012); (6) Solberg (2006b) 
and Solberg (2008); (7) Smets (2013) and Smets et al. (2013); (8) Smets 
(2013) and Smets et al. (2016); and (9) Yu and To (2008, 2011).  
[4] All the studies in sets 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 (see endnote 3) were not marked as 
duplicate and coded separately. The studies in sets 1, 6, 7, and 8 (also endnote 
3) were marked as duplicate. We kept Challagalla and Shervani (1996) and 
Solberg (2006b), but dropped Challagalla and Shervani (1997) and Solberg 
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(2008) as they were published later. Concerning the PhD dissertation by 
Smets (2013), we dropped this dissertation as the two studies (i.e., Smets et 
al. (2013, 2016)) from this have since been published.  
[5] The formula for Perreault and Leigh’s reliability index is represented by 
Ir = {[(F/N) – (1/k)][k/(k–1)]}0.5, for F/N > 1/k; where F is the frequency of 
agreement between coders, N is the total number of judgments, and k is the 
number of categories (the Ir values range from 0 to 1, with higher values 
representing greater reliability). 
[6] According to Cao and Lumineau (2015), two methodological techniques 
can be used to examine the complementary or substitute effects between 
independent variables: (1) using the interaction terms for the independent 
variables in the structural model for which complementarity or substitute 
effects need to be examined (Song et al., 2005); (2) analyzing the relationship 
between the independent variables and dependent variables simultaneously 
and examining whether the independent variables are positively or negatively 
related to the dependent variable (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Given that the 
studies in our sample did not report the correlation values between the 
interaction terms and the dependent variable, we employed the second 
method in our analysis, and we used the approach followed by Cao and 
Lumineau (2015) in their meta-analytic study. 
[7] We want to thank one of the reviewers for drawing our attention to this 
issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Organizational Controls, Knowledge Integration Mechanisms, and 
Supplier Flexibility in New Product Development Outsourcing2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Managing outsourced new product development (NPD) activities is a core 
issue for organizations. Organizations depend on supplier flexibility since 
NPD generally takes place in a context of uncertainty. Working with 
suppliers that are able to quickly respond to changes in the demands of 
organizations is essential for performance. Drawing on organizational 
control theory and the knowledge-based view, this study posits that the 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating cooperation and coordination between 
organizations and their suppliers enhance supplier flexibility. In particular, 
the study investigates the influence of various forms of organizational control 
(outcome, behavior, clan) and knowledge integration mechanisms (KIMs) on 
supplier flexibility, and what effect this has on NPD project performance. 
Based on data from 109 outsourced NPD projects, the empirical results show 
that using outcome and clan control encourages suppliers to be more flexible, 
leading in turn to higher NPD project performance, but that behavior control 
and KIMs do not promote supplier flexibility. Post-hoc analyses reveal that 
while outcome control can be a double-edged sword in that it has both 
beneficial and adverse effects on NPD project performance, clan control 
                                                 
2 Earlier version of this chapter were presented at the below mentioned conferences: 
• Sihag, V., Rijsdijk, S.A., and van den Ende, J (June, 2018). “Managing Outsourced New 
Product Development: The Role of Organizational Controls, Knowledge Integration 
Mechanisms, and Supplier Flexibility”. In Innovation and Product Development 
Management Conference (IPDMC), Porto, Portugal. 
• Sihag, V., Rijsdijk, S.A., and van den Ende, J (March, 2018). “Managing Outsourced 
New Product Development: The Role of Organizational Controls, Knowledge 
Integration Mechanisms, and Supplier Flexibility”. In International Purchasing and 
Supply Education and Research Association (IPSERA) Conference as competitive 
paper, Athens, Greece. 
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helps to achieve higher levels of performance. The analyses also indicate that 
KIMs can have adverse effect on NPD project performance via supplier 
flexibility. Collectively, these findings advance our understanding of the 
antecedents of supplier flexibility and highlight it as an appropriate way of 
achieving higher project performance in NPD outsourcing. 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizations outsource their new product development (NPD) activities to 
complement their core capabilities with the unique knowledge, skills, and 
resources of their suppliers (Calantone and Stanko, 2007; Carson, 2007). 
Access to such complementary and specialized knowledge and resources has 
been found to have a positive influence on a wide range of performance 
outcomes, as it can lead to shorter development times, improved product 
quality, and lower development costs (Johnsen, 2009; Quinn, 2000; Takeishi, 
2001). NPD outsourcing involves a supplier contributing to the outsourcing 
organization’s product development (Carson, 2007; Lawson, Krause, and 
Potter, 2015). Despite the benefits to be gained by outsourcing NPD 
activities, many organizations find it difficult to manage these activities 
effectively, particularly because of the evolving nature of NPD projects 
(Johnsen, 2009; Stanko and Calantone, 2011).  
NPD projects evolve for various reasons, such as changes in market 
dynamics, the acquisition of new technical and product knowledge, or the 
creation of new knowledge as a result of project learning (Iansiti, 1995; 
Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). Therefore, product specifications often 
change partway through an NPD project and the project requirements 
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initially agreed between the outsourcing organizations and their suppliers 
may no longer be adequate (Ivens, 2005; Noordewier et al., 1990). To address 
this problem, organizations want their suppliers to incorporate the new 
requirements. Organizations are therefore highly dependent on supplier 
flexibility that refers to the willingness of suppliers to respond flexibly to the 
changing requirements of outsourcing organizations (Cannon and Homburg, 
2001; Ivens, 2005). 
To encourage flexible behavior from suppliers, organizations need to 
ensure that their suppliers are willing to align their efforts to those of the 
outsourcing organization, to incorporate the new requirements (Gulati et al., 
2005; Ivens, 2005). Achieving alignment of efforts from suppliers requires 
both cooperation (alignment of interests) and coordination (alignment of 
actions) (Gulati et al., 2005). It is difficult for organizations to ensure 
cooperation and coordination from their suppliers because the suppliers have 
different interests and knowledge (Gulati et al., 2005; Johansson, Axelson, 
Enberg, and Tell, 2011). Also, making the adjustments required to comply 
with the outsourcing organization’s requirements entails considerable costs 
for suppliers as they have to make available additional resources of various 
kinds (Han, Sung, and Shim, 2014). Suppliers are therefore not always likely 
to be ready to adjust to the changing requirements of outsourcing 
organizations. For example, Cui, Loch, Grossman, and He (2009) describe 
how the launch of a Siemen’s product was delayed by half a year because a 
supplier was not willing to adjust the product specifications. Hence, a lack of 
flexibility on the supplier’s part can result in problems, such as developing a 
product that does not meet the requirements specified by the outsourcing 
organizations or lower project performance. In light of these concerns, 
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scholars and practitioners need to know the mechanisms for improving 
cooperation and coordination can help to promote supplier flexibility. 
Existing research on NPD outsourcing has focused primarily on when 
and why to outsource NPD activities (Stanko and Calantone, 2011). In 
addition, researchers have investigated various antecedents (e.g., higher 
profit margins, control mechanisms), moderators (e.g., market uncertainty, 
technological uncertainty), and performance outcomes (e.g., stock market 
reaction, supplier task performance) associated with NPD outsourcing (e.g., 
Calantone and Stanko 2007; Carson 2007; Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 
2012). A number of important insights have been provided in all of these 
areas. However, the issue of precisely which mechanisms enhance supplier 
flexibility in NPD outsourcing has not been given sufficient attention.  
Against this backdrop, this study examines the influence of 
organizational controls and knowledge integration mechanisms (KIMs) on 
supplier flexibility since they have been recognized in previous studies as 
mechanisms that enable cooperation and coordination respectively (e.g., De 
Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Organizations can 
exercise organizational controls to increase cooperation from suppliers as 
controls advance alignment of interests. Organizational controls refer to the 
mechanisms exercised by organizations to motivate their suppliers to align 
their interests with those of the outsourcing organizations (Das and Teng, 
1998; Tiwana, 2008). Similarly, KIMs can help organizations to improve the 
efficacy of their coordination efforts through effective transfer of knowledge 
between them and suppliers (Cheung, Myers, and Mentzer, 2011; Tsai, Liao, 
and Hsu, 2015). KIMs refer to the processes and structures that facilitate 
knowledge sharing as they enable one party to capture, articulate, combine, 
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and exploit the varied knowledge and skills of other parties (Olson et al., 
1995; Zahra et al., 2000). Therefore, the first research question examined in 
this study is: Do organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) and KIMs 
enhance supplier flexibility? 
Further, increased flexibility from suppliers can help organizations to 
achieve their NPD project objectives in a timely manner as they can use 
supplier resources to respond to the changes in project requirements 
efficiently (Cannon and Homburg, 2001). This study focuses on the 
responsive behavior of suppliers, whereas previous research on the outcomes 
of supplier flexibility that involved behavioral aspects focused mostly on 
relational outcomes such as buyer satisfaction, relationship commitment, 
relationship quality, and trust in either industrial buyer–supplier relationships 
or channel relationships (e.g., Ivens 2005; Han, Sung, and Shim 2014). As 
such, empirical evidence on the effect of supplier flexibility on the NPD 
project performance remains limited. Therefore, the second research 
question investigated by this study is: Does supplier flexibility influence NPD 
project performance? 
Investigating these two research questions provides fresh insights that 
make several contributions to the existing literature. First, by examining the 
effect of organizational controls and KIMs on supplier flexibility in NPD 
outsourcing, we can ascertain how organizations may be able to encourage 
flexible behavior in their suppliers. This is important since NPD projects are 
inherently knowledge-intensive and involve a high degree of ambiguity; they 
therefore require higher levels of cooperation and coordination with suppliers 
than is required in other types of project (Johnsen, 2009; Yan and Dooley, 
2013). By providing a better understanding of this issue our study makes a 
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contribution to the NPD outsourcing literature and the literature on buyer–
supplier relationships.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature on supplier flexibility. 
While extant research on supplier flexibility provides useful insights 
regarding antecedents such as opportunism, market uncertainty, relationship-
specific investments, and mutuality (e.g., Ivens 2005; Han, Sung, and Shim 
2014), there has been limited research on the determinants of supplier 
flexibility that focus on cooperation and coordination in inter-organizational 
relationships. Also, by investigating the relationship between supplier 
flexibility and NPD project performance we can help to build a better 
understanding of how supplier flexibility can drive success in NPD 
outsourcing.  
Third, most of the existing research on the effectiveness of organizational 
controls and KIMs has been limited to the management of in-house NPD 
projects, even though organizations quite often outsource their NPD 
activities (e.g., Tsai, Liao, and Hsu 2015; Sihag and Rijsdijk 2018). 
Therefore, this research also contributes to the literature on organizational 
controls and KIMs and their effectiveness. In particular, investigating the 
different effects that organizational controls and KIMs can have on supplier 
flexibility, and thus NPD project performance, enables us to provide a more 
nuanced view of their outcomes. Overall, our research provides new insights 
to practitioners as well as to scholars, and helps them to understand better the 
various managerial mechanisms that can be used in complex projects where 
development activities span organizational boundaries. 
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3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
3.2.1 Cooperation, Coordination, and Supplier Flexibility 
A typical NPD outsourcing relationship involves a supplier developing a 
particular product component or technology that forms a part of the 
outsourcing organization’s product, but occasionally it also includes the 
supplier delivering the complete product or technology (Carson, 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2015; Stanko and Calantone, 2011). Though, organizations 
(hereafter referred to as clients) outsource their NPD activities to suppliers 
because they can provide other skills or capabilities that are not available in-
house, such differences can also lead to conflicts of interest (Das and Teng, 
2001; Johansson et al., 2011). Because they have different objectives, 
suppliers are more likely to behave in ways that favor their own interests, 
rather than those of the client (Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014), and they are 
therefore less likely to be flexible. Conflicts of interest between clients and 
suppliers then lead to problems of cooperation (Gulati et al., 2005).  
NPD projects also involve high levels of knowledge sharing between 
clients and their suppliers (Lawson, Petersen, Cousins, and Handfield, 2009). 
Their different areas of knowledge along with the organizational boundaries 
between clients and suppliers, makes it difficult for them to share the tacit 
knowledge held by their employees and embedded in their routines 
(Johansson et al., 2011; Puranam and Gulati, 2008). Due to the lack of shared 
and accurate knowledge, the clients and suppliers do not fully understand 
each other’s decision rules and how their actions are interlinked (Gulati et 
al., 2005; Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 2009). Clients therefore find it 
difficult to coordinate their actions with those of their suppliers and to make 
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effective decisions regarding how to deal with evolving NPD requirements. 
Clients therefore need to manage both cooperation and coordination 
problems in order to foster supplier flexibility. 
The problems of cooperation and coordination are rooted in different 
paradigms. While cooperation problems arise as a result of the differing 
interests of the client and its suppliers, coordination problems are due to poor 
knowledge sharing between them (Gulati et al., 2005). Clients therefore need 
to use different mechanisms to resolve these two types of problem. For better 
cooperation they need mechanisms to align the suppliers’ interests with their 
own, whereas for better coordination they need mechanisms to enable better 
knowledge sharing with suppliers. Drawing on organizational control theory 
and the knowledge-based view, we postulate that clients can stimulate 
supplier flexibility by using organizational controls to deal with cooperation 
problems and KIMs to tackle coordination issues. 
 
3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 Organizational Controls and Supplier Flexibility 
Organizational control theory suggests that controls can help clients to 
manage cooperation problems with suppliers as controls facilitate the 
alignment of interests (Das and Teng, 2001; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). 
Organizational controls refer to the mechanisms used by a controller (in this 
case the client) to motivate its controllee (in this case the supplier) to behave 
in a manner consistent with the controller’s objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; 
Tiwana, 2008). Although control scholars have identified several types of 
organizational control, we focus on the three that have been investigated most 
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extensively and are thus conceptually well elaborated in the literature: 
outcome, behavior, and clan (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2019). In this study, we 
postulate that a client’s use of outcome, behavior, and clan control will 
resolve cooperation problems with its suppliers and thus enhance supplier 
flexibility. 
 Outcome control involves controllers specifying quantitative 
performance goals and monitoring, evaluating, and rewarding controllees’ 
performance based on the extent to which they have achieved the specified 
goals (Cardinal, 2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006). In in-house NPD projects, 
controllers (i.e., project managers) generally specify performance outcomes 
such as project budget, cycle time, project goals, and deliverables to 
controllees (i.e., project team members) (Bonner et al., 2002). Such 
performance outcomes can also be specified by clients to their suppliers and 
then used to evaluate the suppliers’ performance. The outcomes used by 
clients for development activities that span organizational boundaries are 
generally derived from the goals that determine the overall project 
performance (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). As a result, 
outcome control aligns the suppliers’ goals with those of the clients. 
According to Chen, Meindl, and Meindl (1998), one actor will cooperate with 
another when their goals are positively related. As such, outcome control 
motivates suppliers to behave more cooperatively. Therefore, suppliers are 
more likely to show cooperative behaviors such as responding flexibly to 
clients’ needs as goals are associated with the motives that underlie the 
intended behavior (Jap and Anderson, 2003; Mintzberg, 1983). Outcome 
control therefore ensures that suppliers identify with a client’s requirements 
and respond in a manner that is in alignment with them. 
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Outcome control also facilitates cooperative behavior from suppliers 
because of its hands-off approach, and that further enhances supplier 
flexibility. It can be seen as hands-off in that it does not specify the type of 
process that needs to be followed to achieve the specified goals (Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). Once the client has stated the desired outcomes, suppliers 
are given substantial autonomy and creativity to select and follow their own 
procedures to achieve those outcomes (Stouthuysen et al., 2012; Wallenburg 
and Schäffler, 2014). This allows suppliers to deal efficiently with emerging 
project requirements, making them therefore more likely to accommodate 
new requirements from the client. The hands-off approach of outcome 
control is also perceived by suppliers as less obtrusive and therefore arouses 
less psychological resistance in them (Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Heide, 
Wathne, and Rokkan, 2007). Also, the use of outcome control is perceived 
by suppliers as a signal that their client considers them to be more trustworthy 
and competent because their behavior is not being closely monitored 
(Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2006; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000). Suppliers 
are therefore less likely to indulge in opportunistic behaviors. Low levels of 
opportunism have been shown to be associated with high levels of supplier 
flexibility (Han et al., 2014). Since outcome control discourages opportunism 
and encourages flexible behavior from suppliers, we thus propose that: 
H1: Outcome control is positively associated with supplier flexibility. 
 
Behavior control can both promote and constrain supplier flexibility. 
We therefore develop competing hypotheses regarding how behavior control 
may affect supplier flexibility. Behavior control involves controllers setting 
out procedures and rules that controllees need to follow while doing their 
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assigned activities, and controllees are monitored, evaluated, and rewarded 
for their performance based on how well they have adhered to the prescribed 
procedures (Bonner et al., 2002; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Behavior control 
in a NPD context can include specifying development methodology, rules, 
and procedures (Cooper, 2001; Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). Scholars 
and practitioners have posited that prescribing a specific development 
methodology and procedures such as stage-gate processes, quality function 
deployment, and design for six sigma, which are analogous to behavior 
controls, helps in aligning different functional perspectives and interests, and 
that this leads to the completion of development activities (e.g., Cooper 2001; 
Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker 2002). We therefore extend this reasoning to 
the NPD outsourcing context and expect behavior control to have a similar 
effect in facilitating cooperation between clients and suppliers. In particular, 
using a standard development methodology and procedures gives structure 
and flow to the development activities (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). A 
structured environment helps suppliers to better understand both their role in 
a NPD project and the procedures that clients are using to evaluate the 
suppliers’ performance (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Carbonell and 
Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013). Therefore, the transparent nature of behavior 
control reinforces suppliers’ beliefs that their role is integral to the project 
and helps them to feel that they are being treated fairly (Long, Bendersky, 
and Morrill, 2011). Consequently, suppliers are more likely to take 
ownership of clients’ interests and engage in cooperative behaviors by being 
flexible in allowing adjustments in project requirements.  
Behavior control also requires dynamic involvement from clients as 
they need to actively provide clear inputs to suppliers regarding the behaviors 
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required of them to ensure complete the various project activities (Aulakh 
and Gencturk, 2000). Such an active involvement from the client signals to 
supplier that the client is committed to the project (Nakos and Brouthers, 
2008). Being actively involved in supplier’s development activities also 
allows clients to deepen their understanding of various issues relating to a 
project (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003). The knowledge acquired not only 
helps clients to provide feedback that will enable suppliers to take corrective 
action, but also helps them to make decisions regarding trade-offs that can 
be made to deal with changes in project requirements (Smets, Langerak, and 
Tatikonda, 2016). Behavior control helps suppliers to cope better with 
uncertain requirements, because it enables any issues they face to be resolved 
more quickly by the client (Gopal and Gosain, 2010). Thus, behavior control 
is less likely to be perceived by suppliers as having been imposed by the 
client without any understanding of the suppliers’ own needs and they are 
therefore likely to be more cooperative as a result. Behavior control therefore 
makes suppliers more effective at dealing with ambiguous and complex 
situations, and more flexible with regard to accepting changes to project 
requirements. 
In contrast, some scholars have argued that imposing a standard 
methodology and procedures for development inhibits suppliers from using 
their own particular expertise (e.g., Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker 2002; 
Tiwana and Keil 2007). As noted earlier, NPD project requirements tend to 
evolve over the course of the project, and suppliers need creativity and 
independence to respond quickly to emerging problems (Carson, 2007). 
Thus, limiting their discretion to adjust the development procedures may lead 
to inertia in suppliers and increase the likelihood that they will be less willing 
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to accept the changes desired by clients (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder, 
1994; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Using standard procedures can also be 
perceived by a supplier as a sign that the client does not believe that it can 
complete the outsourced development activities without being given 
directions by the client. Further, the monitoring involved in behavior control 
can send a negative signal to a supplier that it is not completely trusted by 
the client (Tiwana, 2010; Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014). Therefore, a 
client’s use of behavior control can result in the supplier feeling 
circumscribed, and thus becoming unwilling to accept the changes required 
by the client. 
In summary, these arguments suggest that behavior control can either 
promote or diminish supplier flexibility. Therefore, we put forward the 
following two competing hypotheses: 
H2a: Behavior control is positively associated with supplier 
flexibility. 
H2b: Behavior control is negatively associated with supplier 
flexibility. 
 
In clan control, controllers employ mechanisms to motivate 
controllees to embrace common values, norms, and goals, and to behave in a 
manner that is in line with agreed-upon behaviors (Kirsch et al., 2010; Ouchi, 
1979). Examples of such mechanisms in client–supplier relationships include 
social events, off-site meetings, and casual lunches or dinners (Choudhury 
and Sabherwal, 2003; Chua, Lim, Soh, and Sia, 2012). These socialization 
mechanisms facilitate the transmission of beliefs, values, and cultural norms 
between clients and suppliers and thereby make suppliers more cooperative 
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in meeting the client’s goals’ (Kirsch et al., 2002). In other words, clan 
control facilitates the internalization of values and norms between client and 
suppliers, making suppliers more dedicated and committed to achieving the 
project’s objectives (Chua et al., 2012; Das and Teng, 2001). Internalizing 
these values and norms enables suppliers to respond flexibly to new 
requirements that emerge partway through the project, because the values 
and norms are clear to them (i.e., achieving project objectives), even though 
the situation is new (Lebas and Weigenstein, 1986). Also, clan control 
increases flexibility, because social interactions enable the parties involved 
to adapt mutually and make adjustments quickly when requirements evolve 
(Huang et al., 2014; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). 
Clan control also helps to create a common understanding and 
language between clients and suppliers (Kirsch et al., 2002; Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). This then further enhances cooperative behavior from 
suppliers as it gives them a rich and broad implicit guide as to what the clients 
consider to be either acceptable or deviant behavior without formally 
monitoring their behaviors to ensure compliance (Aulakh and Gencturk, 
2000; Kirsch et al., 2010). As a result, suppliers are intrinsically motivated 
and are committed to achieving the project objectives (Das and Teng, 2001; 
Kirsch, 2004); they are therefore more likely to respond flexibly to the 
client’s requirements. As such, clan control helps to realize flexible 
behaviors from suppliers through cooperation. 
Clan control also promotes mutual trust and interests through 
informal social interactions (Das and Teng, 1998; Kirsch, 2004). The 
increase in positive mutual expectations and interests motivates suppliers to 
become more committed to their partnerships with clients (Das and Teng, 
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2001). This encourages suppliers to openly identify issues and to share and 
discuss them with clients (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Huang et al., 2014). 
Since NPD issues are then more likely to be identified, examined, and 
resolved, clan control also encourages suppliers to be more cooperative and 
respond more flexibly. Past research has also shown that mutual trust and 
interests between clients and suppliers lead to improved decision-making and 
on-time completion of NPD activities (Bstieler, 2006). All in all, by enabling 
cooperative behaviors from suppliers clan control plays a pivotal role in 
promoting supplier flexibility. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H3: Clan control is positively associated with supplier flexibility. 
 
3.3.2 KIMs and Supplier Flexibility  
The knowledge-based view of the firm emphasizes that coordination 
problems can be resolved by using mechanisms such as KIMs that facilitate 
knowledge sharing (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Gulati et al., 2005). 
KIMs help different parties to synthesize, analyze, reconfigure, and integrate 
different types of knowledge among them (Olson et al., 1995). Specifically, 
KIMs are processes and structures – such as systematic information-sharing 
meetings, analysis of successful and failed projects, or project reviews – that 
enable one party to capture, articulate, combine, and exploit the varied 
knowledge and skills of other parties (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007). 
We posit that KIMs play a pivotal role in ensuring effective coordination 
between clients and suppliers as they enable knowledge to be transferred 
between them, thereby enhancing the flexibility of suppliers to accept new 
requirements that emerge during the project. 
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As new project requirements emerge, they need to be integrated into 
the development process so that development activities can be completed 
satisfactorily (Johnsen, 2009; Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). KIMs 
facilitate the integration of new requirements into development activities as 
they allow both clients and suppliers to make better sense of the emerging 
requirements (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Takeishi, 2001). As a 
result, clients and their suppliers are more likely to make timely decisions 
about compromises that might need to be made in order to integrate new 
requirements into the development activities. Therefore, suppliers are more 
likely to be flexible in aligning their activities in order to integrate the new 
requirements. 
NPD projects also involve the transfer of both codified and tacit 
knowledge for effective coordination and completion of development 
activities (Berggren, Bergek, Bengtsson, Söderlund, and Hobday, 2011). 
While codified knowledge can be easily articulated and transferred, tacit 
knowledge is not easily transferable or codifiable as it is sticky in nature and 
requires close observations and interactions (Berggren et al., 2011; Lawson 
et al., 2009). As such, the transfer of tacit knowledge affects a client’s ability 
to coordinate the development activities and a supplier’s ability to respond 
flexibly as the supplier do not fully understands the interdependencies among 
various development activities. KIMs facilitate transmission of tacit 
knowledge as they enable different parties to work together closely and 
exchange knowledge with each other (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; 
Tsai et al., 2015). Suppliers are therefore better able to understand how the 
client’s development activities are dependent on their own development 
activities and this encourages them to take the actions needed to fulfill the 
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client’s new requirements. Thus, the use of KIMs facilitates better 
coordination between clients and suppliers, and promotes supplier flexibility.  
KIMs allow different parties to openly discuss the various approaches 
that could be followed to solve various development problems that emerge 
during the course of an NPD project. They also provide a common platform 
for one party to give feedback to another and to analyze various project 
problems and mistakes (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007). In other words, 
KIMs enable the parties involved to learn from previous product 
development activities and exploit the knowledge acquired effectively in 
future product development (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Olson et 
al., 1995). Therefore, clients’ use of KIMs will enhance coordinative and 
flexible behaviors from suppliers because problems can be openly identified, 
examined, and resolved. In summary, we expect KIMs to enhance supplier 
flexibility. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4: KIMs are positively associated with supplier flexibility. 
 
3.3.3 Supplier Flexibility and NPD Project Performance 
A key aspect of supplier flexibility is the supplier’s willingness to 
accommodate changes in the client’s requirements (Ivens, 2005). The more 
flexible a supplier is, the more willing it will be to let the client use its skills 
and competencies to deal with new project requirements (Narayanan and 
Narasimhan, 2014). A high level of supplier flexibility, in particular, 
suggests that a client can easily share its ideas and solve problems with its 
suppliers (Liao et al., 2010). For example, when a client wants to make 
changes to its NPD project requirements, it can communicate these easily to 
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the supplier and explore possible ways of meeting the new requirements. As 
a result, both client and supplier use fewer resources to accommodate the 
new requirements and their remaining resources can be used to create better 
value – for example, finding more appropriate solutions to the new 
requirements in a timely manner. In essence, a higher level of supplier 
flexibility helps a client to achieve the desired project performance. 
Past research has also shown that greater flexibility from suppliers 
helps in completing NPD projects within time and budget. For example, 
Narayanan and Narasimhan (2014) found that a higher level of flexibility 
from suppliers leads to increased performance in terms of speed of 
completion, adherence to budget, and quality achieved. This perspective is 
also supported by the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, which argues 
that clients outsource their activities to access rare, valuable, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable complementary resources that they require to enhance their 
performance (Barney, 1991; Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2006). 
Supplier flexibility is a complementary resource that helps clients to respond 
efficiently to the new requirements in outsourced NPD activities. Based on 
the above arguments, we bring forward the following hypothesis: 
H5: Supplier flexibility is positively associated with NPD project 
performance. 
Figure 3.1 shows the complete hypothesized model. 
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
To test our hypotheses, we gathered data using a cross-sectional survey 
design. The sample for our study was drawn from the REACH (Review and 
Analysis of Companies in Holland) database. The database contains 
information of all the companies registered at the Chamber of Commerce in 
the Netherlands and provides industry, contact and other information (Wuyts, 
Rindfleisch, and Citrin, 2015). The coverage bias is therefore less likely to 
be an issue as there is less likelihood of some population segment missing 
out (Blair and Zinkhan, 2006).  
 The REACH database consists of information related to both clients 
and supplier organizations. The responses for the survey measures used in 
this study were only solicited from managers belonging to client 
organizations. We focused specifically on six research-intensive industries, 
Supplier 
flexibility 
NPD project 
performance 
Organizational 
controls 
• Outcome control 
• Behavior control 
• Clan control 
Knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms (KIMs) 
H1: -, H2a: +,  
H2b: -, H3: + 
H4: + 
H5: + 
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indicated below by their two-digit U.S. standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes), because organizations in these industries are actively involved 
in intensive NPD: 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 30 (Rubber and 
Miscellaneous Plastic Products), 35 (Industrial and Commercial Machinery 
and Computer Equipment), 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical Devices and 
Components, except Computer Equipment), 37 (Transportation Equipment), 
38 (Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks Manufacturing). Within 
these six industries, we gathered contact details for 1502 organizations that 
had more than 50 employees.  
Researchers approached the NPD managers in these organizations to 
ask them if they could think of a recently completed project that had been 
outsourced to a supplier. The outsourced projects had to be recent so as to 
prevent any survey recall issues. Of the 1502 organizations, 153 had 
outsourced their NPD projects and their managers agreed to participate in the 
survey. Of these 153 managers, 109 returned usable responses, resulting in a 
response rate of 71.24%. The respondents had an average tenure of 12.5 years 
within the client organization and the average project duration was 16 
months. Following Carson (2007), we also made sure that the data did not 
include NPD outsourcing relationships where the client holds any equity in 
the supplier organization. 
 
3.4.2 Measures 
The survey constructs were developed after carefully examining the 
organizational controls and new product development literatures. The items 
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used for each construct were adapted from prior instruments. A seven-point 
Likert scale was used for all the multi-item constructs, and each item was 
measured on a scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The face 
validity of the construct items was assessed by five management scholars 
who served as judges. The items were further refined and finalized based on 
a pilot study with six product development managers to ensure that all the 
items were understandable and clear. Finally, the questionnaire was 
administered to the full sample.  
Previous studies on organizational controls have used different scales 
for the organizational controls. Drawing upon these studies, we compiled 
various items from mature scales to measure the three forms of 
organizational controls: outcome, behavior, and clan. The measure for 
Outcome control consists of seven items based on Atuahene-Gima and Li 
(2006), Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker (2002), Kirsch (1996), and Snell 
(1992b). The measures for behavior control are adapted from Bonner, 
Ruekert, and Walker (2002), Carson (2007), and Snell (1992b), and comprise 
six items. Clan control is a six-item measure, and is adapted from Kirsch 
(1996) and Kirsch et al. (2002). KIMs measures are adapted from De Luca 
and Atuahene-Gima (2007), and consists of five items. The measure for 
supplier flexibility consists of five items adapted from Bello and Gilliland 
(1997) and Gulati et al. (2005). NPD project performance is measured using 
five items that indicate the success of the project in relation to project 
objectives in terms of timing, budget, quality, technical performance, and 
general satisfaction. We consider NPD project performance to be a formative 
construct as it is a manifestation of the five measures not necessarily 
correlated with each other (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). These 
Chapter 3 
 
86 
 
perceptual measures are consistent with ones that have been used previously 
to measure the performance of NPD projects (Bonner et al., 2002; Lawson et 
al., 2015).  
Five control variables were included in this study to ensure the 
robustness of the results since other variables can account for supplier 
flexibility and NPD project performance. Respondents were asked to provide 
information on these variables in the survey. The first set of control variables 
concerns project characteristics, namely product component and supplier 
team members. We included a dummy variable for product component, and 
measured it by asking respondents whether the ‘product’ under development 
was an independent product or a component of a larger system. A product 
that is a component of a larger system involves more complexity (Swink, 
Sandvig, and Mabert, 1996), and can therefore require frequent changes, that 
is, the supplier is required to be flexible more often. Product component can 
also influence project performance in NPD projects. Independent products 
usually require low product development management influencing 
development costs and time and also involve higher knowledge utilization 
that can lead to desired quality and technical performance (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2011). We controlled for supplier team 
members as having more people within the supplier team provides access to 
a larger pool of dedicated resources and that can potentially lead to higher 
project performance (Tiwana, 2008). Also, higher levels of supplier team 
members can lead to relatively higher knowledge exchange between clients 
and suppliers (Le Dain and Merminod, 2014). Suppliers therefore are able to 
understand clients’ requirements with relative ease and can be more flexible 
to changes required by clients. Therefore, supplier team members 
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operationalized as the log transformation of supplier’s number of employees 
involved in the outsourced NPD project. 
 The second set of control variables entails relationship 
characteristics, namely geographic proximity, relationship duration, and 
previous projects. We controlled for geographic proximity, because a 
supplier that is located closely to a client is likely to be more flexible (Cannon 
and Homburg, 2001). Geographic proximity also influences NPD 
performance due to the strong relational ties between clients and their 
suppliers (Ganesan et al., 2005). The two variables, relationship duration and 
prior projects, account for the relationship history between clients and its 
suppliers. The duration (in years) of a relationship - the number of years 
client has been working with the suppliers - can also influence the various 
behavioral aspects of a client–supplier relationship (Cannon and Homburg, 
2001). Consequently, relationship duration may help explain the flexible 
behavior of suppliers. Also, clients and suppliers with a longer relationship 
are more likely to align their project-related activities and this therefore 
affects project performance (Tiwana, 2010; Wagner, 2012). Further, the 
number of projects a client and supplier have carried out together in the past 
can not only potentially facilitate development of trust and shared values 
(Carson, 2007), but also the level and speed of learning (Wagner, 2012). That 
can enhance flexible behavior in suppliers and hence performance of NPD 
projects. We therefore controlled for previous projects that the client and 
supplier have conducted in the past. Appendix 3.1 presents the constructs, 
along with the items and control variables used in this study. Table 3.1 
provides the mean, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables 
in this study. 
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3.4.3 Unidimensionality, Reliability, and Validity 
We took several steps to assess the construct unidimensionality, reliability, 
and validity. First, each item was tested for robustness to ensure that the data 
was consistent with the assumptions of multivariate analyses (normal 
distribution and linearity). We examined the skewness and kurtosis values 
(i.e., absolute values of skewness below 2.0 and kurtosis below 7.0) for all 
observed items, and also measured the Mahalanobis distance to determine 
whether the data included possible outliers. The results showed that there was 
no significant outlier in the data. Given that NPD project performance is 
operationalized as a formative construct, we did not consider it for further 
analysis as traditional techniques are not suitable for assessing its reliability 
and validity. 
  Second, we conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
maximum likelihood extraction with promax rotation to assess the 
unidimensionality of all the constructs. The analysis suggested that five 
factors underlie the data. We checked whether all the construct items loaded 
on to their designated construct factors with small cross-factor loadings. 
While factor loadings above 0.30 are considered to meet the minimum 
standard, factor loadings in the 0.40–0.50 range are preferable (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006). We deleted two items for both 
outcome control and KIMs, and one item each for behavior control and 
supplier flexibility (see Appendix 3.1). The deleted items were ones that 
either loaded low on all of the five factors, and therefore did not represent 
any of those factors, or ones that loaded high (greater than 0.40) on multiple 
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factors, and therefore did not distinguish between the various factors (Hair et 
al., 2006). The five factors account for 70.4% of the total variance in the data.  
Third, we further assessed the unidimensionality of all the constructs 
using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). To perform CFA, we evaluated 
the measurement model using the maximum likelihood (ML) approach in 
AMOS 22. As seen in Appendix 3.1, the factor loadings of all the items on 
their intended latent construct is significant at p < 0.001, supporting 
convergent validity. The measurement model was evaluated using a number 
of fit indices that are not sensitive to sample size: the ratio of 𝜒𝜒2 to degrees 
of freedom; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA); 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR); incremental fit index (IFI); 
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI); and comparative fit index (CFI) (Hair et al., 
2006; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, and Müller, 2003). The CFA results 
suggest that the measurement model has an overall good fit (χ2 /df = 1.27, 
RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, IFI = 0.96, and TLI = 0.95). 
 We used Cronbach’s alpha (α), composite reliability (CR), and 
average variance extracted (AVE) values to establish the reliability and 
convergent validity of a construct. All the constructs have Cronbach’s alpha, 
CR, and AVE values above the desired levels of 0.70, 0.70, and 0.50 
respectively, except for outcome control (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; 
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). While the AVE for outcome control (0.49) 
is below 0.50, it is still above the acceptable level of 0.40 (Menor, Kristal, 
and Rosenzweig, 2007). Also, the CR value for outcome control (.80) is 
above the threshold of 0.70, so we keep the outcome control construct in its 
current form. 
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We used the following two methods to demonstrate discriminant 
validity. First, we conducted chi-square difference tests for all the constructs 
in pairs to determine whether the restricted model (i.e., correlation fixed at 
1) is significantly poorer than the freely estimated model (correlation 
estimated freely) (Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips, 1991). The chi-square 
differences are significant for all the 10 pairs, suggesting that all constructs 
represent unique scales. Second, we compared the square root values of AVE 
with the inter-construct correlations. The square root of AVE values for each 
construct is greater than the corresponding correlations of each construct 
with other constructs, as seen in Table 3.1 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Taken 
together, the reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity tests indicate 
that the theoretical constructs exhibit acceptable psychometric properties.  
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3.4.4 Potential Biases 
Common method bias can be a potential issue when same survey respondent 
is used to collect data on independent and dependent variables (Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003). To address this issue, we first 
performed CFA using a single-factor approach. The fit for the single-factor 
model (χ2/df = 1.82, RMSEA = 0.09, SRMR = 0.13, CFI = 0.88, IFI = 0.88, 
and TLI = 0.86) is considerably poorer than for the five-factor model (χ2 /df 
= 1.27, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, IFI = 0.96, and TLI = 
0.95), and the chi-square difference between these two models is significant 
(Δχ2 (3) = 121.84, p < 0.001), indicating that the measures do not suffer from 
the common method bias. Second, we used a marker variable (MV) test 
(Lindell and Whitney, 2001). In the questionnaire, the construct software 
platform (see Appendix 3.1) was included as an MV because it is 
theoretically unrelated to the controls and KIMs variables (Tiwana, 2008). 
We computed the adjusted construct correlations for all the variables and 
their statistical significance using the lowest positive correlation (r = 0.006) 
between the MV and other variables. Table 3.1 shows that all correlations 
did not change substantially for the predictor variables after the adjustment. 
These results provide reassuring evidence that the results of this study are not 
strongly influenced by common method bias.  
We also checked for the potential multicollinearity issues. As per Mason 
and Perrault’s (1991) recommendation, each independent variable was 
regressed on the other independent variable to detect linear relationships 
between them. None of the R-square values between the independent 
variables exceeded the R-square value of the overall model, indicating that 
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multicollinearity is not an issue. Further, the maximum variance inflation 
factor (VIF) score of 1.7 is much lower than the recommended value of 10 
(O’Brien, 2007), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major issue in this 
study. 
 
3.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The hypothesized relationships as shown in Figure 3.1 were tested by 
performing path analysis using co-variance-based structural equation 
modelling (SEM) with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in AMOS. We 
used the SEM approach because it is better than the common regression 
analysis approach for testing indirect relationships between different 
constructs, especially for sample sizes of less than 200 (Iacobucci, Saldanha, 
and Deng, 2007). The path analysis was performed using the bootstrapping 
option. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric statistical method that repeatedly 
samples from the available dataset with replacement and is particularly useful 
for small samples as it helps to avoid the problems caused by asymmetric 
and non-normal sampling distributions (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). The 
number of resamples for the estimation of bias-corrected bootstrap intervals 
was set at 5,000 and the level of confidence intervals at 95%. For the path 
analysis, a single indicator was used for each of the constructs as this 
minimizes the variance shared by the indicator of each construct and 
therefore reduces the effect of sampling error on the parameter estimates 
(Landis, Beal, and Tesluk, 2000). 
 Before testing the hypotheses, we empirically tested the various 
alternative nested models to ensure that we were using the right model to 
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analyze the hypothesized relationships (Iacobucci et al., 2007). The model 
with both the hypothesized relationships and the direct links from 
organizational controls and KIMs to NPD project performance was therefore 
compared with the full mediation model and the model with direct effects 
only. The full mediation model included direct paths from the three 
organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) and KIMs to supplier 
flexibility, and from supplier flexibility to NPD project performance. In the 
direct effects model, organizational controls and KIMs are directly related to 
NPD project performance.  
 
Table 3.2. Fit Statistics for Alternative Models 
Model fit criterion 
Full model 
with direct 
and indirect 
effects 
Full mediation 
model with 
supplier 
flexibility as 
mediator 
Direct effects only 
model (model 
without supplier 
flexibility) 
χ2 29.542 45.145 72.594 
df 27 31 32 
RMSEA 0.03 0.07 0.11 
SRMR 0.07 0.08 0.10 
IFI 0.99 0.92 0.77 
TLI 0.97 0.84 0.55 
CFI 0.98 0.91 0.74 
Chi-square 
difference (compared 
to full model) 
- 15.60** 43.05*** 
Notes: *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001 
As shown in Table 3.2, the fit indices and chi-square differences clearly 
indicate that the full model (with direct and indirect effects) is better than the 
full mediation model (Δχ2 (4) = 15.60, p < 0.01) and the direct effects model 
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(Δχ2 (5) = 43.05, p < 0.001). Taken together, the results suggest that the full 
model fits the data very well. 
To address the potential endogeneity issue, the errors terms of the 
mediator (supplier flexibility) and the dependent variable (NPD project 
performance) were allowed to co-vary in the full model, as suggested by 
Antonakis et al. (2010). The model fit (χ2= 29.542, df = 27, RMSEA = 0.040, 
SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.98, IFI = 0.98, and TLI = 0.95) did not change 
compared to the full model. Also, the correlation estimate between the error 
terms of supplier flexibility and NPD project performance was non-
significant. These results indicate that endogeneity does not undermine the 
structural path estimates presented in Table 3.3. 
 
3.5.1 Hypothesized Effects Results 
In Table 3.3 we present the path estimates for the hypothesized relationships. 
H1 positively links outcome control to supplier flexibility. The path estimate 
for this path is significant (β = 0.266, p < .01). H1 is thus supported. Our 
results do not support either H2a or H2b, as the estimate for the path leading 
to supplier flexibility from behavior control is not significant (β = 0.032, 
n.s.). In H3 we hypothesize that clan control is positively associated with 
supplier flexibility. The results show that the path estimate is positively 
significant (β = 0.373, p < .001), and hence support H3.  
 H4 predicts that KIMs are positively associated with supplier 
flexibility. We do not find support for H4 as, contrary to our hypothesis, the 
estimate for the path between KIMs and supplier flexibility path is negative 
and also not significant (β = -0.167, n.s.). The estimate for the path between 
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supplier flexibility and NPD project performance is significant and in the 
expected direction (β = 0.315, p < 0.01). H5 is therefore supported. 
 
Table 3.3. Path Analysis: Standardized Parameter Estimates 
  Standardized coefficient 
Proposed 
effect Result 
Hypothesized Relationships     
H1: Outcome control → supplier flexibility 0.266** Positive Positive 
H2a,b: Behavior control → supplier flexibility 0.032 
Positive 
or 
Negative 
Non-
significant 
H3: Clan control → supplier flexibility 0.373*** Positive Positive 
H4: KIMs → supplier flexibility -0.167 Positive Non-significant 
H5: Supplier flexibility → NPD project performance 0.315** Positive Positive 
 
Outcome control → NPD project performance -0.260* 
Behavior control → NPD project performance 0.074 
Clan control → NPD project performance 0.308** 
KIMs → NPD project performance 0.118 
 
Control Relationships   
Geographic proximity → supplier flexibility 0.027 
Previous projects → supplier flexibility -0.090 
Relationship duration → supplier flexibility -0.152† 
Supplier team members → supplier flexibility -0.237* 
Product component → supplier flexibility -0.022 
Geographic proximity → NPD project performance -0.038 
Previous projects → NPD project performance 0.271* 
Relationship duration → NPD project performance 
Supplier team members → NPD project performance 
-0.110 
0.014 
Product component → NPD project performance 0.102 
   
Variance explained (R2) Supplier 
flexibility 
 0.370 
Variance explained (R2) NPD project 
performance 
 0.321 
Notes:*p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001 (all two-tailed test). Significance levels are based on 
bootstrapped, bias-corrected confidence intervals.   
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3.5.2 Post-hoc Analyses: Mediation Effects  
To gain additional insights, post-hoc analyses were conducted to investigate 
whether supplier flexibility mediates the relationship of the three controls 
(outcome, behavior, and clan) and KIMs with NPD project performance. 
Table 3.4 presents the detailed standardized coefficient estimates for the 
total, direct, and indirect effects computed for the mediation analysis. As seen 
in Table 3.4, the results suggest that the estimate for the path leading from 
outcome control to NPD project performance is significant but negative (β = 
-0.260, p < 0.05). Given the positive zero-order correlation between outcome 
control and NPD project performance (see Table 3.1), we conducted some 
further analysis which revealed that outcome control is a suppressed variable 
in relation to NPD project performance (see Appendix 3.2 for details). A 
statistical model should account for the suppression effect as it advances 
theoretical development because without the suppressor variable the 
relationship between an independent and a dependent variable may be 
smaller or may be of opposite signs (Cheung and Lau, 2008; Maassen and 
Bakker, 2001). Therefore, to interpret the results, one should combine the 
effects of both the suppressor variable and the suppressed variable (Cheung 
and Lau, 2008). Since outcome control is a suppressed variable, the model 
without other predictors of NPD project performance underestimates the 
direct negative effect of outcome control on NPD project performance. Thus, 
by including behavior control, clan control, KIMs, and supplier flexibility in 
our model, we get a more accurate path estimate for direct effect of outcome 
control on NPD project performance. The results shown in Table 3.4 further 
demonstrate that the indirect effect of outcome control on NPD project 
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performance is significant but positive (β = 0.084, p < 0.01). As such, the 
total effect between outcome control and NPD project performance is not 
significant. The results therefore imply that there is competitive mediation 
(or inconsistent mediation) in the relationship between outcome control and 
NPD project performance. Competitive mediation exists when an 
independent variable has both direct and indirect effects on a dependent 
variable, but these effects have opposite signs; this may result in an overall 
non-significant effect between the two variables (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen, 
2010). Thus, supplier flexibility mediates the relationship between outcome 
control and NPD project performance.  
As seen in Table 3.4, the direct and indirect effects of behavior 
control on project performance are not significant. Supplier flexibility 
therefore does not mediate the relationship between behavior control and 
NPD project performance. Concerning clan control, the analysis 
demonstrates that the path estimates for the direct (β = 0.308, p < 0.01) and 
indirect (β = 0.118, p < 0.01) effects of clan control on NPD project 
performance are positive and significant. As such, supplier flexibility 
mediates the relationship between clan control and NPD project 
performance. The direct effect of KIMs on NPD project performance is not 
significant (β = 0.118, n.s.). In contrast, the indirect effect of KIMs on project 
performance through supplier flexibility is negative and significant (β = -
0.053, p < 0.05), suggesting an indirect-only mediation (Zhao et al., 2010). 
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3.6 DISCUSSION 
Organizations increasingly regard outsourcing of NPD activities to suppliers 
as a strategic means of improving NPD project performance. The 
overarching objective of this study was to provide new insights regarding 
supplier flexibility in NPD outsourcing. This study investigated 
organizational controls and KIMs as the mechanisms that clients can 
leverage to generate more flexible behavior from suppliers, enabling them to 
resolve cooperation and coordination issues and thus achieve better NPD 
project performance. Our empirical analysis of survey data from 109 NPD 
projects that involved outsourcing shows that outcome and clan control 
stimulate supplier flexibility, leading to higher NPD project performance, but 
that the use of behavior control and KIMs does not enhance supplier 
flexibility. Post-hoc analyses reveal that supplier flexibility mediates the 
relationship of outcome and clan control to NPD project performance and 
that KIMs have an indirect effect on NPD project performance via supplier 
flexibility. On the whole, this research makes significant contributions to the 
literature and also has implications for the practice. 
 
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study makes three important contributions to the literature. The first key 
contribution is that it reveals the direct effects of organizational control on 
supplier flexibility in NPD outsourcing. The results show that, while 
outcome and clan control are effective in increasing the willingness of 
suppliers to behave flexibly, behavior control is not. Our results are therefore 
not in line with those of traditional control research, where scholars often 
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advocate using one form of control in a particular context (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1985; Ouchi, 1979). The differences in how outcome and clan control affect 
supplier flexibility relative to behavior control may also be explained by the 
fact that outcome and clan control allow suppliers to select their own methods 
and procedures to complete the outsourced activities. In contrast, behavior 
control can restrict suppliers from using their own specific knowledge, 
preventing them from responding quickly to the changes required by clients 
(Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). 
Suppliers are therefore less willing to respond to changes in the clients’ 
requirements. However, since our results indicate that behavior control does 
not influence the supplier flexibility, the dysfunctional effects of behavior 
control are probably offset by its positive influence and this is an area that 
warrants further investigation.  
The finding that behavior control does not enhance supplier 
flexibility also supports the previous observation of Sihag and Rijsdijk 
(2019) that this form of control is not effective in NPD tasks because of the 
high levels of complexity involved in such tasks. This finding is interesting 
in that it runs counter to the notion found in the literature that using a 
structured procedure is helpful when dealing with unpredictable 
requirements (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). 
One plausible explanation could be that using behavior control is beneficial 
for alignment of interests only when the control sets the boundary conditions 
for how outsourced NPD activities should be carried out. However, behavior 
control does little or nothing to enhance supplier flexibility if it becomes too 
explicit in defining the procedures that suppliers have to follow when 
undertaking those activities. Overall, we encourage future research to focus 
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on developing a more detailed understanding of how behavior control 
functions in NPD outsourcing by examining the degree of specifying rules 
and procedures moderates the effects of behavior control on performance.  
The second key contribution of our study is that it provides insights 
into the relationship between KIMs and supplier flexibility in NPD 
outsourcing. However, contrary to our prediction, we find that KIMs do not 
foster supplier flexibility. The fact that KIMs appeared to have little or no 
influence might be due to differences in perception between clients and 
suppliers (Chen et al., 2016). For instance, a client may feel that the project 
requirements need to change and use KIMs to communicate that fact. The 
supplier, however, sees no need for these changes, and therefore interprets 
the use of KIMs as a sign that the client does not trust it as a supplier and is 
looking to analyze something which it, the supplier, has done wrong. In these 
circumstances the use of KIMs by a client will not encourage a supplier to be 
more flexible. 
Previous research has shown that in situations where there is a high 
level of variability, communication mechanisms between buyers and 
suppliers are often not effective because the two parties have different 
perceptions of these mechanisms and the purpose behind them (Oosterhuis 
et al., 2011; Yan and Dooley, 2013). However, our results do not dispute the 
fact that mechanisms that facilitate knowledge sharing between clients and 
suppliers are important. Rather, our results appear to call into question the 
claim that using knowledge-sharing mechanisms will readily improve 
performance in inter-organizational relationships. This may or may not be 
the case, depending on how suppliers perceive the use of such mechanisms. 
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Future research therefore needs to examine in depth the role of KIMs in NPD 
outsourcing. 
The third key contribution of this study is that it elucidates the role of 
supplier flexibility in NPD outsourcing. Our results support the assertion that 
flexible behavior from suppliers helps clients to achieve higher performance 
(Liao et al., 2010; Narayanan and Narasimhan, 2014). Our post-hoc analyses 
provide further insights into the role of supplier flexibility in NPD 
outsourcing. The analyses suggest that supplier flexibility mediates the 
effectiveness of outcome and clan control, but does not mediate the 
relationship between behavior control and NPD project performance. 
Specifically, the analyses show that both outcome and clan control enhance 
project performance through their effect on supplier flexibility. The post-hoc 
analyses also demonstrate that KIMs indirectly diminish NPD project 
performance via supplier flexibility. Supplier flexibility is therefore one of 
the most important elements in the relationship between clients and suppliers 
in NPD outsourcing, and plays a critical role in the success of NPD projects.  
Our post-hoc analyses also reveal that clan control also has direct 
positive effects on NPD project performance. A plausible explanation for this 
positive effect is that clan control helps to create close channels between 
clients and suppliers for sharing interpersonal information. Having many bi-
directional information-sharing channels has been found to make suppliers 
more committed to the relationship, so that they become more intrinsically 
motivated to maintain it (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). With regard to 
outcome control, the post-hoc analyses show that this form of control is a 
double-edged sword; while it can benefit performance indirectly by 
encouraging supplier flexibility, it can also have a direct adverse effect on 
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performance. Although the finding that outcome control diminishes NPD 
project performance needs further investigation because of the negative 
suppression effects, it provides support for the agency theory assertion that 
rewarding controllees (i.e., suppliers) based on performance outcomes in 
settings that involve variability (NPD projects in this case) transfers risk to 
them because achieving those outcomes is dependent on their actions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As controllees are risk-averse, they behave 
opportunistically and that has a negative effect on performance. Collectively, 
this study’s findings complement the contemporary work on controls which 
suggests that each type of organizational control works in a different way 
(e.g., Cardinal et al., 2010; Turner and Makhija, 2006). 
 
3.6.2 Managerial Implications 
This study has a number of managerial implications. Managers should 
recognize that not all mechanisms can be used to promote supplier flexibility. 
They need to understand that exercising behavior controls may not pay off in 
NPD outsourcing settings, as their prescriptive nature may not give suppliers 
sufficient flexibility. Managers should also exercise caution when using 
KIMs as these mechanisms can result in lower NPD project performance by 
adversely effecting supplier flexibility. 
To promote flexible behavior from suppliers, managers should focus 
particularly on using outcome and clan control. To achieve greater success, 
they should prioritize clan control as this not only leads to higher NPD 
project performance by making suppliers behave flexibly but also has other 
positive effects on performance because it helps in developing a common 
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vision and spirit, both of which are central to the functioning of inter-
organizational relationships (Chua et al., 2012; Liu, 2015). By contrast, the 
fact that outcome control can have both beneficial and detrimental effects on 
the NPD project performance raises the question of how to exercise this form 
of control effectively. Managers thus need to think carefully before using this 
form of control. They should not only analyze the potential benefits but also 
consider the challenges involved. For example, they should take care not to 
specify outcomes that involve factors beyond the control of suppliers, as this 
can then transfer undue risk to the suppliers. Risk of this kind can lead to 
suppliers to behave opportunistically, thereby making the outcome control 
less effective (Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014). However, specifying 
outcomes that are achievable and allowing open discussion of any outcomes 
that are beyond the suppliers’ control can help in ensuring NPD projects are 
completed successfully. Managers should therefore assess the risks 
associated with achieving each of the specified outcomes. Overall, since 
supplier flexibility is such an important element of the NPD outsourcing 
relationship and critical to the successful completion of projects, managers 
should take all the steps needed to foster flexibility in their suppliers. 
 
3.7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has limitations that should be taken into account when 
interpreting the research findings and identifying areas for future research. 
The first limitation is that the data used in this study is cross-sectional. Cross-
sectional data limits the ability to draw conclusions regarding causality. 
Therefore, future studies should include alternative types of data, such as 
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longitudinal or experimental data that allow scholars to examine the causal 
effect of organizational controls and KIMs on the project performance over 
the course of the project. The second limitation of this study is that it uses 
self-reported data collected from a single respondent from each client 
organization. While common method bias is not regarded as a serious 
concern when using CFA techniques, the possibility of some common 
method bias affecting the research findings cannot be ruled out. It would be 
fruitful for future studies to collect data from multiple respondents from each 
client organization. In addition, future research could use additional sources 
to measure the dependent variable in order to minimize the potential impact 
of common method bias. The third and final limitation of our study is the 
small sample size, although this similar to other studies at the project level 
(e.g., Tiwana and Keil 2009; Liu 2015), as large sample sizes are difficult to 
obtain at this level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Supplier Compliance or Motivation? A Self-Determination Theory 
Perspective of Organizational Controls in New Product Development 
Outsourcing 
 
ABSTRACT 
Organizations outsource new product development (NPD) tasks to benefit 
from the idiosyncratic expertise of suppliers. To effectively leverage 
suppliers’ expertise, organizations use various forms of organizational 
control. Controls can either trigger compliance or prompt intrinsic 
motivation. Building on self-determination theory (SDT), this study 
examines the influence of outcome, behavior, and clan control on supplier 
mechanical compliance and intrinsic motivation. An empirical investigation 
based on the survey data from 114 suppliers involved in NPD outsourcing 
shows that outcome control promotes mechanical compliance as it 
discourages a supplier from utilizing its own idiosyncratic knowledge 
sometimes, but behavior control does not induce mechanical compliance. We 
also find that mechanical compliance can be attenuated by exercising clan 
control. The findings further reveal that using outcome and behavior control 
does not undermine the intrinsic motivation to perform the outsourced NPD 
tasks, whereas clan control stimulates intrinsic motivation. Finally, post-hoc 
analyses indicate that supplier mechanical compliance is critical to 
understand the relationship of outcome and clan controls with project 
performance in NPD outsourcing. The NPD project performance is curtailed 
by outcome control via supplier mechanical compliance, but clan control 
improves NPD project performance by curtailing mechanical compliance. 
Overall, the study improves our understanding of the behavioral 
consequences of controls.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
NPD outsourcing helps organizations to gain access to the complementary 
specialized knowledge of suppliers (Carson, 2007; Quinn, 2000). In NPD 
outsourcing, suppliers are usually required to develop a particular component 
of a product or technology that underlies the component of the outsourcing 
organization’s product, but at times they are also needed to deliver the 
complete product or technology (Carson, 2007; Lawson et al., 2015; Stanko 
and Calantone, 2011). The idiosyncratic expertise of suppliers, such as 
innovative capabilities, engineering skills, technological knowledge, help 
them to perform the outsourced NPD tasks (Carson, 2007; Stanko and 
Calantone, 2011). Suppliers that are also intrinsically motivated are better 
able to perform the outsourced tasks because intrinsic motivation enhances 
creative behavior and problem-solving capabilities and that are necessary as 
well for the completion of NPD tasks (Amabile, 1997; Burroughs et al., 
2011). Therefore, a lack of use of idiosyncratic expertise by suppliers and 
their lower intrinsic motivation can greatly impact the completion of 
outsourced tasks (Carson, 2007; Tiwana and Keil, 2007).  
Research has shown that organizations can use organizational 
controls to direct and motivate suppliers to behave in a desired manner 
(Carson, 2007; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2019). Scholars have, however, made 
implicit observations in prior research that controls can induce varied 
behavioral responses in external partners, especially the ones that differ from 
those that are desirable. For example, Tiwana and Keil (2007) have noted 
that a client’s use of explicit procedures in outsourced projects could 
sometimes lead its suppliers to dutifully follow the specified procedures and 
discourage them from effectively applying their idiosyncratic expertise due 
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to fear of non-compliance. Further, Grewal et al. (2013) observed that the use 
of controls by a subsidiary of multinational corporation can also inhibit 
foreign distributor’s motivation to perform the outsourced tasks. 
Extrapolating these observations to NPD outsourcing makes things even 
more complicated considering that organizations outsource their tasks to 
leverage suppliers’ idiosyncratic expertise and also need their suppliers to be 
intrinsically motivated to perform the outsourced NPD tasks (Carson, 2007; 
Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Organizational controls in NPD outsourcing 
therefore could also lead to behaviors that differ from those needed for 
completion of outsourced NPD tasks, which partially explains why 
organizations that outsource their NPD tasks sometimes fail short of inducing 
desired behaviors. Scholars and practitioners therefore need to understand 
the relationship of organizational controls with their behavioral 
consequences for effective governance of outsourced NPD tasks. In 
particular, there is a need to examine whether organizational controls in NPD 
outsourcing can influence a supplier to adhere to the specified prescriptions 
such that it sometimes does not use its own idiosyncratic expertise, and also 
restrict the intrinsic motivation of the supplier.  
To address this knowledge gap, this study examines the following 
research question: what are the effects of various organizational controls on 
supplier mechanical compliance and intrinsic motivation? Supplier 
mechanical compliance refers the extent to which a supplier sometimes 
adheres to specified prescriptions without using its own idiosyncratic 
expertise and effective way of working, whereas intrinsic motivation refers 
to the intent of a supplier to perform a task in order to experience satisfaction 
and enjoyment inherent in the task (Tiwana and Keil, 2007; Van Yperen and 
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Hagedoorn, 2003). Our definition of supplier mechanical compliance is 
distinct from the term supplier compliance discussed in the extant inter-
organizational literature. While supplier compliance describes a supplier’s 
adherence to the prescriptions specified by the outsourcing organization (B. 
Jiang, 2009; Payan and McFarland, 2005), supplier mechanical compliance 
encompasses the notion that a supplier sometimes can become reluctant to 
use its own idiosyncratic expertise and the most effective way of working so 
as to comply with outsourcing organization’s prescriptions (Tiwana and Keil, 
2007).  
Researchers have generally recommended that to better understand 
the behavioral implication of controls, one should take into account the 
perspective of those on whom the controls are exercised (Long et al., 2011; 
Long and Sitkin, 2018). This perspective would help scholars to better 
understand how those that are subjected to controls perceive the controls they 
encounter and stimulate their behavioral responses, such as compliance and 
intrinsic motivation, to them (Korsgaard et al., 2010; Long, 2010; Weibel, 
2010). As such, the aforementioned research question is therefore examined 
from suppliers’ perspective.  
This study uses SDT as the theoretical lens to explain how 
organizational controls can influence supplier mechanical compliance and 
intrinsic motivation. SDT explains the different regulatory processes that 
underlie the mechanisms that influence extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
(Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan and Deci, 2000b). Specifically, SDT specifies 
that the regulatory processes range from passive compliance based on the 
avoidance of non-compliance to external prescriptions (extrinsic motivation) 
to active commitment based on the inherent enjoyment and interest (intrinsic 
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motivation) (Ryan and Deci, 2000b). SDT details the different factors that 
promote or reduce compliance and intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 
2002; Ryan, 1995). Using SDT, this study explains how controls that involve 
adherence with explicit outcomes and procedures emphasize compliance, but 
diminish intrinsic motivation. In contrast, controls that involve 
internalization of values, beliefs and norms reduce mechanical compliance, 
but increases intrinsic motivation.  
This study makes several contributions. First, this study contributes to 
the controls literature by applying SDT and empirically revealing the effects 
of various organizational controls on supplier mechanical compliance and 
intrinsic motivation. In doing so, the study extends the body of research on 
controls in inter-organizational context and NPD tasks as that has mostly 
focused either on the effectiveness of controls in the outsourcing context or 
in-house NPD projects (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2019). Second, our study 
complements and extends the controls research that has looked at behavioral 
responses to controls in intra-organizational settings (e.g., Boss et al., 2009; 
Ramaswami, 1996). Although this research provides important empirical 
insights (e.g., Boss et al., 2009; Ramaswami, 1996), but it does not capture 
the characteristics of an inter-organizational setting that involves weaker 
managerial authority (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003). Due to relatively 
weak managerial authority, a supplier, unlike an employee in an 
organization, has relatively more discretion of not following the measures 
and procedures specified by the outsourcing organization.  
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4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
4.2.1 Organizational Controls 
Organizational controls refer to the process that can be applied by a controller 
(i.e., one who exercises control) to align a controllee’s (i.e., one over whom 
the control is exercised) behaviors with its own interests (Sihag and Rijsdijk, 
2019; Turner and Makhija, 2006). In outsourcing, the controller is usually 
the outsourcing organization (henceforth as clients) and the controllee is the 
supplier that is responsible for performing the outsourced tasks (Tiwana, 
2008; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). The extant research on organizational controls 
that is based on Ouchi’s (1979, 1980) seminal work has examined 
fundamentally three different controls: outcome, behavior, and clan. 
Outcome control involves a controller evaluating a controllee  based on 
achievement of specified outputs (Tiwana and Keil, 2007; Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). Behavior control involves a controller assessing a controllee 
based on adherence to specified procedures (Cardinal, 2001; Turner and 
Makhija, 2006). Despite the differences in the ways in which controllees are 
evaluated in outcome and behavior controls, both of them direct behaviors 
by evaluating adherence with documented measures. In contrast, clan control 
involves a controller using socialization mechanisms to promulgate desired 
behaviors among controllees. Clan control operates through development of 
shared norms, values, and beliefs (Kirsch et al., 2010; Turner and Makhija, 
2006).  
Controls can differ along various dimensions, such as formality, 
target, motivation, and informational and social prerequisites (Cardinal et al., 
2010; Korsgaard et al., 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). This study builds on 
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the motivational dimension to conceptualize the behavioral mechanisms that 
underlie various controls. Research and theory suggest that various controls 
operate through distinct motivational mechanisms to facilitate cooperative 
behavior (Korsgaard et al., 2010; Weibel, 2010). While controls that involve 
external contingency mechanisms emphasize adherence with explicit outputs 
and procedures, controls that involve social influence mechanisms 
emphasize internalization of values, norms, and beliefs (Cardinal et al., 2004; 
Korsgaard et al., 2010). As such, outcome and behavior controls facilitate 
cooperative behavior based on extrinsically motivated behavior through 
compliance with external regulations and clan control based on intrinsic 
motivation due to internalization of values, norms, and beliefs (Korsgaard et 
al., 2010; Weibel, 2007, 2010). Next, we define the compliance and intrinsic 
motivation constructs used in the study. 
 
4.2.2 Supplier Mechanical Compliance and Intrinsic Motivation 
In outsourcing, a supplier sometimes might pursue compliance to specified 
measures in a mechanistic manner. That is, a supplier might follow a client’s 
prescriptions even though the prescribed measures and rules does not 
completely fit with the thinking and how it usually does its work. To 
represent this view of compliance, we use the term supplier mechanical 
compliance and conceptualize it as the extent to which a supplier sometimes 
adheres to a client’s prescriptions without using its own idiosyncratic 
expertise and effective way of working (Tiwana and Keil, 2007). This 
definition differs from the concept of compliance discussed in the extant 
literature. Compliance has been defined as one actor following the 
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instructions of the other actor (e.g., O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Payan and 
McFarland, 2005).  
Studies that have focused on compliance in intra-organizational 
context have used the term “obedience to authority” based on Milgram’s 
(1974) work (e.g., Brief et al., 2000; Krackow and Blass, 1995). Obedience 
to authority is defined as an individual doing what it’s being told to do by a 
managerial authority (Blass, 1999). Further, in the control literature, Boss et 
al. (2009) have discussed the notion of compliance by employing the concept 
of ‘mandatoriness’, which refers to the extent to which an individual 
perceives that conformance with policies and procedures that are specified 
by the organizational management is necessary. The individual follows the 
specified policies and procedures because of the perceived managerial 
authority of organizational management (Boss et al., 2009). We, however, 
believe the terms “obedience”, “authority”, and “mandatoriness” do not fully 
represent our notion of compliance for several reasons. First, there is 
relatively less direct managerial authority that exists in an outsourcing 
context because suppliers are generally not direct employees of clients 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003). Therefore, unlike an employee in an 
organization, a supplier has relatively higher discretion of not obediently 
following the policies and procedures specified by the client. Second, the 
organizational separation between the client and supplier can make the 
monitoring of specified outcomes and procedures relatively difficult. 
Therefore, the supplier’s perception related to the conformance with policies 
and procedures is necessary may be lower. 
Intrinsic motivation refers to the intent of carrying out a task to 
experience the satisfaction and enjoyment that are integral to the task (Ryan 
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and Deci, 2000a; Van Yperen and Hagedoorn, 2003). The construct intrinsic 
motivation has been largely researched at the individual level. In this study, 
we examine the intrinsic motivation of a supplier and that refers to the intent 
of a supplier to perform a task in order to experience satisfaction and 
enjoyment inherent in the task. Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) assert that 
the constructs that have different structures (i.e., at different levels) can 
perform similar functions. They define function as “the causal outputs or 
effects of a given construct” (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999, pg. 254). 
Therefore, the intrinsic motivation construct in this study at organizational 
level (i.e., supplier) serves the same function as the intrinsic motivation 
construct at an individual level. That is because, just like an individual’s 
intrinsic motivation, the supplier’s intrinsic motivation captures the 
willingness of a supplier to perform a task in order to experience satisfaction 
and enjoyment inherent in the task. Therefore, even though the structure of 
the intrinsic motivation of a supplier in our study is different from the 
structure of the intrinsic motivation of an individual, both of them serve the 
same function.  
 
4.2.3 Self-Determination Theory 
SDT postulates that behaviors can be motivated either through external 
regulation or through internalization of values (Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan 
and Deci, 2000b). While mechanisms that involve satisfying an external 
contingency motivates compliance, whereas mechanisms that focus on 
internalization of values enhance intrinsic motivation. Further, SDT 
recognizes three factors that play a critical role in influencing internalization 
of values: autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 2002; 
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Ryan, 1995). Autonomy indicates the degree to which individuals perceive 
that they have the freedom to select their own behaviors (Ryan and Deci, 
2000b). Competence refers to the feeling of individuals that is associated 
with the opportunity to apply and exhibit their capabilities (Deci and Ryan, 
2002). Relatedness reflects the individuals’ feelings of connectedness with 
others and concerns their sense of being in unity with others (Ryan, 1995). 
Some scholars have also applied cognitive evaluation theory (CET) to study 
intrinsic motivation in inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Chae et al., 
2017). Although CET is based on SDT, CET does not discuss the relatedness 
dimension and, as such, does not focus on the relational aspect between the 
two actors involved in a relationship (Gagné and Deci, 2005).  
Although SDT is an individual-level theory, the theory can be employed 
at an inter-organizational level because an organization can be considered as 
a social actor whose actions can be attributed to individuals that constitute 
the organization (King, Felin, and Whetten, 2010). Whetten et al. (2009) 
claim that a theory can be vertically borrowed, that is, a theory meant for 
individual level of analysis can be used for organizational level of analysis 
when an organization can be considered as a social actor.  
 We use SDT to contend that outcome and behavior control can 
enhance supplier mechanical compliance because they rely on adherence 
with external contingency and undermine intrinsic motivation as they can 
thwart some of the factors needed for internalization of values; whereas clan 
control not only reduces supplier mechanical compliance, but also facilitates 
intrinsic motivation because it emphasizes internalization of values for 
regulating behaviors. Figure 4.1 presents the theoretical model that is 
examined in this study. 
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical model based on SDT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.3.1 Outcome Control, Supplier Mechanical Compliance, and 
Intrinsic Motivation 
In outcome control, clients specify the outputs that suppliers need to 
accomplish. Such outputs in NPD outsourcing can include predetermined 
budgets, project cycle time, and delivery milestones. Once clients have 
specified the outputs, they monitor and evaluate their suppliers on the basis 
of the achievement of the specified outputs (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Tiwana 
and Keil, 2009). Suppliers usually have limited discretion in changing or 
adjusting the outputs afterwards (Tiwana, 2010). According to SDT, such 
imposed outputs can lead to the perception of external regulation and 
therefore can result in compliance (Ryan and Deci, 2000b).  
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Further, outcome control function as a market based mechanism 
because the controllees (i.e., suppliers) are evaluated based on achievement 
of outputs (Long et al., 2011). SDT indicates that pressurized evaluations can 
also be perceived as satisfying the external demand (i.e., outputs)  and 
therefore can result in compliance such that the work is mostly performed to 
achieve some specified outcomes (Ryan and Deci, 2000b). That could 
discourage suppliers, at times, from applying their own knowledge and 
putting their own ideas forward if the ideas do not contribute towards the 
achievement of specified outputs. Snell (1992, pg. 296) also notes that 
outcome control can sometimes stimulate “myopic behavior” in controllees 
such that they become overly focused on specified goals by excluding other 
unspecified important outcomes. In sum, clients’ use of an outcome control 
can sometimes induce its suppliers to behave in such a manner that they 
simply follow specified outputs to the exclusion of their own idiosyncratic 
expertise. Thus, we hypothesize 
H1: Outcome control is positively associated with supplier 
mechanical compliance. 
 
 Outcome control does not require that clients closely monitor the 
actions of their suppliers as they can easily gather information from the 
outputs of suppliers for judging whether they met the specified outputs or not 
(Tiwana, 2010). It therefore follows a hands-off approach, that is, clients 
need not be actively engaged with suppliers for effectively exercising 
outcome control (Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Such 
a disengagement could lead to suppliers feeling disconnected from their 
clients and therefore can hurt suppliers’ sense of connectedness. SDT 
Chapter 4 
 
119 
 
maintains that a low feeling of relatedness has an adverse effect on intrinsic 
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2002). Outcome control can therefore undermine 
the intrinsic motivation of suppliers. 
 Outcome control although allows little or no discretion to suppliers 
for selecting their own goals, the hands-off approach of outcome control 
allows suppliers to select their own behaviors (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; 
Turner and Makhija, 2006). Outcome control, therefore does not fully limit 
suppliers’ independence in making their own choices and, as such, does not 
completely weaken their sense of autonomy. However, as outcome control 
involves evaluation of suppliers against the specified outputs, it institutes a 
strong extrinsic incentives system (Tiwana, 2010). Such extrinsic incentives 
can be seen by suppliers as a means to achieve the specified goals rather than 
as an opportunity to apply their capabilities. The suppliers are therefore less 
likely to be satisfied with their expectation of showcasing their capabilities 
and that in turn can undermine suppliers’ feeling of competence. According 
to SDT, mechanisms that thwarts feelings of competence diminishes intrinsic 
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985). Extant research on intrinsic motivation 
also indicates that evaluation contingent on extrinsic incentives impair 
intrinsic motivation because it weakens the feeling of autonomy and 
competence (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999). Overall, outcome control is 
expected to undermine the intrinsic motivation of suppliers and we therefore 
hypothesize: 
H2: Outcome control is negatively associated with supplier’s 
intrinsic motivation. 
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4.3.2 Behavior Control, Supplier Mechanical Compliance, and 
Intrinsic Motivation 
Behavior control involves clients specifying the methods and procedures that 
they expect their suppliers to follow while performing the outsourced tasks 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). In NPD 
outsourcing, clients can specify processes such as product development 
methodologies and procedures. Suppliers are evaluated based on how well 
they adhered to the specified methods and procedures while carrying out the 
outsourced tasks (Tiwana, 2010). SDT indicates that evaluation contingent 
on directives can be perceived as an external regulation and can result in 
performing a task to only satisfy the external contingencies (Ryan and Deci, 
2000b). Therefore, evaluation of suppliers based on specified processes and 
methods can lead to extrinsically motivated behavior in suppliers such that 
they perform the task in a manner that adheres with the specified 
contingencies (i.e., methods and procedures). 
 Tiwana (2010) also suggests that imposing strict procedural 
guidelines can constrain suppliers from applying their own idiosyncratic 
knowledge due to the fear of non-compliance. Even if behavior control relies 
on detailed and comprehensive procedural guidelines, such guidelines are 
more likely to be at a macro level (i.e., general product development 
methodologies) rather than at a micro-level (i.e., detailed design and 
manufacturing processes). Suppliers can, therefore, for a positive evaluation, 
become too much focused on adhering to the specified macro-level 
guidelines to the exclusion of their own expertise at micro-level. Kerr (1975) 
also notes that organizations usually emphasize procedures that are highly 
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visible and can be easily measured, but ignores the procedures associated 
with task that are not visible and that promotes behaviors with a too much 
focus on following the emphasized procedures.  
Clients generally evaluate their suppliers either by directly 
monitoring their adherence to prescribed methods and procedures or through 
the reports provided by the suppliers (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; 
Tiwana, 2010). According to SDT, such demanding evaluations contingent 
on external regulations can stimulate compliance. Further, Tiwana and Keil 
(2007) argues that  monitoring suppliers’ adherence to the prescribed 
procedures can also imply a lack of trust and that can stimulate suppliers to 
sometimes exhibit compliance with the specified procedures even though 
that is not how they usually work. In sum, we expect behavior control to 
foster supplier mechanical compliance and that leads use to hypothesize: 
H3: Behavior control is positively associated with supplier 
mechanical compliance. 
 
The specification of procedures in behavior control limits the 
independence of suppliers to select their own methods and procedures. 
Behavior control therefore thwarts a supplier’s sense of relative 
independence (Das and Teng, 1998). Specifying procedures can also signal 
a supplier that it’s client does not trust the supplier to be competent enough 
to completed the outsourced tasks without its guidance (Tiwana, 2010). As 
such, the use of behavior control by clients can send negative signals to 
suppliers related to its perceived autonomy and competence to perform the 
outsourced development tasks. According to SDT (Ryan and Deci, 2000a), 
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failure to recognize competence and provide autonomy to select own 
behaviors for completion of tasks hampers intrinsic motivation.  
Behavior control, unlike outcome control, promotes dialogue 
between clients and suppliers due to the dynamic involvement of clients as 
they need to monitor and evaluate the suppliers against specified procedures 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003). As such, suppliers feel connected with 
their clients. However, due to the formal aspect of monitoring and evaluation 
in behavior control, the supplier can feel less connected to the client at an 
interpersonal level and therefore the supplier’s feeling of relatedness may not 
be fully met.  
Moreover, in behavior control, since clients evaluate their suppliers 
based on their adherence to specified procedures, it relies on extrinsically 
rewarding mechanisms. Such an emphasis limits the independence and self-
decision capability of suppliers that is inherently required for completion of 
outsourced tasks, especially in new product development (Carson, 2007). As 
behavior control involves monitoring of suppliers’ behaviors (Choudhury 
and Sabherwal, 2003), research suggests that monitoring often reduces 
autonomy and send signals of distrust (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). For 
example, Falk and Kosefeld (2006) in their principal agent game demonstrate 
that agents reduced their efforts to perform the tasks and felt less motivated 
when principal monitored their behaviors. The agents perceived controlling 
by principal as a signal of distrust and a reduction in autonomy to make their 
own choices. Overall, we expect behavior control to hinder a supplier’s 
autonomy and competence, and not completely fulfill its need for 
relatedness. Consequently, behavior control undermines the intrinsic 
motivation of a supplier and as such, we hypothesize: 
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H4: Behavior control is negatively associated with supplier’s 
intrinsic motivation. 
 
4.3.3 Clan Control, Supplier Mechanical Compliance, and Intrinsic 
Motivation 
Clan control involves socialization mechanisms that facilitate promulgation 
of shared values, norms, and beliefs between clients and suppliers (Tiwana, 
2010; Wiener, Remus, Heumann, and Mähring, 2015). Examples of such 
socialization mechanisms include social events, off-site meetings, joint 
trainings, and lunch or dinner trainings (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; 
Kirsch, 2004). These socialization mechanisms make clients and their 
suppliers to interact with each other. The client-supplier interactions allow 
clients to facilitate development of shared values, norms, and beliefs 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Wiener et al., 2015). When individuals 
share values, norms, and beliefs with their leaders, then they perform beyond 
the “mechanical compliance with the routine directives” prescribed by the 
leader (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000, pg. 153). We expect a similar behavior from a 
supplier while performing a client’s outsourced NPD tasks due to the 
common norms and values cultivated by the clan control.  
Shared values, beliefs, and norms also fosters identification, that is, 
the process by which an individual sees himself as one with another 
individual or group of individuals (Kirsch et al., 2010; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). According to SDT, identification due to internalizations of values and 
norms helps one to identify with the objectives of others (Ryan and Deci, 
2000b). Therefore, due to shared values, beliefs, and norms, a supplier also 
identifies itself as a part of the client and, as such, with the client’s objectives. 
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Such an identification helps in fostering trusting relations between a client 
and its supplier (Das and Teng, 1998; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Due to 
such trusting relations, a supplier is more willing to openly discuss its work 
with the client (Gopal and Gosain, 2010). As such, a supplier can openly 
share its ideas and opinion and therefore discuss any inputs related to 
specified outcomes and procedures without the fear of non-compliance. Clan 
control therefore does not discourage suppliers from utilizing their 
idiosyncratic knowledge and thus the following hypothesis:  
H5: Clan control is negatively associated with supplier mechanical 
compliance. 
 
Clan control, unlike outcome and behavior controls, does not rely on 
evaluation that is contingent on documented outcomes or procedures (Kirsch 
et al., 2002). Clan control rather provides a broad implicit guide related to 
acceptable behaviors. Clan control therefore provides the independence to a 
supplier to select its own behaviors (Das and Teng, 1998). Thus, the use of 
clan control by the client not only provides the autonomy to a supplier, but 
also signals a sense of confidence in supplier’s ability to carry out the 
outsourced tasks (Das and Teng, 2001; Tiwana, 2010). Clan control therefore 
enhances a supplier’s feeling of autonomy and competence.  
As clan controls also involves participation of suppliers in development 
of shared understanding and values, they promote social cohesion (Chua et 
al., 2012). In addition, the client-supplier interactions through socialization 
mechanisms also result in communication at interpersonal level (Choudhury 
and Sabherwal, 2003). A supplier therefore feels connected with its client at 
a relational level when clan control is operating. Clan control therefore 
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enhances a supplier’s feeling of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. 
According to SDT, an increase in the feeling associated with autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness help in facilitating intrinsic motivation to a 
greater degree (Ryan and Deci, 2000b). We therefore hypothesize: 
H6: Clan control is positively associated with supplier’s intrinsic 
motivation. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
4.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The buyer-supplier relationship in NPD outsourcing is the focus of this study. 
The data for hypotheses testing was gathered using a cross-sectional survey 
design. The REACH (Review and Analysis of Companies in Holland) 
database was used to find the sample for data collection. The database 
contains information of all the companies registered at the Chamber of 
Commerce in the Netherlands and provides information related to them 
(Wuyts et al., 2015). Therefore, there is less likelihood of some segment of 
the population missing out and therefore coverage bias is less likely to be an 
issue (Blair and Zinkhan, 2006). 
 The REACH database consists of both clients and supplier 
organizations. For this study, the responses on survey measures were only 
gathered from managers belonging to supplier organizations because the 
study aims to analyze the hypothesized relationships from suppliers’ 
perspective as mentioned in the introduction section. Using the two-digit 
U.S. standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, we focused on the 
following six industries because suppliers functioning in them are heavily 
involved in NPD projects: 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 30 (Rubber 
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and Miscellaneous Plastic Products), 35 (Industrial and Commercial 
Machinery and Computer Equipment), 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical 
Devices and Components, except Computer Equipment), 37 (Transportation 
Equipment), 38 (Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks 
Manufacturing).  
 Within these six industries, a list of 1502 organizations having more 
than 50 employees was used for approaching the managers in supplier 
organizations. These managers were then asked if they could think of an NPD 
project that has been completed recently and has been outsourced to them 
recently by a client organization. The recently completed outsourced NPD 
projects were solicited to prevent any survey recall issues. The number of 
supplier organizations that had been involved in an outsourced project and 
agreed to participate in the survey was 152. The survey questionnaire was 
then send to the key informants in the supplier organizations who were 
knowledgeable about the outsourced project. The response rate was 75% 
based on 114 valid responses received. The average tenure of the respondents 
was 12.61 years and the average project duration was 14.5 months. As 
suggested by Carson (2007), we made sure that the client organization that 
has outsourced the NPD project did not own any equity position in the 
supplier. 
 
4.4.2 Measures 
The survey constructs were developed using standard survey and 
psychometric scale development procedures. The items used for each 
construct were populated from existing instruments after carefully examining 
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organizational controls and intrinsic motivation literatures. Each item was 
measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale. Five management scholars 
assessed the face validity of the construct items. A pilot study with six 
product development managers was conducted to further refine and finalized 
the items and to ensure that all the items were understandable and clear. The 
questionnaire was finally administered to the full sample.  
The organizational controls literature has used various scales for the 
measurement of control constructs (e.g., Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker, 2002; 
Kirsch, 1996; Snell, 1992). Using this extant literature, the items from mature 
scales were compiled to measure outcome, behavior, and clan control. 
Outcome control consists of seven-items that are adapted from Snell (1992b), 
Kirsch (1996), Bonner et al. (2002), and Atuahene-Gima and Li (2006). 
Behavior control comprises of six-items and they are adapted from Snell 
(1992b), Bonner et al. (2002), and Carson (2007). The six-items for clan 
control are adapted from Kirsch (1996) and Kirsch et al. (2002). The 
measures for supplier mechanical compliance are self-developed but based 
on Tiwana and Keil (2007) and consists of six-items. Intrinsic motivation 
consists of five-items adapted from Van Yperen and Hagedoorn (2003).  
We controlled for relationship specific variables to ensure the 
robustness of results, namely relationship duration and previous projects. 
Respondents were requested to provide information on these variables during 
the survey. We controlled for relationship duration – the number of years the 
supplier had been working with the client- as clients and suppliers with 
relatively longer duration of relationship can influence the behavioral aspects 
of the relationship between clients and their suppliers, such as compliance 
and motivation of the suppliers (Carey, Lawson, and Krause, 2011; Chae et 
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al., 2017). Also, the number of previous projects that has been executed 
together by a client and supplier can potentially influence the relationship 
functioning as it can facilitate development of shared norms and trust (Gopal 
and Gosain, 2010; Wagner, 2012). As such, the prior working experience in 
working together can influence the supplier’s mechanical compliance to 
controls and their motivation. We, therefore, controlled for previous projects 
that a client had executed with the supplier. Appendix 4.1 contains the 
constructs with final items. Table 4.1 provides the mean, standard deviations, 
and correlations of all the variables examined in this study. 
 
4.4.3 Construct Validity and Reliability 
We performed several assessments for unidimensionality, reliability, and 
validity. First, we tested each item for normality and linearity to ensure that 
the data is consistent with the assumptions of multivariate analyses. The 
skewness and kurtosis values for all the observed items were below the 
accepted levels of 2.0 and 7.0 respectively. The Mahalanobis distance was 
also computed for possible outlier distortion. The results confirmed that there 
was no significant outlier in the data. 
Second, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
maximum likelihood with promax rotation along with confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to assess the unidimensionality of all constructs. The EFA 
analysis indicates that five factors underlie the data. All the construct items  
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loaded onto their designated construct factors with factor loadings greater 
than 0.30, the conservative cut-off level (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988; Hair 
et al., 2006). The five factors account for 68.7% of the total variance in the 
data.  
 Third, we assessed the five-factor measurement model with a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
approach in AMOS 22. The fit indices along with squared multiple 
correlation values were carefully examined to determine an inadequate item 
and model fit. The squared multiple correlation assesses the degree to which 
an observed item is useful for measuring the latent construct and its value 
should be greater than 0.30 (Kim, 2014). The squared multiple correlation 
values for all the items were greater than 0.30 except for three items of 
outcome control and one item of clan control (see Appendix 4.1). The final 
constructs with all the items are presented in Appendix 4.1. After dropping 
the items, the CFA results suggest overall good fitting measurement model 
(χ2 /df = 1.60, RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR = 0.08, CFI = 0.92, IFI = 0.92, and 
TLI = 0.90). 
The construct reliability and convergent validity of the constructs 
were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α), composite reliability (CR), and 
average variance extracted (AVE) values. Appendix  shows the Cronbach’s 
alpha, CR, and AVE values of all the constructs. All the constructs have 
Cronbach’s alpha above the desired value of 0.70. The CFA results were used 
to calculate the CR and AVE values. The CR and AVE values for all the 
constructs are above the desired level of 0.70 and 0.50 respectively, except 
for supplier mechanical compliance (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 
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2006). One item of supplier mechanical compliance did not load well on the 
construct and was therefore dropped (See Appendix 4.1).  
The discriminant validity was assessed using the following two 
methods. First, we performed chi-square test for all the constructs in pairs to 
assess if the freely estimated model performed better than the restricted 
model (i.e., correlation fixed at 1) (Bagozzi et al., 1991). A significant 
difference in the chi-square values of the restricted and free estimated model 
indicates that the two constructs are different. The chi-square differences 
were significant for all the 10 pairs. Second, we compared the square root of 
AVE for each construct with the bivariate correlation coefficients between 
the construct and another construct. A measurement model displays an 
acceptable level of discriminant validity when the value of square root of 
AVE is greater than the value of correlation coefficient between the construct 
and another construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). A shown in Table 4.1, all 
the square roots of AVE are greater than the corresponding correlation 
coefficients. Taken together, these results provide evidence for the sufficient 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of the constructs. 
 
4.4.4 Potential Biases 
We checked for common method bias as we use self-reported data from a 
single respondent for both dependent and independent variables (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). We conducted CFA with single-factor technique to assess 
potential common method bias. The fit for single-factor model (χ2 /df = 1.95, 
RMSEA = 0.09, SRMR = 0.18, CFI = 0.85, IFI = 0.86, and TLI = 0.83) was 
considerable poorer than the five-factor model (χ2 /df = 1.60, RMSEA = 0.07, 
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SRMR = 0.08, CFI = 0.92, IFI = 0.92, and TLI = 0.90). The chi-square 
difference between the single-factor and five-factor model is also significant 
(Δχ2 (9) = 107.20, p < 0.001), thereby, indicating that the measures do not 
suffer from common method bias. 
 We further assessed common method bias using marker variable 
technique (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). A marker variable is a variable that 
is theoretically unrelated to at least one variable in the study. We used 
software platform (see Appendix 4.1) as the marker variable as it is 
theoretically unrelated to the predictor variables (Tiwana, 2008). Using the 
lowest absolute correlation (r = 0.039) between the marker variable and other 
variables, the adjusted correlations for all the variables were computed. The 
correlations did not change substantially after the adjustment as can be seen 
in Table 4.1. 
 We also assessed the potential multicollinearity issues. Following 
Mason and Perreault’s (1991) suggestion, each independent variable was 
regressed on the other independent variable to detect linear relationships 
between them. The R-square values between the independent variables did 
not exceed the R-square value for the overall model, suggesting 
multicollinearity is not an issue.  
 
4.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
4.5.1 Hypothesized Effects Results 
The proposed hypotheses as shown in Figure 4.1 were examined by using 
path analysis modelling approach involving co-variance based structural 
equation modelling (SEM) with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in 
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AMOS. The hypotheses were tested using SEM approach because it allows 
to covary the independent variables that are highly correlated with each other 
and therefore helps to control for the potential multicollinearity effects. A 
single indicator was used in the path analysis for each of the constructs. The 
use of single indicator reduces the sampling error’s influence on the 
parameter estimates because it helps in minimizing the variance shared by 
the indicator of each construct (Landis et al., 2000). The fit indices values 
indicate that the model shown in Figure 4.1 fits the data very well: χ2/df = 
1.69; SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, IFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.90, and RMSEA = 0.07 
(90% confidence interval: 0.00,0.153).  
 The path estimates for the hypothesized relationships are presented 
in Table 4.2. Hypothesis 1, which examines the relationship between 
outcome control and mechanical compliance, received empirical support. 
The path coefficient for this path is significant (β = 0.235, p < 0.05). We do 
not find support for Hypothesis 2 that predicts that outcome control is 
negatively associated with intrinsic motivation. The standardized path 
coefficient for outcome control-intrinsic motivation relationship is not 
significant (β = -0.100, n.s.). The results do not support Hypotheses 3 and 4 
as the estimates of the paths leading from behavior control to mechanical 
compliance (β = 0.147, n.s.) and intrinsic motivation (β = -0.060, n.s.) are not 
significant. The results provide support for Hypotheses 5 and 6 as the path 
estimates for clan control- mechanical compliance (β = -0.304, p < 0.05) and 
clan control-intrinsic motivation (β = 0.411, p < 0.05) are significant and in 
the expected direction. 
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Table 4.2. Path analysis: Standardized Parameter Estimates 
 Standardized 
coefficient 
Proposed 
Effect 
Result 
Hypothesized Relationships    
H1: Outcome control → 
mechanical compliance 
0.235* Positive Positive 
H3: Behavior control → 
mechanical compliance 
0.147 Positive Non-
significant 
H5 Clan control → mechanical 
compliance 
- 0.304** Negative Negative 
    
H2: Outcome control → intrinsic 
motivation 
-0.100 Negative Non-
significant 
H4: Behavior control → intrinsic 
motivation 
-0.060 Negative Non-
significant 
H6: Clan control → intrinsic 
motivation 
0.411** Positive Positive 
  
Control Relationships   
Previous projects → mechanical 
compliance 
0.005 
Relationship duration → 
mechanical compliance 
0.009 
Previous projects → intrinsic 
motivation 
-0.006 
Relationship duration → intrinsic 
motivation 
-0.010 
  
Variance explained (R2) mechanical 
compliance 
0.166 
Variance explained (R2) intrinsic 
motivation 
0.123 
Notes:†p <0.10, *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001 (all two-tailed test). Significance levels are 
based on bootstrapped, bias-corrected confidence intervals. 
 
4.5.2 Post-hoc Analyses: NPD Project Performance 
A post-hoc analyses involving NPD project performance was tested to better 
understand the relationship between organizational controls and their 
behavioral consequences, supplier mechanical compliance and intrinsic 
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motivation. Therefore, the variable NPD project performance was added to 
the model shown in Figure 4.1. NPD project performance is defined here as 
the extent to which the project is successful in relation to five project 
objectives: timing, budget, quality, technical performance, and general 
satisfaction (Bonner et al., 2002; Lawson et al., 2015). For the post-hoc 
analysis, the paths of three organizational controls, supplier mechanical 
compliance and intrinsic motivation with NPD project performance were 
considered. The fit indices values indicate that the model that estimates paths 
for organizational controls-NPD project performance and supplier 
mechanical compliance-NPD project performance as shown in Figure 4.2 fits 
the data very well: χ2/df = 1.49; SRMR = 0.05, CFI = 0.90, IFI = 0.98, TLI 
= 0.97, and RMSEA = 0.05 (90% confidence interval: 0.00,0.138).  
 
Figure 4.2: Post-hoc analyses model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bootstrapping option was used to perform the path analysis. 
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric statistical method that repeatedly samples 
from the available dataset with replacement and is particularly useful for 
small samples as it helps to avoid the problems caused by asymmetric and 
Outcome control 
Behavior control 
Clan control 
Mechanical 
compliance 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
NPD project 
performance 
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non-normal sampling distributions (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). The path 
analysis results indicate that the path estimates for the relationship between 
three organizational controls and intrinsic motivation remained the same.  
The results also indicate that the path estimate for supplier mechanical 
compliance-NPD project performance is significant (β = -0.187, p < 0.05).  
Table 4.3 presents the detailed standardized coefficient estimates for the 
total, direct, and indirect effects of outcome, behavior, and clan control on 
NPD project performance via supplier mechanical compliance. The direct 
effect of outcome control on NPD project performance is not significant (β 
= -0.086, n.s.). In contrast, the indirect effect of outcome control on NPD 
project performance through supplier mechanical compliance is negative and 
significant (β = -0.044, p < 0.05), suggesting an indirect-only mediation 
(Zhao et al., 2010). The direct and indirect effects of behavior control on 
NPD project performance are not significant. Supplier mechanical 
compliance therefore does not mediate the relationship between behavior 
control and NPD project performance. Concerning clan control, the analysis 
demonstrates that the path estimates for the direct (β = 0.295, p < 0.01) and 
indirect (β = 0.057, p < 0.01) effects of clan control on NPD project 
performance via supplier mechanical compliance are positive and significant. 
As such, supplier mechanical compliance mediates the relationship between 
clan control and NPD project performance. 
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4.6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Organizational controls that are exercised by clients to direct and motivate 
suppliers to behave in a desired manner can have varied behavioral 
consequences. Using SDT, this study examines the relationship of 
organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) with their behavioral 
consequences (supplier mechanical compliance and intrinsic motivation). 
The results provide support for the assertion that outcome control increases 
mechanical compliance from suppliers, but clan control reduces supplier 
mechanical compliance. The results also show that while the intrinsic 
motivation of the suppliers is enhanced by clan control, it is not undermined 
by outcome and behavior control as often implicitly asserted in the literature. 
Post-hoc analyses reveal that mechanical compliance from suppliers have a 
direct influence on reducing NPD project performance such that while 
outcome control minimizes NPD project performance via supplier 
mechanical compliance, clan control enhances NPD project performance by 
reducing supplier mechanical compliance. Overall, this study has several 
implications for the extant literature and practice. 
 
4.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
First, the key contribution of this study to the NPD outsourcing literature is 
investigation of the relationship of organizational controls with their 
behavioral consequences using SDT. While prior control research has often 
implicitly discussed the behavioral implications of controls in outsourcing 
projects (e.g., Tiwana, 2010; Liu, 2015), the results of this study provide 
empirical insights related to these relationships. In doing so, the study 
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complements and extends the controls research in inter-organizational 
settings that has often focused on the performance consequences of 
organizational controls (Liu, 2015; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 2019). 
Second, another key contribution of this study is to empirically 
investigate the notion of compliance, suggested by Tiwana and Keil (2007), 
as one of the behavioral consequences of controls, by putting forth the term 
‘supplier mechanical compliance’. The results of this study reveal that 
outcome control facilitates mechanical compliance from suppliers. In that 
sense, the results suggest that clients who place emphasis on following 
specified outputs and evaluating suppliers based on achievement of specified 
outputs can sometimes discourage their suppliers from utilizing their own 
complementary knowledge. As such, outcome control can, at times, result in 
suppliers’ actions that are geared towards the achievement of specified 
outcomes by excluding their own idiosyncratic knowledge and better 
judgement  (Tiwana, 2008; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Clan control, on the 
other hand, attenuates mechanical compliance due to promulgation of shared 
values, norms, and understanding as that helps to create an environment 
where suppliers can openly discuss their work with the clients (Gopal and 
Gosain, 2010). Therefore, this study provide support for the notion of 
supplier mechanical compliance that represents the concept of compliance 
involving adherence to specified measures in a mechanistic manner and, as 
such, extends the relatively simple view of compliance often discussed in the 
control literature. 
The results do not provide support for the assertion that emphasizing 
behavior control is associated with supplier mechanical compliance. This is 
contrary to what is typically suggested in the literature that behavior control 
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promotes too much focus on the adherence to specified procedures as it 
involves close supervision (Ramaswami, 1996; Turner and Makhija, 2006). 
A possible explanation for the lack of support could be the way in which 
information is collected for the evaluation of specified procedures and rules. 
Even though both outcome and behavior control involve evaluation against 
specified measures, the information required for evaluation of a supplier’s 
adherence to specified outcomes and behaviors is collected through distinct 
mechanisms (Tiwana and Keil, 2009).  
The information for evaluation of outcomes can be directly gathered 
through output reports from a supplier, whereas the information for a 
supplier’s adherence to specified procedures is gathered through both process 
reports and direct monitoring (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana, 
2010). The relatively low involvement of suppliers in direct gathering of 
outputs from suppliers’ reports as compared to the high interactions between 
clients and their suppliers during collection of process reports and direct 
monitoring could make suppliers feel relatively less participative in the 
outcome control. Therefore, suppliers can perceive that they have a relatively 
lower chance of explaining the conditions associated with achievement of 
various outputs and that can result in a supplier complying with client’s 
prescriptions and not utilizing its idiosyncratic knowledge due to fear of non-
compliance. Future research, however, needs to further explore this 
explanation.  
Third, our research contributes to the body of research on controls and 
NPD outsourcing by explicitly studying the relationship between the three 
organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) and intrinsic motivation of 
suppliers. The findings do not provide support for the prediction that outcome 
Chapter 4 
 
141 
 
and behavior controls diminish suppliers’ intrinsic motivation. As such, these 
findings refine the common assertion in the control and NPD literature that 
outcome and behavior controls can thwart intrinsic motivation (e.g., Carson, 
2007; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). However, it is important to note that the 
direction of impact of outcome and behavior control on intrinsic motivation 
is negative. While future studies are needed to further understand the 
relationship of outcome and behavior control with a supplier’s intrinsic 
motivation, a possible explanation for the current findings could be that the 
negative effects of outcome and behavioral control on intrinsic motivation 
are alleviated by their positive influence on intrinsic motivation via other 
mechanisms. Weibel (2010) has also pointed out that while exercising 
controls, employing mechanisms such as participation in development of 
control mechanisms and constructive feedback can promote intrinsic 
motivation (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996; Sitkin et al., 1994).  
Finally, the post-hoc results point out that supplier mechanical 
compliance is paramount to understand the relationship of organizational 
controls with project performance in NPD outsourcing. The results show that 
when suppliers behave in a mechanistic manner that minimizes the 
performance of NPD projects. Further, the results point out that the 
mechanical compliance from suppliers because of outcome control is 
transformed into lower NPD project performance. In contrast, clan control 
improves NPD project performance by reducing supplier mechanical 
compliance. In general, the supplier mechanical compliance plays a critical 
role in influencing the project performance in NPD outsourcing. 
Overall, this study provides support for the recent discussion in the 
controls research that various controls evoke distinct behavioral responses 
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and therefore operate in fundamentally different ways on the behaviors of 
those that are subjected to them (Korsgaard et al., 2010; Sihag and Rijsdijk, 
2019). 
 
4.6.2 Managerial Implications 
For managers, our research demonstrates that they must consider behavioral 
consequences of control as they design and exercise various organizational 
controls. In particular, client managers should direct their effort towards 
addressing mechanical compliance from suppliers as that can jeopardize the 
project performance in NPD outsourcing. This study highlights that client 
managers should be careful in emphasizing compliance with the specified 
outputs as that can lead to suppliers sometimes not using their own 
idiosyncratic expertise. However, client managers should emphasize 
development of common values, norms, and understanding as that 
diminishes mechanical compliance from suppliers and also intrinsically 
motivates them to perform the outsourced NPD tasks. Studies have also 
shown that suppliers that are intrinsically motivated are willing to cooperate 
with clients above and beyond the financial benefits (Brown et al., 1995; 
Chae et al., 2017). In sum, managers should avoid mechanisms that 
reinforces suppliers’ behaviors that are not desired by the clients, such as 
mechanical compliance, and, at the same time, should employ managerial 
tools that facilitates the intrinsic motivation of the suppliers. 
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4.7 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Despite the contributions made by this study, it also has limitations that needs 
to be addressed by future research. The first limitation is that similar to other 
studies that look at client-supplier relationships in the outsourcing context 
(e.g., Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2007), this study is limited 
by a relatively small sample size. The second limitation is that we do not 
investigate the longitudinal behavioral consequences of controls as we used 
cross-sectional data for investigating our hypotheses. That is, future research 
needs to examine how behavioral responses to control changes based on the 
evolution of suppliers’ behaviors over time. It is possible that the behaviors 
of suppliers that are initially motivated by contingent rewarding can evolve 
to a point where the behaviors are finally motivated by internalization of 
values (Korsgaard et al., 2010) and that could lead to lower supplier 
mechanical compliance because of the high intrinsic motivation of the 
suppliers.  
Three possible future research areas can be explored. First, future 
research could explore whether our model and findings hold in inter-
organizational settings of other types of tasks (e.g., marketing, logistics, and 
services). Second, controllees with different motivational orientations can 
respond differently to the behavioral responses of controls (Korsgaard et al., 
2010). Future research can therefore examine the influence of different 
motivational orientation of controllees (i.e., suppliers) on our findings. Third, 
as monitoring suggests distrust and therefore undermines intrinsic motivation 
(Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), new working styles, such as flexible working and 
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virtual teams, may change the nature of monitoring (discrete vs continuous) 
and therefore intrinsic motivation of the controllees. Therefore, future 
research needs to investigate the interplay among controls, the nature of 
monitoring, and controllees’ intrinsic motivation. 
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
The overall key contribution of this study is that it examines often discussed 
but untested premises that outcome, behavior, and clan control can lead to 
varied behavioral consequences. Using SDT, the study investigates the 
influence of outcome, behavior, and clan control on supplier mechanical 
compliance and intrinsic motivation. The results shows that outcome control 
encourages suppliers to comply with a clients’ prescribed outputs such that 
the suppliers, at times, do not use their own idiosyncratic expertise, but 
behavior control does not facilitate mechanical compliance. Clan control, 
however, reduces such a compliance from suppliers. Additionally, clients’ 
use of clan control intrinsically motivates suppliers to perform the outsourced 
NPD tasks. The post-hoc analysis point out that while exercising outcome 
control can lead to lower NPD project performance as it facilitates 
mechanical compliance from suppliers, clan control enhances NPD project 
performance by reducing mechanical compliance. Overall, the findings 
suggest that clients should be careful in exercising controls to manage its 
suppliers and should try to circumscribe the potential pitfalls, if any, of 
controls. 
  
145 
CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
5.1 SYNOPSIS 
Managers exercise controls to facilitate desired behaviors from 
organizational employees and external partners in order to achieve the 
desired organizational objectives (Das and Teng, 1998; Turner and Makhija, 
2006). Even though, control research has seen a spurt in the recent past, there 
are several critical research issues in the controls literature that needs to be 
addressed, especially the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan 
control. This dissertation therefore examined what are the behavioral and 
performance consequences of outcome, behavior, and clan control? To 
address this research question, the dissertation focused on the following two 
research objectives: First, to assess the relationship between the three 
organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) and various performance 
outcomes along with their performance effects in combination, in general.  
Second, to investigate the performance and behavioral consequences of the 
three organizational controls in NPD outsourcing. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the empirical evidence 
related to the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control remains 
equivocal. These mixed findings provided a major motivation to meta-
analyze the relationship between the three organizational controls and 
performance outcomes in Chapter 2 (Study 1). Chapter 2 (Study 1) also 
examined whether and how the three controls interact with each other to 
improve the performance outcomes. Chapter 2 (Study 1) therefore 
accumulates empirical research on organizational controls—performance 
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relationships and provides insights related to research questions that are more 
closer to the general population (Combs et al., 2011; Eden, 2002).  
The findings from the meta-analytic study coupled with critical 
research gaps in the controls literature provide the basis to conduct the 
subsequent empirical studies in Chapters 3 (Study 2) and 4 (Study 3). Both 
the studies in Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the NPD outsourcing context because 
of the following reasons: (a) while flexibility is essential for the completion 
of outsourced NPD tasks, but that can be at odds with the main aim of 
outsourcing organizations to exercise controls, that is, external partners’ 
exhibiting alignment with outsourcing organizations’ needs, (b) controls can 
also have varied behavioral consequences, such as discouraging external 
partners’ sometimes from utilizing their idiosyncratic knowledge and 
inhibiting their intrinsic motivation (Grewal et al., 2013; Tiwana and Keil, 
2007). Since both effective utilization of idiosyncratic knowledge and 
intrinsic motivation are also essential for the completion of NPD tasks 
(Amabile, 1997; Carson, 2007; Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000), outsourcing 
organizations face the challenge of exercising right type of controls, and (c) 
the lack of formal managerial authority over the external partners and also 
the lack of knowledge of external partners’ processes associated with 
transformation of inputs into outputs makes the effective governance of 
outsourced tasks challenging for the outsourcing organizations (Tiwana and 
Keil, 2009). 
Chapter 3 (Study 2) focuses on supplier flexibility, which is the 
willingness of suppliers to respond flexibly to the changing requirements of 
organizations, because the outsourcing organizations depend on supplier 
flexibility to deal with evolving requirements in NPD projects (Ivens, 2005; 
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Noordewier et al., 1990). To facilitate flexible suppliers’ behaviors, the 
outsourcing organizations need both cooperation (alignment of interests) and 
coordination (alignment of actions) from suppliers (Gulati et al., 2005). As 
organizational controls have been recognized as mechanisms that facilitate 
cooperation (e.g., Turner and Makhija, 2006) and KIMs have been 
highlighted as mechanisms that facilitate coordination (De Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima, 2007), Chapter 3 investigates the influence of controls and 
KIMs on supplier flexibility. Chapter 3 also studies the influence of supplier 
flexibility on NPD project performance because increased flexibility from 
suppliers can help the outsourcing organizations to efficiently use the 
supplier resources to respond to the changes in project requirements 
(Narayanan and Narasimhan, 2014). 
Chapter 4 (Study 3) focuses on the relationship of organizational 
controls with their behavioral consequences, namely, supplier mechanical 
compliance and intrinsic motivation. Supplier mechanical compliance refers 
to the extent to which a supplier adheres to the specified prescriptions without 
sometimes using its own idiosyncratic expertise, whereas intrinsic 
motivation refers to the intent of a supplier to perform tasks for the external 
partner in order to experience satisfaction and enjoyment inherent in the task 
(Chae et al., 2017; Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Chapter 4 uses self-determination 
theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000b) to assert that 
outcome and behavior control that draw on extrinsic motivation can induce 
supplier mechanical compliance, but undermine intrinsic motivation. On the 
other hand, clan control that draws on intrinsic motivation reduces 
mechanical compliance, but enhances intrinsic motivation.  
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Overall, the results of three studies allows us to better understand the 
performance and behavioral consequences of the three organizational 
controls. The following sections provide a brief summary of the main 
findings of each individual study, the theoretical contributions made by this 
dissertation, the managerial implications of the overall findings, and a 
discussion on the limitations and directions for future research. 
 
5.2 SUMMARY of MAIN FINDINGS  
5.2.1 Findings from Chapter 2 (Study 1) 
The results reveal that outcome, behavior, and clan controls are generally 
positively related to performance, but the strength of three controls with each 
performance outcome differs partly depending on the type of performance 
outcome. The positive performance effects of the three controls did not differ 
for different types of performance data and various organizational settings 
and level of analysis. However, the effectiveness of controls varies partly 
depending of the type of task that is being controlled. The results show that 
behavior controls are more effective for tasks involving routine procedures 
and identifiable steps for each activity such as IS development and sales than 
for NPD and HRM tasks that involve higher level of complexity and a more 
diverse knowledge (Colbert, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2006). The results also 
provide support for the complementary perspective, that is, one control 
increases the effectiveness of the others.  
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5.2.2 Findings from Chapter 3 (Study 2) 
The results demonstrate that both outcome and clan controls are effective in 
fostering flexible behaviors from suppliers, but exercising behavior control 
and KIMs do not help organizations to facilitate supplier flexibility. The 
results also show that supplier flexibility is important for achieving the 
desired project performance as an increase in supplier flexibility is associated 
with high levels of NPD project performance. Post-hoc analyses reveal that 
supplier flexibility mediates the relationship of outcome and clan controls 
with NPD project performance. Concerning outcome control, the post-hoc 
analyses also show that it functions as a double-edged sword because the 
performance benefits achieved via supplier flexibility are balanced by the 
direct negative performance consequences of outcome control. 
  
5.2.3 Findings from Chapter 4 (Study 3) 
The results show that outcome control promotes supplier mechanical 
compliance, whereas behavior control is not associated with mechanical 
compliance. Clan control, on the other hand, reduces mechanical compliance 
from suppliers. Both outcome and behavior control do not have any influence 
on the intrinsic motivation of the suppliers to carry out the outsourced tasks. 
The results also demonstrate that exercising clan control is beneficial as it 
fosters intrinsic motivation in the suppliers to perform the outsourced NPD 
tasks. Additionally, post-hoc analyses suggest that NPD project performance 
is diminished by outcome control via supplier mechanical compliance, but 
clan control enhances NPD project performance by reducing mechanical 
compliance from suppliers. 
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5.3 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Each individual chapter already discusses the theoretical contributions of 
each individual study. This section therefore only discusses the overall 
theoretical contributions of this dissertation to the organizational controls, 
NPD, and outsourcing literature.  
5.3.1 Organizational Controls Literature  
This dissertation offers several key contributions to the controls literature. 
First, the traditional research on controls (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 
1979) has emphasized “singular” view of control where “singular control 
equates to a theoretical and empirical focus on one type of control” (Cardinal 
et al., 2017, pg. 25). However, contemporary research on controls suggests 
to move beyond the “singular” view of control towards the “holistic” view 
that focuses on multiple control types (Cardinal et al., 2017, 2004; Long et 
al., 2002; Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011). As all the three empirical studies 
in this dissertation theorize and empirically examine multiple types of 
controls (outcome, behavior, clan), this dissertation represents another 
crucial stepping stone in the development of “holistic” approach towards 
organizational controls (Cardinal et al., 2017). The results of Chapter 2 
(Study 3) provides support for the complementarity perspective on 
organizational controls and show that, in general, outcome, behavior and clan 
control interact to increase the efficacy of one another. However, considering 
the three way interaction between the outcome, behavior and clan control in 
Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) neither improved the model fit 
nor had a significant influence on NPD project performance.  
Chapter 5 
 
151 
 
 Although the support for the complementarity finding in meta-
analytic study was not found in the two subsequent empirical studies, but that 
does not indicate that controls do not have a complementary impact on 
performance. In fact, this incongruent result provides support for the 
previous observation of Cardinal, Sitkin, Long, and Miller (2018) that while 
examining interactions between controls is important to advance controls 
research, but interaction models only consider simpler and fewer aspects of 
controls functioning. Therefore, a configurational analyses of control is 
needed to understand how outcome, behavior, and clan control levels can be 
balanced and which controls need to be blended to exhibit the right levels 
and combinations of various control types that should be exercised for 
managing complex settings (Cardinal et al., 2017, 2010). For example, 
Kreutzer and Lechner (2010) research focusing on the combination and 
levels of controls that are needed for managing strategic initiatives needs to 
be further investigated to clarify the aforementioned issue. 
 Second, the findings of this dissertation reveal that the magnitude of 
the relationship between one control and various outcomes is either bigger or 
smaller than the other controls. Chapter 2 (Study 1) shows that the direct 
effects of outcome, behavior, and clan controls on each type of outcome (i.e., 
rational goal, adaptability, process, and human relations outcomes) differ in 
strength, depending partially on the type of outcome. The findings from 
Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) also demonstrate that the 
magnitude of the relationship between the three controls and various 
outcomes (supplier flexibility, supplier mechanical compliance, intrinsic 
motivation, and NPD project performance) varies. As such, these findings 
contribute to the controls literature by suggesting that outcome, behavior, and 
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clan controls are distinct from each other and each of them have its own 
behavioral and performance ramifications. Given that similar controls are 
also exercised in different types of tasks that span organizational boundaries 
(e.g., information systems development projects, logistics, services) or 
contexts (e.g., clients and vendors, headquarters and subsidiaries) (Brenner 
and Ambos, 2013; Saldanha, Miller, Shane Hunt, and Mello, 2014; 
Stouthuysen et al., 2012; Tiwana, 2010), future research should explore 
whether the models examined in Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 
3) also hold in different tasks and contexts. 
 The differential performance effects in the three empirical studies 
also indicate that organizational controls influence performance through 
multiple paths. In particular, the results from Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 
4 (Study 3) indicate that outcome and clan control operate through multiple 
paths to influence NPD project performance. These results therefore provide 
support for the observation made in Chapter 2 (Study 1) that there are 
different factors that act as mediators of the control-performance 
relationships. Moreover, the results related to the difference in efficacy of 
controls diverge from the traditional control literature that has emphasized 
the perspective that the feasibility of exercising controls is the determining 
factor in controls’ effectiveness (Kirsch, 1996). This feasibility perspective 
has highlighted that the three factors: outcome measurability, behavior 
observability, and knowledge of the transformation process, determine the 
effectiveness of exercising controls in a particular setting. Recent studies has, 
however, provided evidence that controls can also be exercised in settings 
with low levels of outcome measurability and behavior observability 
(Brenner and Ambos, 2013; Kreutzer et al., 2016). As such, the findings of 
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this dissertation extends this research stream by suggesting that relationship 
of organizational controls with performance is also dependent on other 
factors.  However, as suggested in Chapter 3 (Study 2), it is conceivable that 
the three feasibility factors can interact with various mediation mechanisms 
to exert differential effects on the organizational controls-performance 
relationships. Due to the complexity of modeling this phenomenon in the 
models examined in Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) along with 
small sample size, an empirical investigation on this issue could not be 
performed. Future research therefore could help to further shed light on this 
issue. 
Third, the findings of the three empirical studies suggest that the 
effectiveness of controls partly depend on the type of task that is being 
governed. In particular, the findings from all the three studies indicate that 
even though exercising behavior control generally is beneficial for achieving 
the desired performance, it does not contribute towards the achievement of 
desired NPD project performance or does not have significant behavioral 
implications in NPD tasks. Chapter 4 (Study 3) also reveals the dark side of 
the outcome control as it can discourage the supplier sometimes from using 
its own idiosyncratic knowledge to carry out the outsourced NPD tasks and 
as a result can lead to lower NPD project performance. Given this finding, 
the empirical result found out in Chapter 3 (Study 2) that outcome control 
has a direct negative influence on NPD project performance is reasonable. 
Additionally, considering that NPD tasks usually involve higher levels of 
complexity and the actions within a system usually depend on the complexity 
involved within that system (McCarthy et al., 2006), future research should 
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explore how complexity influences the effectiveness of controls in NPD 
tasks. 
  
5.3.2 New Product Development (NPD) Literature 
This dissertation also has implications for the NPD literature. A first key 
contribution of this dissertation to the NPD literature is that it provides 
insights concerning the relationship between controls and flexibility. NPD 
research suggests that flexibility is essential for accommodating the 
requirements that emerge over the course of the NPD project (e.g., Tatikonda 
and Rosenthal, 2000). However, that can be at odds with the primary 
objective of control that is following specified outputs and procedures 
(Turner and Makhija, 2006). The findings of Chapter 3 (Study 2)  shows that 
outcome and clan control facilitate supplier flexibility and provide support 
for the notion in the literature that both control and flexibility are needed for 
achieving the desired performance (Bonner et al., 2002; Tatikonda and 
Rosenthal, 2000). However, behavior control does not have any influence on 
supplier flexibility and the meta-analytic results in Chapter 2 (Study 1) also 
suggest that behavior control is generally not effective for NPD tasks. 
Further, both Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) reveal that 
outcome control can have negative behavioral and performance implications 
and therefore can also have a dark side. We encourage future research to 
explore the conditions under which each type of control facilitates supplier 
flexibility. Future research should also explore whether and how controls 
facilitate flexible behaviors in project team members for NPD tasks that are 
carried out within organizational boundaries. 
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 A second key contribution of this dissertation is that it highlights the 
importance of further increasing the understanding related to the dissimilar 
consequences of controls in the NPD context. The results of the two 
empirical studies in Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study3) demonstrate 
that the relationship of outcome, behavior, and clan control with different 
outcomes can be contrasting to each other. For example, outcome and clan 
control increases supplier flexibility, but behavior control does not have any 
effect on supplier flexibility. Similarly, outcome control increases supplier 
mechanical compliance, whereas behavior control is not associated with 
mechanical compliance and clan control reduces mechanical compliance. 
Therefore, future research should further explore the mechanisms that 
underlie the functioning of the three controls, such as learning orientation, 
effective information flows, fairness judgements (Cardinal et al., 2017; Long 
et al., 2011). 
  
5.3.3 Outsourcing Literature 
This dissertation also contributes to the outsourcing literature. The first 
contribution of this dissertation to the outsourcing research is that contrary 
to the popular opinion in the literature that clan control can be less effective 
in the outsourcing context due to the organizational culture differences 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009), the findings from 
Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 2) reveal that clan control is 
effective in governing outsourcing tasks. These findings further support the 
meta-analytic finding in Chapter 2 (Study 1) that clan control is also effective 
in inter-organizational settings. Control research has repeatedly argued that 
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it is difficult to realize the social requirements for effectively exercising clan 
control, such as detecting adherence or non-compliance with shared values 
and norms (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Future 
research therefore should focus on improving our understanding of how clan 
control is exercised in the outsourcing context and explore how social 
requirements related to the clan control are realized in the context of 
outsourcing.  
The second key contribution is that this dissertation extends the 
outsourcing literature by investigating the behavioral implications of the 
three controls in the context of outsourcing. Research investigating controls 
in the outsourcing context has mainly focused on the effectiveness of controls 
(Cardinal et al., 2017). Using SDT, Chapter 4 (Study 3) argues that outcome, 
behavior, clan control can either enhance or diminish supplier mechanical 
compliance and intrinsic motivation considering whether each type of control 
increases or decreases the feeling of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. 
The results reveal contrasting findings as outcome control can lead to 
mechanical compliance such that suppliers sometimes do not use their 
idiosyncratic knowledge for which the organization had outsourced its tasks, 
but behavior control does not facilitate supplier mechanical compliance. Clan 
control is effective in reducing such a mechanical compliance from suppliers. 
Further, the results do not provide support for the assertion that both outcome 
and behavior control destroy intrinsic motivation, but shows that exercising 
clan control is beneficial for intrinsically motivating the supplier to perform 
the outsourced tasks. Therefore, these results suggest that different controls 
can have distinct behavioral implications in the outsourcing context. Future 
research should empirically examine the direct relationship between 
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outcome, behavior, clan control and the three drivers of intrinsic motivation: 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness to provide a clearer picture related 
to the mechanisms that underlie the behavioral consequences of the 
organizational controls. 
  
5.4 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
The findings of this dissertation offer important insights for practitioners. 
First, managers should not rely on a single type of control to achieve the 
various performance outcomes in a particular context. Managers should use 
multiple types of controls to govern various tasks. The key take-away from 
all the empirical studies in this dissertation is that managers should prioritize 
those mechanisms that facilitates development of shared values, norms, and 
understanding to achieve greater performance benefits. However, this is not 
to suggest that managers should ignore those mechanisms that promotes 
benefits in exchange for work, but should exercise caution while exercising 
these controls to achieve their maximum potential.   
 Second, the findings of this dissertation suggest that managers cannot 
employ “one-size-fits” all configurational approach for managing different 
types of tasks. Managers should alter their control portfolio depending on the 
type of task that is being controlled. However, mangers can expect similar 
performance results if they exercise outcome and clan control across various 
type of tasks. Since behavior control can be less effective for tasks that 
involve high complexity and can potentially have no behavioral implications 
in tasks that span organizational boundaries, managers should be extra 
careful in exercising behavior control as they are costly to exercise. 
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 Third, and finally, the findings of this dissertation suggest that NPD 
managers can facilitate flexible behaviors in suppliers to deal with emerging 
requirement by exercising outcome and clan controls. Doing so, NPD project 
managers can effectively manage the incorporation of the requirements that 
emerge over the course of NPD projects in the outsourced NPD tasks. The 
findings also suggest that the argument that specifying outcomes and 
behaviors destroy intrinsic motivation is not entirely valid. However, NPD 
managers should be careful in using outcome control to govern outsourced 
NPD tasks because as it can sometimes influence suppliers to not use their 
own idiosyncratic knowledge and way of working.  
 
5.5 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
While each study in this dissertation discusses its own limitation, the findings 
of this dissertation should also be viewed in the light of following limitations. 
First, the cross-sectional nature of the data in Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 
4 (Study 3) limits us to make causality claims or to assess the dynamics of 
controls during the different stages of NPD projects. Future research should 
therefore conduct longitudinal and panel data studies to uncover the dynamic 
nature of organizational controls during the various stages of NPD projects. 
Second, the self-reported scales were used to capture the dependent variables 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Scholars have suggested that using objective 
scales can help in significantly reducing the issues related to single informant 
bias and, as such, is more reliable than self-reported scales (Ketokivi and 
Schroeder, 2004). Although our meta-analysis indicates that overall the 
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effectiveness of organizational controls does not vary between self-reported 
and objective (archival) data for various performance outcomes, but we still 
encourage empirical studies involving archival data. Third, the data in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were collected from respondents in the Netherlands. 
Future research could examine organizational controls in NPD outsourcing 
in other countries because cultural differences can lead to different controls 
being viewed differently by the ones over whom the controls are exercised 
(Cardinal et al., 2017). 
 In addition to addressing the aforementioned limitations, future 
research can also explore the following research areas. First, research has 
shown that risks, such as complexity and requirements risks, can also have 
an influence on the effectiveness of controls (Keil et al., 2013; Liu, 2015). 
Therefore, future research can introduce various risks in the empirical models 
that are examined in Chapter 3 (Study 2) and Chapter 4 (Study 3) to 
investigate if there is a change in the effectiveness of each control. Second, 
different types of controller-controllee relationships can influence the use of 
controls in a particular context depending on the type of interactions and 
dependence between the controller and controllee (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch and Choudhury, 2010). Therefore, future research 
can investigate how controller-controllee relationship structure influences 
the effectiveness of controls. Third, different leadership styles, such as 
transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire, can have distinct 
behavioral influences (Deluga, 1990). Given that leadership styles can also 
affect the control choices of managers (Kleine and Weißenberger, 2014), 
future research can explore the effect of leadership styles on the behavioral 
and performance implications of the organizational controls. 
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Appendix 3.1. Measurement Scales 
Construct Name Measures
  
SFL 
Outcome control 
(α = 0.79 ; CR = 
0.80; AVE = 
0.49) 
To what extent did you influence the external party by setting 
goals?  
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
• We monitored the degree to which the external party achieved 
specific goals 
0.77 
• We evaluated the external party on the degree to which it 
achieved these specified goals 
0.71 
• We strongly emphasized attaining project goals 0.80 
• We assessed the extent to which our organization adhered to 
predetermined budgets 
0.52 
• We set clear goals for the external party concerning the cycle 
time of the project 
0.65 
• We clarified which customer requirements the product should 
meeta 
- 
• We used pre-specified technical specifications as a benchmark 
for evaluationsa 
- 
   
Behavior control  
(α = 0.92 ; CR = 
0.93; AVE 
=0.73)  
 
To what extent did you control the external party project by 
specifying the procedures and processes to be followed? 
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
• We formulated detailed and comprehensive specifications for 
the procedures that the external party had to follow 
0.78 
• We specified the processes and methods by which the external 
party had to operate 
0.96 
• We monitored whether the external party operated according 
to prescribed methods 
0.89 
• Our evaluations of the external party were strongly based on 
how well they followed specified processes or procedures 
0.86 
• We strongly emphasized that the external party conducted the 
tasks according to our prescriptions 
0.76 
• We determined the actions that the external party had to take 
during the projecta 
- 
   
Clan control  
(α = 0.87 ; CR = 
0.90; AVE = 
0.60) 
 
To what extent did you try to build a sense of unity between the 
members of your organization and those of the external party? 
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
• We tried to achieve a sense of unity among the members of 
our organization and those of the external party 
0.74 
• We ensured that the members of the external party strongly 
felt part of the project 
0.80 
• We put considerable emphasis on achieving shared goals, 
values, and norms between the members of our organization 
and those of the external party 
0.64 
• There was a strong sense of common spirit between our 
organization and the external party 
0.82 
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Construct Name Measures
  
SFL 
• We tried hard to have good relations with the team members 
of the external party 
0.76 
• There was a bond of trust between our organization and the 
external party 
0.83 
   
Knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms 
(KIMs)  
(α = 0.77; CR = 
0.80; AVE = 
0.60)  
 
To what extent did the project use the following methods for 
capturing knowledge and information and communicating it 
between your organization and the external party?  
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
• Regular formal reports and memos that summarize learning 0.49 
• Formal analyses of problems in the project 0.98 
• Formal analyses of pleasant surprises within the project 0.77 
• Information-sharing meetingsa - 
• Face-to-face meetings between members of the different 
organizationsa 
- 
   
Supplier 
flexibility  
(α = 0.90; CR = 
0.90; AVE = 
0.70)  
 
How would you describe the flexibility of the external party?   
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
• They reacted flexibly in response to requests for changes 0.85 
• They were open to revising prior agreements 0.79 
• They had no problems with adapting to changes in the product 
requirements 
0.84 
• They were prepared to adjust initial agreements if this was 
required by the situation 
0.86 
• They would rather work out a new plan than hold on to the 
original agreements when an unexpected situation arosea 
 
- 
NPD project 
performance 
(Formative 
construct) 
(NA)  
 
Please indicate the level of success of the project compared to the 
project goals for the following project outcomes. (1 = much worse 
than preset goals, 4 = equal to preset goals, 7 = much better than 
present goals) 
 
• Timing - 
• Budget - 
• Quality - 
• Technical performance - 
• General satisfaction - 
   
Geographic 
proximity 
(NA) 
Was the most important contact of the external party located 
abroad or in your own country? 
0 = Abroad, 1 = Domestic 
- 
   
Previous 
projects (NA) 
How many prior projects did you execute together with this 
external party? …projects 
- 
   
Relationship 
duration (NA) 
For how many years has your organization been working together 
with the external party? …years 
- 
   
Appendices 
 
194 
 
Construct Name Measures
  
SFL 
Supplier team 
members (NA) 
How many employees of the external party worked on this project? 
… employees 
 
- 
   
Product 
component  
(NA) 
Does the ‘product’ under development concern a component of a 
larger system or an independent product? 
0 = Component, 1 = Independent product 
- 
   
Software 
platform  
(as marker 
variable) (NA) 
Was the software platform used during this project Microsoft 
Windows? 
0 = No, another platform, 1 = Yes, Microsoft Windows 
- 
Notes: SFL = Standardized factor loading, α = Cronbach’s alpha, CR = Composite reliability, AVE = 
Average variance extracted. NA = Not applicable. aThis item was deleted from further analysis 
because of its low or cross factor loading. 
 
 
Appendix 3.2. Dealing with Suppression Effect 
Conger (1974, pg. 36) notes that “a suppressor variable is defined to be a variable 
that increases the predictive validity of another variable (or set of variables) by its inclusion 
in a regression equation”. According to Tzelgov and Henik (1991), a suppression effect 
occurs because the suppressor variable has either no or very few elements in common with 
the dependent variable but it shares information with other correlated variables that is 
irrelevant to the dependent variable. To check for the suppression effect, we used the 
procedure suggested by Maassen and Bakker (2001). We analyzed different regression 
models with outcome control and each of the other four predictors of NPD project 
performance (i.e., behavior control, clan control, KIMs, and supplier flexibility). The 
analysis reveals that the negative path coefficient between outcome control and NPD project 
performance became larger and significant when each of the four antecedents were also 
included as a predictor of NPD project performance in alternative regression models. 
Therefore, the analysis suggests that when the variance in NPD project performance due to 
behavior control, clan control, KIMs, and supplier flexibility was accounted for, the 
remaining variance correlated with outcome control revealed a negative relationship 
(Cheung and Lau, 2008; Maassen and Bakker, 2001). This indicates that the other predictors 
were acting as suppressors for outcome control (the suppressed variable) in relation to NPD 
project performance (cf. Wei, Frankwick, and Nguyen 2012). 
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Appendix 4.1. Measurement Scales 
Construct Name Measures SFL 
Outcome control 
 (α = 0.84;  
CR =0.83;  
AVE = 0.56) 
To what extent did the external party influence the project by setting 
goals?   
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)  
• They monitored the degree to which our organization achieved 
specific goals 
0.82 
• They evaluated our organization on the degree to which it 
achieved these specified goals 0.87 
• They strongly emphasized attaining project goals 0.69 
• They assessed the extent to which our organization adhered to 
predetermined budgets 0.59 
• They set clear goals for our organization concerning the cycle 
time of the project - 
• They clarified which customer requirements the product should 
meeta 
- 
• They used prespecified technical specifications as a benchmark 
for evaluationsa 
 
- 
Behavior control  
(α = 0.92;  
CR =0.92;  
AVE = 0.65) 
To what extent did the external party influence the project by 
specifying the procedures and processes to be followed?  
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)  
• They formulated detailed and comprehensive specifications for 
the procedures that our organization had to follow 0.86 
• They specified the processes and methods by which our 
organization had to operate 0.92 
• They monitored whether we operated according to prescribed 
methods 0.79 
• Their evaluations of our organization were strongly based on 
how well we followed specified processes or procedures 0.80 
• They determined the actions we had to take during the project 0.68 
• They strongly emphasized that our organization conducted the 
tasks according to their prescriptions 0.78 
   
Clan control  
(α = 0.88;  
CR =0.88;  
AVE = 0.60) 
To what extent did the external party try to build a sense of unity 
between the members of your organization and those of the external 
party? Please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the 
statements below. 
 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)  
• They tried to achieve a sense of unity among the members of 
our organization and those of their organization 0.73 
• They ensured that the we strongly felt part of the project 0.73 
• They put considerable emphasis on achieving shared goals, 
values and norms between the members of our organization and 
those of their organization 
0.65 
• There was a strong sense of common spirit between the external 
party and our organization 0.81 
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Construct Name Measures SFL 
• They tried hard to have good relations with the team-members 
of our organization 0.85 
• There was a bond of trust between their organization and oursa - 
   
Supplier 
mechanical 
compliance  
(α = 0.82;  
CR = 0.84;  
AVE = 0.52) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following 
statements on how you complied with the prescriptions of the 
external party. 
 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)  
• We sometimes complied to prescriptions of the external party 
against our better judgment 0.70 
• Within this project we sometimes left our expertise unused 
because our views would not fit those of the external party 0.67 
• The external party's word was law 0.56 
• We conducted certain tasks the way the external party wanted, 
even though this was not always the most effective way 0.80 
• We were reluctant to bring forward our views because they did 
not match those of the external party - 
• We sometimes followed up instructions from the external party, 
even though we would normally go about it in a different way 0.85 
   
Intrinsic 
motivation  
(α = 0.92;  
CR =0.92;  
AVE = 0.70) 
Please indicate to what extent the members of your organization 
were intrinsically motivated for this project.   
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)   
Our employees…  
• worked on this project enthusiastically 0.87 
• enjoyed performing their tasks 0.90 
• were motivated to solve certain problems with this project 0.84 
• were completely absorbed by their work for this project 0.81 
• enjoyed the new things they learned 0.76 
   
Previous projects How many prior projects did you execute together with this external 
party? …projects 
- 
   
Relationship 
duration 
 
For how many years has your organization been working together 
with the external party? …years 
- 
   
Software platform 
(as marker 
variable) (NA) 
0 =No, another platform, 1 = Yes, Microsoft Windows - 
Notes: SFL = Standardized factor loading, α = Cronbach’s alpha, CR = Composite reliability, AVE = 
Average variance extracted. NA = Not Applicable 
aThis item was deleted from further analysis because of its low or cross factor loading 
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Summary 
Management scholars and practitioners have long acknowledged that 
organizational controls are an integral part of organizational functioning. 
Managers exercise organizational controls to direct and motivate employees 
and external partners to behave in desired ways. Even though controls have 
been recognized as an important aspect of the managers’ organizational life, 
the behavioral and performance consequences of the three commonly 
specified prototypical organizational controls (outcome, behavior, clan) 
remain equivocal. The aim of this dissertation was therefore to improve the 
understanding about what are the behavioral and performance consequences 
of outcome, behavior, and clan control. To investigate this research question, 
the dissertation focused on two research objectives.  
 The first main objective of this dissertation was to assess the 
relationship of three organizational controls and various performance 
outcomes along with their performance effects in combination. The first 
empirical study meta-analyzes the empirical evidence related to 
organizational controls-performance relationships. The study shows that 
outcome, behavior, and clan controls generally enhance performance, with 
each control having distinct relationships with various performance 
outcomes. The study also reveals that controls act as complements and that 
exercising one type of control increases the effectiveness of the others. The 
meta-analytic study also demonstrates that controls’ effectiveness depends 
partly on the task that is being controlled, in particularly for new product 
development (NPD) tasks. Further, the meta-analytic sample reveals that 
controls research on NPD projects that span organizational boundaries 
remain limited.  
The second main objective of this dissertation is to address these critical 
research gaps in the current literature. Thus, the second and third empirical 
studies focus on the use of outcome, behavior, and clan controls in NPD 
outsourcing. Those studies focus on the role of distinctive intervening 
factors, particularly supplier flexibility in the second study, and on 
mechanical compliance and intrinsic motivation in the third study. 
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The second empirical study investigates the influence of the three 
organizational controls and knowledge integration mechanisms (KIMs) on 
NPD project performance via supplier flexibility. The study focuses on both 
cooperation and coordination as both of them are needed to facilitate flexible 
behavior in external partners. Based on survey data from clients in 109 
outsourced NPD projects, the study shows that both outcome and clan 
controls are important for fostering flexible behaviors from suppliers. 
Exercising behavior control and KIMs, however, do not help organizations 
to facilitate supplier flexibility. The study also reveals that an increase in 
supplier flexibility is associated with high levels of NPD project 
performance. Post-hoc analyses, however, reveal that outcome control 
functions as a double-edged sword because it has both beneficial and adverse 
effects on NPD project performance. 
The third study examines behavioral consequences of outcome, behavior, 
and clan controls in NPD outsourcing. Using self-determination theory, the 
study posits that controls which draw on extrinsic motivation can induce 
supplier mechanical compliance and diminish intrinsic motivation. In 
contrast, controls that involve internalization of values, beliefs and norms 
reduce mechanical compliance and enhance intrinsic motivation. An 
empirical investigation based on survey data from 114 suppliers involved in 
NPD outsourcing demonstrates that outcome control promotes supplier 
mechanical compliance, but, surprisingly, does not undermine intrinsic 
motivation of the suppliers. Behavior control is neither associated with 
mechanical compliance nor intrinsic motivation. Clan control, on the other 
hand, not only reduces mechanical compliance from a supplier, but also 
fosters intrinsic motivation in the suppliers to perform the outsourced NPD 
tasks. 
Overall, this dissertation informs managers and scholars about the 
behavioral and performance consequences of exercising organizational 
controls, both, in general and NPD outsourcing.
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
Wetenschappers en professionals hebben lang erkend dat organisatorische 
controlemechanismen een integraal onderdeel zijn van het functioneren van 
organisaties. Managers zetten organisatorische controlemechanismen in om 
werknemers en externe partners te sturen en te motiveren om zich op de 
gewenste manier te gedragen. Hoewel organisatorische 
controlemechanismen worden erkend als een belangrijk aspect van het 
dagelijkse leven van managers, blijft er onduidelijkheid bestaan over de 
effecten van drie organisatorische controlemechanismen (outcome, behavior, 
clan) op gedrag en prestaties. Dit proefschrift richtte zich daarom op het 
verbeteren van ons begrip van wat de gedrags- en prestatieconsequenties zijn 
van outcome-, behavior- en clan-controlemechanismen. Om deze 
onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, heeft het proefschrift twee 
onderzoeksdoelen.  
De eerste hoofddoelstelling van dit proefschrift was het beoordelen van 
de relatie tussen drie organisatorische controlemechanismen en verschillende 
prestatie-uitkomsten. Het eerste empirische onderzoek vergelijkt het 
empirische bewijsmateriaal dat verband houdt met organisatorische 
controlemechanismen – prestatie relaties aan de hand van een meta-analyse. 
Het onderzoek laat zien dat outcome-, behavior- en clan-
controlemechanismen over het algemeen prestaties verbeteren, waarbij elke 
controlemechanisme een duidelijke relatie heeft met verschillende prestatie-
uitkomsten. Daarnaast laat het onderzoek zien dat het combineren van 
controlemechanismen de effectiviteit van elk controlemechanisme verhoogt. 
Het meta-analytische onderzoek toont ook aan dat de effectiviteit van 
controlemechanismen deels afhangt van de taak die onderworpen is aan 
controle. Dit geldt met name voor NPD-taken. Daarnaast onthult de analyse 
van de onderliggende onderzoeken dat onderzoek over controlemechanismen 
ingezet in NPD-projecten die organisatorische grenzen overschrijden beperkt 
is.  
De tweede hoofddoelstelling van dit proefschrift is om deze belangrijke 
tekortkoming in de bestaande literatuur te adresseren. De tweede en derde 
empirische studies onderzoeken daarom het gebruik van outcome-, behavior- 
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en clan-controlemechanismen bij NPD-uitbesteding. Deze onderzoeken 
richten zich op de rol van onderscheidende interveniërende factoren, 
leveranciersflexibiliteit in het tweede onderzoek, en mechanische 
compliance en intrinsieke motivatie in het derde onderzoek. 
Het tweede empirische onderzoek bestudeert de invloed van de drie 
organisatorische controlemechanismen en kennisintegratiemechanismen 
(KIM's) op de prestaties van NPD-projecten via leveranciersflexibiliteit. De 
focus ligt hierin op samenwerking als coördinatie omdat beide nodig zijn om 
flexibel gedrag bij externe partners te faciliteren. Door een survey dataset 
bestaande uit 109 NPD-projecten te analyseren, toont dit onderzoek aan dat 
zowel outcome- als clan-controlemechanismen belangrijk zijn voor het 
stimuleren van flexibel gedrag van leveranciers. Daarentegen helpt het 
inzetten van behavior-controlemechanismen en KIM's organisaties niet om 
flexibiliteit van leveranciers te faciliteren. Het onderzoek laat ook zien dat 
een toename in leveranciersflexibiliteit gepaard gaat met hoge niveaus van 
NPD-projectprestaties. Post-hoc analyse laat echter zien dat outcome-
controlemechanisme zowel gunstige als negatieve effecten heeft op de 
prestaties van NPD-projecten. 
Het derde onderzoek bestudeert gedragsconsequenties van outcome-, 
behavior- en clan-controlemechanismen bij NPD-uitbesteding. Aan de hand 
van zelfbeschikkingstheorie stelt het onderzoek dat outcome- en behavior-
controlemechanismen voor mechanische compliance van de leverancier kan 
zorgen, maar intrinsieke motivatie verdringen. Daarentegen vermindert de 
inzet van clan-controlemechanisme mechanische compliance maar verhoogt 
tegelijkertijd intrinsieke motivatie. Aan de hand van een empirisch 
onderzoek gebaseerd op een survey dataset die 114 leveranciers betrokken 
bij NPD uitbesteding betreft, laat het onderzoek zien dat outcome-
controlemechanismen de mechanische compliance van leveranciers 
bevordert maar verrassend genoeg de intrinsieke motivatie van de 
leveranciers niet ondermijnt. Behavior-controlemechanismen zij niet 
geassocieerd met mechanische compliance en intrinsieke motivatie. Het 
inzetten van clan-controlemechanismen vermindert daarentegen niet alleen 
de mechanische compliance van een leverancier, maar verhoogt ook de 
intrinsieke motivatie om de uitbestede NPD-taken uit te voeren. 
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In het geheel genomen ontwikkelt dit proefschrift belangrijke praktische 
inzichten en theoretische bijdragen over potentiële gedrags- en 
prestatieconsequenties van het inzetten van organisatorische 
controlemechanismen zowel in het algemeen als voor NPD uitbesteding.
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Organizational controls have been recognized as an important aspect of the managers’ organizational 
life. Managers exercise organizational controls to direct and motivate employees and external partners to 
behave in desired ways. The extant research on the effectiveness of outcome, behavior, and clan control 
remains equivocal. This dissertation therefore focuses on two research objectives that aims to improve 
the understanding related to the behavioral and performance consequences of outcome, behavior, 
and clan control. The first research objective was to meta-analyze the relationship between the three 
organizational controls and performance along with their performance effects in combination. The 
second research objective was to investigate the behavioral and performance consequences of the three 
organizational controls in NPD outsourcing. 
The two research objectives were met by conducting three empirical studies. The first study elucidates 
the relationships of outcome, behavior, and clan control with various performance outcomes, as well 
as that they act as complements. The second study reveals the effect of outcome, behavior, and clan 
control on supplier flexibility in NPD outsourcing, and what effect this has on NPD project performance. 
The third study examines whether the three organizational controls can influence a supplier to adhere to 
the specified prescriptions such that it sometimes does not use its own idiosyncratic expertise (supplier 
mechanical compliance), and also restrict the intrinsic motivation of the supplier in NPD outsourcing.
Collectively, this dissertation informs managers and scholars about the potential behavioral and 
performance consequences of exercising organizational controls, both, in general and NPD outsourcing.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
